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# THE X Y Z OF COMMUNISM

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THE  
X Y Z OF COMMUNISM

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BY  
ETHAN T. COLTON

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NEW YORK  
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY  
1931



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SET UP BY BROWN BROTHERS LINOTYPERS  
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“It looks as though an economic Mohammed had arisen in Lenin and that the world will have to meet his creed. . . . The question is: How are we going to meet it? The first thing is to study with care the mind and method of Communism.”

CHARLES S. BRENT.



## FOREWORD

IN a book known as *The A B C of Communism* used for world-wide instruction, two Communist authorities have set forth the objectives, principles, and formulas of that militant creed which has its present base in Russia. The co-authors are Bukharin, for long editor of the Central Communist organ in Moscow, also sometime President of the Third International; and Preobrazhensky, formerly prominent in the League of Communist Youth, a training auxiliary of the Russian Communist Party. Differences with Stalin have weakened the present political influence of both men in the Party without in any way impairing the doctrinal soundness of their book. The passages cited as chapter texts in this volume are taken from a translation published by the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1927.

The X Y Z of Communism represents an effort factually to make clear what certain main theories expounded in *The A B C of Communism* prove to involve in terms of action, when serious and resourceful believers in them obtain power and proceed to apply them in human life. The rising interest the world manifests in the practical program of the Communist rulers of Russia and their own serious purpose to secure universal adoption of the program have led me to undertake this work on my sole personal responsibility, and independently of any organization.

Their government of the peoples of Russia has now

extended over thirteen years. This is long enough for procedures to be observed beyond first superficial impressions and for results to be debited or credited directly to them. The leaders do not shirk responsibility for the régime or its consequences. While modifying or holding in suspense some points of pure theory under the pressure of realities, they do so uniformly on the confessed grounds of expediency, disavow any permanent surrender of doctrine, and maintain the methods prescribed by Marx and Lenin as a whole to be correct.

The rest of mankind therefore may with propriety examine what has taken place in the situation and what is in prospect in this incomparably largest experiment and demonstration of practical Communism. The data and commentaries that follow are submitted in the hope that they will serve usefully honest inquiry and appraisal.

My main reliance for documentation has been the official press organs of the Communist Party and of the Government and its Departments, as the most authoritative source materials on Party and Soviet policies and events. In controversial matters I have added the Communist versions of the underlying philosophy, of the ends in view, and of the measures taken. Indeed the Communists have been most consulted to supplement or reënforce my own first-hand knowledge and the riper Russian experience of my collaborators to whom I am most heavily indebted, but who under the circumstances must remain anonymous.

The cartoons from the current Russian press are introduced both for their qualities and to illustrate a Soviet publicity and educational instrument of notable effectiveness. The captions and other textual material

appearing with them are faithful translations of the originals.

Within the compass of this work examination of the full range of Communist activities obviously could not be undertaken. The spheres selected are those about which contemporary concern appears most active. The subject of recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States has been avoided by design. Familiarity with its pros and cons exists throughout the intelligent public, which divides into two camps with well-fixed ideas. Entering the lists on either side now serves chiefly to establish the partisanship of another combatant.

The use of X Y Z in the title does not presume solution of all unknown quantities in the final chapter. The only certain demonstration made in the situation thus far is that nothing about it has reached or approached a final phase. To predict how much of success and of failure will commingle in the years ahead appears idle, even foolish. If the course of events in any degree follows the nearest historical parallels a revolution of these proportions, intensity, and duration though arriving wide of the marks set must effect profound changes in the social order it would destroy and displace—changes confined by no means to the immediate geographical seat of physical disturbance. In Communist theory it is specifically taught that the class war and dictatorship period marks the first phases of the new order. The calmer and happier state lies beyond, and hence does not fall within the scope of this book. To-day's dust and deprivations of the Five Year Plan probably afford the workers and peasants the lowest actual visibility of the promised land they have experienced since the 1921-1922 famine.

The judgments expressed are those of one with respect for the sincerity, zeal, and unselfishness of the genuine Communists who have truly dedicated themselves to bringing in a better day for the masses of humanity. He holds the conviction, after contacts with Communism which coincide exactly with its period of ascendancy over the Russian masses, that its most successful challengers will be men and women with an equal concern for the material well being of the humble and dispossessed, with a superior program for establishing them in the full fellowship of human society, and with more regard for the rights of personality.

ETHAN T. COLTON.

Upper Montclair,  
New Jersey,  
January 1, 1931.

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CHAPTER I  
THE CLASS WAR

*“The class war arises out of the conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These interests are as essentially irreconcilable as are the respective interests of wolves and sheep.”*<sup>1</sup>

*“Sooner or later, notwithstanding all the wiles of the bourgeoisie, the workers will come into violent collision with the master class, will dethrone it, will destroy its robber government, and will create for themselves a new order, a Communist order of labor.”*<sup>2</sup>

*“Many persons have supposed that the ferocious character of our civil war is due to the backwardness of our country, or to some peculiar ‘Asiatic’ traits. The opponents of revolution in western Europe are in the habit of saying that ‘Asiatic Socialism’ flourishes in Russia, and that in ‘civilized’ lands a revolutionary change will be effected without atrocities. Obviously this is all nonsense. Where capitalist development is far advanced, the resistance of the bourgeoisie will be more stubborn. The intelligentsia (the professional classes, the technicians, the managing engineers, the army officers, etc.) are more strongly solidarised with capital, and are for that reason far more hostile to Communism. In such countries, therefore, the civil war will inevitably assume a more savage form than in Russia. The course of the German revolution has actually proved that the war assumes harsher forms in countries where capitalist development is farther advanced.”*<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *A B C of Communism*, p. 63.   <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.   <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 132-3.

## CHAPTER I

### THE CLASS WAR

COMPLETE loss of the trail to an understanding of present-day organized Communism results from any attempt or disposition to regard the language of its class war tenets as figures of speech. Realism admits no such interpretation but rather requires that the fullest literal content be given every sentence and word. Performance here measures up completely to book theory. Lenin, from his lifetime study and organization for revolt, believed and taught one determining reason for the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1872 to be that the resistance of the enemy class was not crushed "with sufficient determination." <sup>4</sup> The Leninized class war program of Karl Marx accordingly stipulates not only the overpowering of all opposition, but its veritable extinction. It decrees and sets up a social order in which dissolution of the remnants of the defeated classes is explicit by a process euphemistically known as "liquidation."

The members of an American Mission to Russia in 1918 asked a high Soviet official why the Russian internal issues, then being contested in bitterness and blood, could not be composed by measures of conference and agreement in which the struggling parties would give and take until a *modus vivendi* were found

<sup>4</sup> Lenin: *The State and Revolution*, published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, p. 55.

to end armed strife and allow time, education, legislation, and experience to make just settlements. The answer of this leader of Communism in action froze the uninitiated, whose "class war" concept had been formed in orthodox university courses on Socialism.

For a true picture this Communist himself needs delineation. Russian born, escaped exile of the old régime, he had lived much of his adult life in the United States. Before the war his name was on a radical ticket as candidate for the lieutenant-governorship of New York. He spoke English well, was quiet mannered, and in appearance like most of the active "comrades" quite belied the popular impression conveyed by the unknowing foreign cartoonists, who habitually draw these young to middle-aged rulers of Russia as men "going down in a sea of whiskers." He had a virile mind, a high intelligence, and faced and acknowledged ugly facts even though they scored against his case. The revolutionary cause had yielded him little except a poor living, epithets, some bricks, political imprisonment, and family separations. For himself he was content with that. Ambition in him spent itself in behalf of his class.

"You ask for negotiation and concession," he replied. "But this is war. No class ever rose above self-interest and none ever will. When the others were in power they governed for their class. Now we in power govern for ours. You think it something terrible that we execute a few thousands of men and women for trying to overthrow this workingman's government, although in a single week your soldiers killed more Germans on the Western Front and you justify it because you are at war. This is war and there will be no compromise. Either they will crush us utterly or we shall as relent-

lessly crush them. We propose either to win it all or to lose it all."

Who compose the irreconcilable "wolves and sheep" that for social justice must fight out to the death ". . . a war in which prisoners are not taken and no compromises made, but opponents are killed?"<sup>5</sup>

The bourgeoisie under Communist classification, for practical purposes, embrace all groups in society, apart from the proletariat and peasantry, who engage in economic production and distribution—conspicuously the capitalists, proprietors, employers, managers, bankers, and merchants. Most members of the legal, medical, educational, scientific, literary, and artistic professions, attached to a capitalistic order, find themselves in the "wolf" category, being regarded as supported by and supporters of the bourgeoisie. Their only alternatives in the period of struggle are unconditionally to surrender to Communism, or pay the penalties meted out to those taking any other course. The best they can hope for under a Communist rule is toleration so long as they are subserviently useful, and newly reared successors with a "safe" social outlook have not been produced to replace them. Holders of landed estates and an aristocracy, where such exist, belong to the well-hated and are promised short shrift. Along with the clergy they have no place in the Communist sun. For good measure the "urban petty bourgeoisie" are thrown in with the "enemy," specifying independent artisans, small shopkeepers, minor salaried intellectuals, and the lesser officialdom. *The A B C of Communism* dismisses these with the comment: "In reality they do not constitute a class, but a motley crowd."

The term proletariat designates the masses of work-

<sup>5</sup> Latsis: *Two Years of Struggle on the International Front*.

men in large-scale industry conceived as propertyless "wage slaves." The peasants are separately classed. For carrying class war to the villages Communists subdivide them into three categories as will appear later. Farm laborers employed for wages are proletarians. When farm enterprises develop beyond petty peasant holdings and approach the status of a small business or industry by working leased land, hiring labor, or operating a feed mill, the owners who have so far prospered and reached independence become "class enemies."

The Communist formula for open revolutionary action begins with seizure of the State by the proletariat on the theory that under bourgeois control it exists with its army and other apparatus to enforce the oppressions of the exploiters upon the workers. Preparatory thereto, will have preceded, legally or otherwise, the disaffecting and undermining of the State's protective forces, and the creation and training of trusted Communist units to act under Party orders either in civil or military capacities. With these preliminaries in order the "historic moment" is awaited for "breaking the governmental machine." \*

The Great War brought Russia to the fullness of time for these tacticians. The Communists and their sympathizers within the military and naval forces possessed both arms and training. The decrepit Czarist Government racked by the struggle of the titans fell in ruins, its throne abdicated. The huge original standing army of the Empire had been practically destroyed. Its killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing totaled 9,150,000. The forces left to the new Government consisted of millions of conscripted recruits, badly dis-

\* Lenin: *The State and Revolution*, p. 41.

ciplined and without morale. Desertions prior to January, 1917, reached 1,000,000. From June of that year everyone informed knew the German army could go through the Russian lines any time, anywhere into territory as deep as its high command deemed strategically useful. For the masses of Russia with respect both to motive and confidence the war really was over by the close of 1916. Intriguing generals completed the reduction of their commands to impotence.

The March, 1917, Revolution came at the hands of the democratic and moderate Socialist Parties committed to continuing the war and to carrying out their political, economic, and social programs, but by constitutional methods. Inexperienced in statecraft, the Provisional Government they formed lacked both direction and driving power equal to coping with the forces released. The Minister of Interior in that Cabinet has related that the office to which he succeeded was only a telephone system attended by girls.

German and Communist agents, with different objectives but acting together through the spring and summer of 1917, flooded the army ripe for demoralization with propaganda to hasten its disintegration. The former strove to force a peace; the latter, to realize Lenin's slogan, urged on Communists in all belligerent countries, "turn the imperialist war into civil war." The German military heads gave Lenin safe conduct from the Swiss border, enabling that redoubtable exile to appear in Petrograd to dig from under the existing Kerensky Cabinet its unstable support. Trotsky<sup>7</sup> gives this version of the transaction: "Ludendorff was saying to himself: 'Lenin will overthrow the patriots, and then I will strangle Lenin and his friends.' And Lenin was

<sup>7</sup> *My Life*, p. 309.



saying to himself: 'I shall pass through in Ludendorff's car, but for his service I shall pay him in my own way.'"

The Army became a vast network of debating societies in ever-rising bad temper. The Government under pressure legalized the election of officers by their units. Orders were discussed and more often rejected than obeyed. Privates took revenge on officers formerly cruel by summarily shooting them. Desertion took on the proportions of mass movement. One morning, for example, a faked newspaper with no marks to betray its propagandist origin circulated through a division of troops giving apparently official notice that on a day appointed the land of the proprietors in their gubernia would be allotted to the peasants. The sons of this Slav race in whom for generations hunger for land had gone unfed read no farther. They remained soldiers no longer. They left camp to arrive where and where the dividing was good. Millions from this largest army of the World War simply went home permanently A. W. O. L.

The "historical moment" of Communist theory had come when in a given situation a small number of disciplined loyal partisans could dominate it and emerge in possession of the ruling power. While propaganda of speech and print had been sweeping through the masses in the Army and the industries, the Communist Party (not then exceeding 25,000\* members) was being fashioned into the framework of a new State and of a new fighting force to install and defend it.

Events followed rapidly. The crucial conflict point

\* *Report of the Communist International, between the V and VI World Congress (1924-1928)*, published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, p. 495.

developed around the authority of the Provisional Government, heir to the shattered State power and machinery left by the Autocracy on the one hand, and that of the Soviet (Council) of Workmen's, Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies on the other. This latter body, skillfully organized and brought into prominence by Lenin, had as its nucleus a restored Workmen's Soviet that had functioned in the ill-fated revolutionary attempt of 1905. The militant instructed rank and file forces of the rising Soviet power came from "factory committees" out of the larger plants—mostly Communists or thoroughly impregnated allies. By virtue of better leadership and greater energy, these came to be the ostensible spokesmen for the Trade Unions and the unorganized industrial masses. The Soviet organizers reached out also to the Army units. They brought in deputies from the soldier committees who were for ending the foreign war and could be stirred into discontent with the slowness of the Provisional Government in giving effect to the standing promises of the older revolutionary parties. In undermining the old régime, party agitators had promised the factories to the workers and the land to the peasants. Many of the Workmen's and Soldiers' deputies were peasant in fact or origin. The plotters succeeded also in establishing liaison with the Soviet of the Peasants, which for a time had held out as an independent body, but came finally to associate itself with the more aggressive body of workmen and soldiers, engineered by the Communist inner organization.

The first measures of the consolidated Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviets were large obstructive. The Provisional Government's progress was blocked by strikes, passive resistance, violent denunciation, and

scorn. Next, demand was made and won that Government decrees must be validated by the Soviet. This concession threw all official proposals into endless debate. The aim to paralyze the Government succeeded. Followed the slogan "All power to the Soviets" on the platform, "Peace, Bread, and Land." Realistically it meant: Throw out the Provisional Government; end the war; use the railroads to feed the city population then in year-long bread lines; dispossess the landlords without legal formalities or delay. The Government's counter-appeal of loyalty to the Allies, calling for further sacrifices and suffering for the war, and promising orderly land distribution by laws still to be enacted by a Parliament under a constitution not yet come into existence, could not stay execution of the elemental human demands in the situation astutely manipulated by perfect masters of agitation.

Internal conditions neared a military phase by the end of the summer of 1917. Troops at the capital and other strategic centers had been won by the Soviet either to open espousal of their demands or to passive acceptance of them. Right as well as Left disloyalty reared its head. A counter-revolutionary movement led by General Korniloff, though blocked, seriously weakened the Government's position. When the Government moved to bring in supposedly loyal units to uphold its authority against the Communists, fraternizing soldier emissaries of the Soviet were able to halt their march outside Petrograd, while the Soviet's supporting forces seized the means of communication and transport, assumed military command, proclaimed to the people overthrow of the Provisional Government, and established its own administration at Smolny Institute. The helpless officials of the fallen Government fled.

Two weeks later Moscow passed into Soviet hands after a not very sanguinary struggle, and progressively the other centers and regions, until the populations under the new rule included all those of the former Empire save the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Bessarabians. These had been carved off by treaty agreements or by force.

The several prescriptions of the Communist revolutionary formula, fulfilled up to this period, were the organization and preparation of the Party legally or otherwise for its opportunity; capitalization of the ripe opportunity to foment unrest and disorder; reconciliation or indifference of the masses to the Party's program of seizing the power; possession of the State apparatus; and the institution of an armed dictatorship.

A Constituent Assembly, provided for by the Provisional Government and actually elected during the last weeks of the latter's existence, remained to be disposed of. The vote had resulted in the choice of a great preponderance of moderate Socialists, a few Communist and other small party minorities. The dissolution of this body at its first day's meeting in January, 1918, by Soviet force gave the *coup de grace* to Russian democratic hopes and procedures for the lifetime of the newly asserted and Communist controlled régime.

The peace quickly negotiated with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk by the Communist leaders enabled them to deal with the issues on the domestic "front." The "Red Guard," improvised under Trotsky as the emergency force to hold the power and to press the fighting against organized opposition still in the field, became the nucleus of a new Army that grew to strength with unexpected rapidity. Though without

military background or training, this dashing revolutionist recruited and directed forces that in two years against great odds cleared the vast Russian territories of all armed enemies including those of strong intervening foreign powers. In the early stages sailors from the fleets and certain Lettish units salvaged from the wreck of the once great Imperial forces proved dependable and capable. Many old régime officers volunteered or were impressed into the service. Assignment over them of Communist civilians, man for man with authority superior to that of the officers, held in check any counter-revolutionary desires that otherwise might have been realized.

To recite the several military movements of the Russian civil war period precipitated by this Communist, or October (November) Revolution as it is sometimes called would deflect the main account from its course. It would serve chiefly to illustrate that, when Communists go to war to gain their objectives and meet armed opposition, blood flows and all the other attendants on real war follow. It was war at its worst. Much of the factual materials remain in partisan hands but it is well enough established that both "Whites" and "Reds" freely violated recognized rules of warfare. The impartial history when written will be burdened with the records of acts such as only hate and desperation inspire—hostages, tortures, reprisals in kind, and wholesale executions, along with the exhibition of the highest courage and devotion, notably by the young.

But the end of military resistance in the class war of Communists affords no footing for peace. The "war" then has only begun. The "struggle," to employ their own language, "has never been interrupted and has never been stilled." It is characteristically pressed

in the political, economic, and social spheres with increased momentum and spread, until in truth every area of life has become one of combat. The class enemies not only have to be defeated but "crushed"—rendered permanently impotent.

The master tool of the class war set up at the onset of internal resistance was the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage—the notorious and terrible "Cheka," which was established on December 20, 1917, and the powers and acts of which left no single individual in Russia, outside the ruling coterie, with a sense of security. This organ was given authority to arrest, imprison, judge, and execute without warrant or trial. With deliberation it singled out the natural leaders of the enemy classes and cut them down, often regardless of the committal of overt acts. Suspected persons could be found guilty of "unconscious counter-revolution." This process carried out systematically during the first years of Communist rule took terrible toll from the intelligence, culture, and executive experience of the nation. After the assassination of Uritzsky, a chief Petrograd Communist, and the attempt against the life of Lenin in Moscow September 1, 1918, the complete unleashing of the Terror multiplied arrests and executions until devastating fear fell on all the land. The counter-revolutionary movements of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch, and Wrangel served to prolong the agony and to increase victims. It is doubtful if any contemporary Russian ever can pronounce "Cheka" unemotionally or pass its headquarters on the Lubyanka in Moscow without a shudder.

The total of lives so sacrificed will long remain in dispute; if ever known. With the "Cheka" mill grinding gruesomely in every administrative seat across

Russia in such a time of fury and disorder, nothing better than a surmise can be made of some fraction of the total human grist that got upon the official records. Latsis, a member of the Collegium of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, in his book, *Two Years of Struggle on the International Front*, issued by the Government Publishing House in 1920, states "In Petrograd alone as many as 500 persons were shot as an answer to the shots fired at comrades Lenin and Uritzsky." *Izvestia*<sup>o</sup> published these figures for 1918-1919 but left of those seized 7,575 not accounted for:

Arrests by the Cheka—1918 .....	47,348
"    "    "    "    1919 .....	80,662
	128,010
Disposition made of arrested persons:	
Released .....	47,167
Hostages .....	9,793
Sent to Concentration Camps (Exiles) ....	14,506
Jailed .....	36,267
Sentenced to compulsory work .....	5,630
Shot for Counter-Revolution .....	7,072

Its successor, the Unified State Political Administration (O. G. P. U.) has perfected the system of Terror under somewhat rearranged powers and remains almighty to detect and instantly suppress on the spot any slightest counteraction. The spying on which it thrives penetrates every organization, village, and apartment. No one dares wholly trust anybody. The network of its units guards every point of vantage and the key personalities. They are numerous enough to constitute the shock troops of any emergent military

<sup>o</sup> February 6, 1920.

situation. They suppress the peasant uprisings against grain seizures where the regular troops cannot be depended upon to shoot. They hold as pawns the peace, liberty, and life of every Soviet citizen.

Steinberg, Left Socialist Revolutionary and Commissar of Justice in an early Soviet Cabinet and later himself an exile, has undertaken to reduce to language the nature of the Terror which the old "Cheka" generated and the O. G. P. U. perpetuates:<sup>10</sup>

"Terror is not an incidental act, nor an accidental expression of governmental displeasure, however frequently repeated. Terror is a system of violence, ever ready to punish from above. It is a system of instilling fear, of compulsion, of mass destruction elevated to the status of law. Terror is a heavy curtain woven of suspicion, of maliciousness, and vengeance."

Of its consequences he says:

"All the psychologic elements of a régime of force and inequality manifest themselves in the atmosphere of fear engendered by terror. On one side we have intoxication with power and a realization that anything done by him who wields power will go unpunished, and on the other—fear, depression, silent hatred, and sycophancy, the rise of two classes: masters and slaves. In turn, the relations among the subjects themselves become perverted. In the struggle to win the favor of the authorities, treachery assumes appalling dimensions. All become slaves with respect to the government, and wolves with respect to one another."

Lenin<sup>11</sup> made "throwing off the bourgeoisie and a complete abolition of the same . . . the main issue"

<sup>10</sup> *New York Times*, February 23, 1930.

<sup>11</sup> *The State and Revolution*, pp. 45-6.



in revolutionary theory. Russian experience has served to lift the phrase out of academic terms. The threat against the bourgeoisie has been fulfilled. From the outset the new ruling caste has directed against them a mud stream of revilement. "Bourgeois" became an epithet of contempt and abuse. In the larger cities its bearer in the first stormy months lost the most elementary physical protection. Appearance on the street with a white collar, hat, fur, or other touch of taste or finery marked the wearer for verbal insult that not infrequently went on to bodily maltreatment. Overcoats were lifted from their owners by irresponsible armed soldiers and sailors wandering somewhere or nowhere in particular between their deserted lines and home. For a time the newly created outcasts were unemployable officially except for tasks of drudgery and dirt. Many jailers made a favorite sport of assigning to the most refined women prisoners the heaviest labor tasks or the cleaning of latrines, reminding them of the reversal of order society had undergone.

Economic ruin as complete as social degradation followed and remains so. The individual survivors among this dispossessed and hounded class constitute a pitiable remnant in Soviet life. They exist through uncertain employment on sufferance and the sale of such belongings as expropriation and time may have left them. Their children help make up the underprivileged in school and college, simply for their non-proletarian origin. They continue handicapped in employability and on beyond to the end of life. Specialists indispensable to the State owned and controlled industries, for the time, receive economic toleration, knowing they will be thrown to their fate the day they can be re-

placed by experts without bourgeois taint though often less well qualified.

The New Economic Policy of 1921 temporarily restored enough private trading rights to afford precarious footing for "Nepmen." How precarious, this bit of finesse described by a high authority<sup>12</sup> suggests:

"We ourselves freed the Nepmen and at the same time set up the Commissariat of Internal Trade which determines market prices. We ourselves permit the bourgeoisie to start small factories employing no more than fifty hired workers, and at the same time organize strikes against them with the help of the Trade Unions. That is all due to the fact that we are in power. From the ranks of our Party we have appointed chairmen of Trusts, Trade Union officials, provincial procurators, and chairmen of Provincial Executive Committees, whom, if the necessity arises, our procurators may bring to trial."

Thus traders and employers led a semi-criminal life, ground between discriminatory taxes, denial of credit, and other disabilities and bearing a name of the lowest ill-repute. Later legislation and administrative acts loaded them with ever weightier handicaps. Yet some stay a little longer in the race against impossible odds, vanishing members of the once honorable calling of merchandising. Hundreds of thousands of Jewish shopkeepers swell the number of penniless and helpless declassed victims, for whom their more favored brethren of "capitalist" lands give millions of dollars to afford them a fresh start for life on the Russian land.

Impoverishment and degradation to this *n*th degree required drastic measures. The Communist repertoire contained them. All land, factories, institutional build-

<sup>12</sup> Zinoviev: *Russia's Path to Communism*, pp. 39-40.

ings, apartments, and residences except the most humble were nationalized and every private right in them extinguished. All liquid wealth, public and private, went the same road, including banks and private deposits. For a period one's own cash in small sums could be drawn under surveillance on the signed order of a Soviet official, if allowable uses to be made of it were first established. Shortly the balances were expropriated, and were not recompensed when the new State banking system became operative. Early seizure of all safety deposit boxes and private vaults took place, the contents permanently sequestered. Domestic securities of every description were declared invalid.

With private trade forbidden, former owners if possible emptied their stores and secreted the goods. Vacated shops, locked and boarded up, lined the city streets. A few continued open under semi-nationalized administration. Most of the meager supply of goods for consumption exchanged hands the first years by bootlegging. Industrial plants taken over by the workmen and run by shop committees functioned hectically until brought to a standstill one by one from ignorance, confusion, exhaustion of raw materials, absence of cash, and credit, a dead market, or by a combination of these "infantile diseases of Communism" as Lenin called them.

The employees dismissed at will owners and managers of hotels, baths, hospitals, and other public institutions and administered them through their own constituted soviet of cooks, janitors, and other proletarians in the establishment. Some universities experienced the ruling ascendancy of the "workers," who reorganized curricula and admitted students regardless of age, literacy, or other qualifying standards. Recalcitrant

individuals found themselves "sitting" in prison if not facing a firing squad. The "Cheka" held non-coöperative, conspiring or obstructionist officials to be saboteurs of whom Latsis wrote in 1920: <sup>13</sup> "There is but one way to get rid of this pestilence—burn it out with a hot iron. And that is what the Executive Committee (of the Extraordinary Commission) is doing."

That remark dates 1920 but in 1929 the "hot iron" still worked at "burning out pestilences." Paul Miliukoff, Foreign Minister in the first Cabinet of the Provisional Government, addressing the French Chamber of Deputies in January, 1930, <sup>14</sup> stated that official figures, which he regarded incomplete, found in the Soviet press during October and November of the preceding year, accounted for 246 executions. The offenses expiated by the death penalty reveal even more than the numbers:

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While Communist theory holds that the intellectuals do not constitute a distinct class, but do the will of such a class, capitalist or proletarian, as gives them means of livelihood, the Russian intelligentsia have found the class war meaningful for them. After the first onslaught the Communist leaders have tried to test each individual intellectual to determine whether he was a servant of the bourgeoisie or of the proletariat, and to deal with him accordingly. This explains

<sup>13</sup> *Two Years of Struggle on the International Front.*

<sup>14</sup> *New York Times*, February 23, 1930.

in part the zigzag policy toward the intellectuals, now suspending the class war principle, now applying it.

The overwhelming majority of Russian intellectuals at the outset of the March, 1917, Revolution threw in their lot with the Provisional Government. In fact as the real leaders of that Revolution they created this Government and, when in October following it was overthrown by the Communist coup, they organized a short-lived attempt to sabotage all the activities of the incoming régime. The effort and failure gave the Communists a powerful weapon against the intellectuals, and for many years a typical campaign of propaganda was waged to fasten on them the charge that, as a social group, they were inimical to the Soviet régime and against the workers' and peasants' cause. Than the latter, no charge more unjust could be invented for intellectuals in defense of the interests of the workmen and peasantry had made up the major opposition force to the Czarist Government. The deposit left by the propaganda persisted to plague the maligners. When a genuine need and desire to make friends with the intellectuals overtook them, the Communists had the embarrassing legacy from the earlier years of denunciation to cope with in the mind of the masses.

The sabotage movement of the intellectuals precipitated the intention on the part of the Communist leaders to eliminate them entirely from all State and social activities. It soon became apparent however in a country with a majority population illiterate that another group of people to replace the discredited intellectuals could not be found ready to hand. Trotsky as War Commissar saw first the necessity of getting coöperation from the professionals. After several battles in the Party inner board of strategy, he secured permission

to invite former officers of the Russian Army to commanding posts in the Red Army. Gradually, the economic, cultural, and State institutions also called in intellectuals.

Lenin too recognized the important rôle of intellectuals, especially as the country entered the reconstructive stage. He evidenced it by arranging for increased food rations for university professors and prominent representatives of theoretical and applied science. With failing health he lost actual control of affairs early in 1922 before his more liberal policy became fully effective.

Among his successors old wounds had not healed. They did not at this point share their chief's point of view. They determined to single out those intellectuals whose ideology could not be changed in favor of the Soviet régime, and to dissect them from the social body by deportation, exile, and death—either outright or through depriving them of a living. They dispersed the leaders of the idealistic school of thought as dangerous to the materialistic doctrine disseminated by themselves. Liberal deportations of university professors and several outstanding philosophers substantially accomplished this. Local authorities received instructions to "liquidate" those intellectuals in their respective districts known to have held important positions in the pre-revolutionary time or to have been close to the Czarist or to the Kerensky régime. In this drive they further searched out and condemned more or less noted members of the Constitutional Democrat and other non-Communist parties, many of whom were shot or deported.

With this destructive work well advanced, the authorities entered cautiously upon what they considered

a constructive plan to organize intellectuals favorable to the Soviet régime. The general theoretical policy of the Party toward them might be thus formulated: "We need the intellectuals and their coöperation, as we cannot proceed in our reconstructive work without them. We think though that the generation of them inherited from the Czarist régime will never become wholehearted supporters of the Soviet policy. Accordingly as we use them we exercise a strict control over their activities, and in the meantime hurriedly prepare a new generation indoctrinated with our ideas and considering us their natural masters."

The proclamation of the New Economic Policy in 1921 attended by a general weakening of the communistic extremities gave overrated promise of a golden era in the relations between the Communist Party and the non-Party intellectuals. It proved to signify a temporary tactical retreat only with no notion to discontinue basic work in the direction of complete socialization. When this era of rapprochement with the intellectuals was at its height, the Communists did not go farther than take the intellectuals on probation allowing them while performing assigned work to prove themselves trustworthy for the future.

Comporting with their conception that intellectuals have no class characteristics, the Communists took energetic steps to mold them by quite the standard methods. They organized them into Unions completely controlled by the Party. So far as possible Communist cells were organized in universities, scientific institutions, and headquarters of economic and industrial organizations where the personnel was predominantly intellectual. Writers, musicians, and artists also were formed into these Communist controlled Unions. Com-

munists appointed to governing boards supervised the work of theaters, museums, and academies of art.

The tactlessness of the lesser Communist authorities considerably foiled the otherwise ingenious harnessing up of the intellectuals. Though it was repeatedly promised that whoever accepted loyally the Soviet régime and faithfully served it would be guaranteed his position, slight pains were taken to conceal the ultimate aim of ridding the system of the existing generation of intellectuals and replacing them by Communists. Zinoviev at the height of his great power referred to the existing professorial group as "manure for the proletarian culture." With this attitude widely understood local officials speeded up replacement of the old intellectuals by new people, hoping to win commendation from the leaders at the center for a prompt execution of the program.

Within the heterogeneous mass of the Russian intelligentsia different schools of conduct toward the régime gradually emerged under the pressures, far from being clear and outstanding, yet with their main lines easily traceable. The majority, by the time of the proclamation of the New Economic Policy in 1921, had reached the conclusion that the Communists would rule Russia for a considerable period of time and, as the extremes of war-Communism seemed relinquished, they prepared sincerely to work with the Government on a non-political program. A numerically smaller group while not giving up hope of a political change considered themselves strictly apolitical and were ready to yield their services to the only employer of their talents left—the State. A still smaller group stubbornly persisted in their contention that the régime was a curse upon Russia and would not be complacent while it



held power. The little group of Communist intellectuals (under the conditions highly influential) filled in the picture—members of the Party and persons outside yet unreservedly supporting its aims and policies.

A fresh and prolonged conflict in the relationships between the Government and the Russian intellectuals developed around the struggle between the Communist contingent and the die-hard group hostile to the régime—a strife in which the indecisive and oscillating body of the intelligentsia had a large stake. The strategic positions of the contending forces have been most unequal yet the contest goes on. The Communist group possesses the powerful backing of the State and Party machinery with both punitive and compensatory measures at command. They have freedom of speech, freedom of organization, the entire press of the country at their disposal. The others present the front of disorganized and hunted individuals, their very ideas subject to punishment and extermination and their activities illegal and intolerable to the State. They have no rights of organization, no press, nor freedom of speech. Their chief advantage has lain in the dilemma and blunders of the Communists.

The issue grew acute in the domain of national economy, where the intellectuals holding positions in economic and industrial institutions were most sensitive to the “replacement experiments” of the Communist leaders. Also the increasing importance of intellectuals in various branches of government service engendered criticism from rank and file Communists, who found the positions they acquired in the first days of the October Revolution threatened by the higher qualifications of the intellectuals. The Left opposition in the Party, headed by Trotsky, charged that the

Soviet administrative machinery was being turned over to non-Party intellectuals who distorted its "class face." The appearance of the first "Red intellectuals," by this time became another important factor. They began emerging from universities and the special Communist educational institutions that had been numerous established. The leaders thought a general offensive against the old intelligentsia could be launched with the quota of their own hand-reared intellectuals already produced.

The offensive as usual was unnecessarily ruthless for the end in view. Its practical application went quite beyond the original aims. The attack opened in full force with the full complement of Communist warfare in action.

The O. G. P. U. was instructed to frame up several flagrant cases of "economic counter-revolution and treason." The Trade Unions were ordered immediately to classify the intellectuals within their ranks into groups of enemies, neutrals, and friends. The proletarian organizations of writers, musicians, actors, sculptors, and artists were strengthened, and creations of bourgeois intellectuals barred from publication, exhibition, or performance. The several sensationally staged trials, such as the Shakhta case and those of engineers in Leningrad and other centers, together with the shooting of several prominent engineers in the Navy and other Departments (which may have had certain provocation) were exaggerated to the extreme and given most abnormal publicity to prove the existence of inimical forces within the Russian intelligentsia, and to demonstrate that the Government was not shrinking from the severest capital methods of extermination.

Discoveries of new "counter-revolutionary plots" among the specialists and research workers continued. A highly sensational one was brought to light late in 1930 involving eminent engineering and other specialists. The trial was calculated to reconcile the people to the hardships of the Five Year Plan and to prepare them for the sterner disciplines that followed. Granting that the alleged importance usually represented exaggeration for political reasons such as to terrorize hesitant specialists, evidently there remained among this personnel elements entirely alien to the Soviet system and often inimical.

Political considerations in this area undoubtedly influenced the use of foreign experts, large numbers of whom have been imported—several hundred from the United States alone. Besides bringing the most modern technical methods, they are strangers to Russian political life, are almost completely isolated by lack of knowledge of the Russian language, devote themselves exclusively to their work, and can more easily be kept under observation. The employment of them in increasing numbers naturally created resentment among Russian engineers especially in view of the extremely privileged treatment accorded them by the Government. Foreign specialists in several cases exposed inefficiency and "counter-revolutionary" activity.

Under the Five Year Plan (October 1, 1928-1933) for developing the national economy and socializing agriculture, the leaders reached the place of demanding that every engineer and technician of the Soviet Union be an active sympathizer of the régime. "The former 'non-Party' neutral attitude of technicians," declared the newspaper *For Industrialization* in an article published February 13, 1930, "became impos-

sible and unbearable under the conditions of socialistic reconstruction." Rykov, then Soviet Premier, at the convention of engineers and research workers of the Moscow district the same month elaborated the position.

The Premier regarded the "neutrals" as by far the largest numerically among the three groups of technical experts into which they then divided—the others being decided enemies or active supporters. Three lines of action followed the agitation, first fighting the enemies. *For Industrialization* urged as the prerequisite of the fight of the Communist Party to win the "middle" group of specialists "a ruthless war against those engaged in harmful activities," stating that, out of the total number of persons tried or brought to trial in connection with injuries to metal, gold, platinum, and military industries and transportation, 89 per cent were engineers and technicians.

Not to rely upon terrorizing alone or chiefly to meet the situation, the Government promised the alleviation and improvement of existing conditions for engineering and technical personnel. The execution of these promises presented extreme difficulties. Improving their material conditions called for the expenditure of funds not available. The creation of a more sympathetic attitude toward engineers on the part of the workers could advance little with a simultaneous offensive campaign progressing against certain groups of that profession. The general position taken by the press and Soviet public opinion that the only radical solution of the problem was the rapid preparation of new pro-Soviet technical personnel likewise operated then as now against the rapprochement with non-Party specialists.

Meanwhile the high-pressure drive, demanded by the belligerent newspaper organ<sup>15</sup> for the preparation of a completely proletarian technical personnel, went forward. The Russian Academy of Sciences, one of the largest and best known institutions of its kind in the world, afforded an example of communization in the field of pure learning and research. For ten years the Academy succeeded in retaining its freedom to elect new academicians and, to an extent, its internal autonomy in matters scientific, due measurably to the wise discretion of the eminent executive secretary whose policy had yielded certain points to the Communists without sacrificing the basic structure of the Academy.

This strategy failed finally to protect the institution's scientific integrity. Professor Oldenburg was discharged and the Academy so remodeled as to leave its old constitution scarcely recognizable. Early in 1928 it was announced that the Academy of Sciences insufficiently represented the scientific tendencies of Soviet Russia and a date was fixed for the election of new academicians. A large number of candidates were brought forward. In the first election the voting academicians declined to admit to their ranks every Communist designated by the Government, but the screws of political pressure exerted at a reëlection some weeks later forced in every inspired nomination. The famous Russian physiologist, Pavlov, chilled somewhat the joy of this fresh "triumph" by the statement that his foot would never cross the threshold of the Academy in its present state.

Another characteristic event of the sort took place in the field of art, the famous dislodgment of Mr. Golovanov, gifted orchestra conductor of the Moscow

<sup>15</sup> *For Industrialization*, February 13, 1930.

Grand Opera. He had refused to participate in the Trade Union activities of the Opera House and did not conceal his unfavorable opinions of the Administration. An organized campaign against both his political convictions and musical achievements ensued. Finally the authorities announced that they would not permit any concert with his participation and that every honest citizen should be ashamed to listen to an orchestra which he conducted.

The great Russian actor, Kuznetzov of the Moscow Little State Theater, became another sacrifice. Mr. Kuznetzov and many other noted Russian actors had conferred on them the degree of "People's Artist"—the highest honorary award in Soviet Art. At a given signal several newspapers turned their guns against him on the ground that he was not worthy of the honor, not being a Soviet sympathizer. Out of the furor a general decision issued to revise all "People's Artist" awards to leave them only with those actors and musicians whose political convictions were *en rapport* with the Government.


The old intellectuals who live on continue, to the official mind, the most suspected and most unreliable in Communism's jurisdiction. To sum up the total of their vicissitudes, except for those equipped scientifically to lend themselves to the development of the national economy, they have fared badly—barely better than the bourgeoisie. Whatever better lot some enjoyed came from their indispensability. All their possessions in the nature of surplus wealth including homes were expropriated. In the rationing period they fell into one of the lower categories. Moscow University professors in the winter of 1921-1922 were apportioned supplies that would require three rations to

nourish one person moderately. In January they went on strike for having received no deliveries since the preceding October. That condition had famine time as partially causal yet with the restoration of salaries and wages under the NEP a janitor's income exceeded that of a full professor as late as 1924.

In 1923 the American Section of European Student Relief found Leningrad professors receiving an average monthly salary of \$26.00, the families averaging four persons in number and the purchasing power of a dollar in Russia not appreciably greater than outside. It meant for them no purchase of clothing, little heating, food far below the health level, at least one ailing member per household, and medication beyond reach. Odessa in 1924 had 420 professors and family members availing themselves of a relief service daily meal. They paid \$4.50 a month. Fifty others received the meal free. Of twenty-one doing work in the kitchen all save two were wives, sons, or daughters of professors—members of the Servants' Union. Hundreds of professorships in the country were either abolished outright or vacated until Marxists could be found or raised up to occupy them. Some of these were the chairs of ancient and modern history, philosophy, economics, political science, and law. A new code wiped out entirely the footing of the former legal professionals along with most of the laws they knew and practiced.

The fate of the surviving Russians of this status presents "liquidation" about at its worst. The active enemies, real and fancied, who fell before firing squads or froze and starved in the Arctic exile camps fared better. The cup they drank held less of mental suffering. These others, though told often enough to hurry in dying, perish slowly in the system designed to de-

stroy their kind. They made the Revolution possible. Their sacrifice calls up Trotsky's grim bit of philosophizing on the cost of epochal changes—"it is . . . victims that move humanity forward."<sup>16</sup>



STALINS PIPE  
Трубка Сталина.

Pravda.

Communist theory was seen to call for class war among the peasants also. In Russia they were last to experience all its realities. In 1929 the assault with devastating force fell upon the rural population known as kulaks (a term of contempt, in the singular meaning "fist"). Russian farmers were first thus designated who leased land beyond their allotment, employed labor, rented out their horse power or machinery for a con-

<sup>16</sup> Trotsky: *My Life*, published by Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, p. 580.



sideration, or owned a mill. It has become the epithet attached to any peasant who desires to farm independently and dispose of his crop most advantageously, whether or not that be to the State grain collecting station. The actual financial position of a legally defined kulak is reflected in the fiscal law of 1928, which placed in that category, by the tax collector's assessment, a peasant producer of not less than \$250 worth of food-stuffs annually, all told, after about ten dollars per head had been deducted for food. The average value of a kulak family's means of production including live stock has been estimated at about \$700.<sup>17</sup> As Russian peasant possessions are reckoned this status represented affluence. In actual administration of the law super-taxation aimed at the kulaks struck with severity peasant property levels much below these figures.

Delay in fomenting "class war in the village" was enforced strategy. Zinoviev<sup>18</sup> pointed out to a Party gathering in 1925 the existence of peasant "class enemies" and that their attitude and behavior constituted class war on their part. "We cannot at present," he said, "advocate kindling class war, but we must clearly recognize that class war is actually going on in the villages. The class war exists. A 4% kulak population is far more dangerous in the villages than the Nepman is in the towns, because the kulak is very frequently the master of the minds in the village; and his economic power is comparatively more dangerous and his influence larger in the village than the Nepman's in the town. We must recognize that class war exists, but we cannot at present issue the slogan of class war."

<sup>17</sup> Walter Duranty: *New York Times*, February 3, 1930.

<sup>18</sup> *Russia's Path to Communism*, p. 34.

The Government's reason for staying fomentation of the war was its dependence on the well-to-do peasant at the time for grain supplies. Taxes were then being lightened and other encouragements offered to production, but woe awaited him. As Zinoviev continued: "It is to the kulak as comrade Lenin defined him that we are now making certain concessions, at the same time taking all necessary measures to organize the rest of the village against him."<sup>19</sup>

The struggles of the kulak in the Communist net being woven around him increased year by year. The fuller story of this appears in the later chapter "Communizing Agriculture." The persistent obstacle he presented through 1929 to "farm collectivization," an essential part of the Five Year Plan, issued in the decision to "liquidate the whole kulak element as a class."

The Council of People's Commissars February 2, 1930, conveyed to local executives power to evict and exile them. The current press of 1929-1930 reported freely the procedures. Preceding the Government's decree of extreme measures, the Party had prescribed "liquidation" and the process was already begun. The Tver correspondent of *Pravda*<sup>20</sup> reported "the spirit of collectivism fully carried out" by the first conference of the collective farmers of the Likhoslavl region, which "approved of the decision of the Party to pass from the policy of limiting the prerogatives and influence of the kulaks to the policy of simply doing away with them as a class." *Pravda* ran the news item under the caption "By Springtime not one Kulak, Priest, or Nepman is to Remain." The conference had enjoined clearing the region also of the derelicts of private trade

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>20</sup> January 19, 1930.

and religion "by all the means they possessed." All the familiar weapons of Communist usage came into action—the furious exhortations and insults in the press, the complete confiscations of property, economic disabilities of every description, disfranchisement with all its economic and civil consequences, arrests, imprisonments, exiles with forced labor, and executions.

The intensity and relentlessness of these pressures may be gauged by the migrations *en masse* of peasant bodies with sufficient solidarity, political influence, and financial resources to get away from Soviet jurisdiction. Mennonite colonies of German origin, dating from the time of Catherine II, after living through Czarist régimes for generations reached the limit of endurance under Communism in 1929. To the number of 13,000 they started on a trek to other lands. When they reached Moscow complications arose with the Government. Some were forced back to their villages. Many remain unaccounted for and ugly stories of their fate persist. A residue in great physical distress reached foreign borders. German charity in which President Hindenburg led relieved their economic miseries. Some of these harried émigrés passed on their way to permanent reestablishment in Canada and Brazil. Large numbers still find shelter in the friendly barracks of the aliens who received them at the time of their deliverance.

The class war aftermath has consequences that make plain warfare in comparison a humane institution. Falling from Soviet good standing means inability to secure employment anywhere. It invites starvation for the persons concerned, together with their families. This fact leads one to note other visitations upon

"class enemies" who reach the outlaw state of "Lishentzy"—those deprived of civil rights. According to *Pravda* January 3, 1930, these were being expelled from socialized houses. The law cited forbade them to reside either temporarily or permanently in any of the nationalized houses. The domiciles belonging to the social fund, the State institutions and enterprises, the city coöperative organizations, the workmen's suburbs, and the watering places were likewise closed to them. Any who lived with the "Lishentzy" and had themselves no personal right to receive quarters suffered the same penalty, also those partly or totally supported by the "Lishentzy." The paper stated further that local soviets had been empowered to expel administratively such persons as had no fixed occupation even if the latter were not deprived of the right of voting. It required only to be proved "that the occupations of such persons are useful to no one." The decision passed by the people's tribunal to expel such persons was final and could not be appealed.

Disfranchisement or "deprivation of civic and electoral rights," as it is phrased in Russian, has become one of the class war methods used widely and ruthlessly. Zeal so far outran even the far-reaching law as to call forth administrative rebuke. A member of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VZIK), Mr. Kutuzov,<sup>22</sup> interviewed on the subject offered these comments on the "distorted instructions of the Party":

"Since the new electoral law was issued in 1926, the number of complaints against unlawful disfranchisement has greatly increased. Following the electoral campaign of 1925-1926, the VZIK considered 469 such

<sup>22</sup> *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, March 16, 1930.

complaints, while in 1929 we had 35,542 complaints or seventy-six times as many. The first two months of 1930 brought 17,000 complaints. Such a great number of complaints," continued Mr. Kutuzov, "is explained by the fact that disfranchisement means also deprivation of other rights, namely, expulsion from apartments, exclusion from Trade Unions, discharge from employment, exclusion from educational institutions, liability to special and individual taxes, 'dekulakization,' etc."<sup>22</sup> . . . Therefore cases of a gross distortion of the policy of the Party and of the Soviet Government are by no means rare. Unlawful disfranchisement often is explained by graft, personal enmities, etc."

To understand the significance of the figures just quoted, one should bear in mind that the Presidium considers only such complaints as have already passed up the hierarchical ladder of local and national Soviet institutions. Under conditions of terror, illiteracy, and the general distrust of government officials existing in Russia, the number of complaints which reach this higher body probably represents but a small fraction of actual infringements of rights.

Out of the 10,620 persons lodging complaints in 1929 on which the Presidium passed, 4,057 or 38.2% had their rights restored. During January and February of the year following 3,045 complaints were considered and 914 of the appellants or 30% were reinstated in their electoral rights. Mr. Kutuzov stated that local electoral commissions often disfranchised a citizen without any reasons, and that some village soviets

<sup>22</sup> He could have added "extremely high rates charged for rent, electricity, communal service, foodstuffs, clothing, and other commodities."

attempted to make the disfranchised citizen believe there was no use in appealing to the central organization. He cited one village soviet in the Moscow district which disfranchised a peasant woman and forbade her to go to Moscow to file a complaint against their decision. In several districts of the Leningrad region local soviet officials according to *Comsomolskaia Pravda* disfranchised middle and poor peasants who were unwilling to join the collectives.

Thus class war covers the Russian land. On the part of the aggressors, it is war in their fundamental assumptions, in their attitudes, feelings, pronouncements, and unchanging mood of struggle. War in the means to ends, in its arbitrary controls, and other violations of personal rights. War in its penalties, wastes, tragedies, and countless searing consequences.



Comsomolskaia Pravda.

SERVICE OF SOCIAL DEFENSE

CHAPTER II  
DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT



*“For the realization of the Communist system the proletariat must have all authority and all power in its hands. . . . Manifestly, the bourgeoisie (class) will not abandon its position without a fight. For the bourgeoisie, Communism signifies the loss of its former power, the loss of its “freedom” to extort blood and sweat from the workers; the loss of its right to rent, interest and profit. Consequently, the Communist Revolution of the proletariat, the Communist transformation of society, is fiercely resisted by the exploiters. It follows that the principle task of the workers’ government is to crush this opposition ruthlessly. Precisely because the opposition will inevitably be so embittered, it is necessary that the workers’ authority, the proletarian rule, shall take the form of a dictatorship. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat is incompatible with freedom for the bourgeoisie. This is the very reason why the dictatorship of the proletariat is needed; to deprive the bourgeoisie of freedom; to bind it hand and foot; to make it impossible for it to carry on a struggle against the revolutionary proletariat.”<sup>1</sup>*

*“The dictatorship of the proletariat is not only an instrument for the crushing of enemies; it is likewise a lever for effecting economic transformation. Private ownership of the means of production must be replaced by social ownership; the bourgeoisie must be deprived of the means of production and exchange, must be “expropriated.”<sup>2</sup>*

*“It follows that the conquest of State power is not the conquest of the preëxistent organization, but the creation of a new organization, an organization brought into being by the class which has been victorious in the struggle.”<sup>3</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> *A B C of Communism*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

## CHAPTER II

### THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

MANIFESTLY the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument for complete and enduring conquest of society by Communism is cardinal and imperative. This distinguishes it from the present position of the Socialist and all other revolutionary parties and most labor movements—a fact to dwell upon until grasped by all who would reach an understanding of distinctive Communist methodology. Indiscriminately branding as “bolshevik” everybody and everything in fundamental disagreement with the *status quo* in the political, social, and industrial order of Western civilization, serves simply to confuse thinking. Likewise those lose the way who, seeking radical reconstruction of the present order but by persuasion and constitutional procedure, make common cause with Communists in agitation for change. Their aid is acceptable so long as they are useful Communist tools in the capacity of apologists or agents of discontent, but invariably time brings out the irreconcilable differences of principle and of action, and the alliance ends with the Communist forces of hate and destruction being loosed upon their erstwhile friends in common with the residue of “alien-minded” society.

The Communist program demands destruction of the existing State whether monarchy or republic, reactionary, liberal, or socialist; and the setting up of an

entirely new governing apparatus by, for, and of proletarians. European Social Democrats, American Socialists, the British Laborites, and the major Trade Union Movements of the Continent, British Isles, and the Americas proceed on the basis that the way to full social justice is through the constitutional State and legal instruments of education, information, organization, and legislation, even though thorough reconstruction of the order of society be involved. With Communists "it is a matter of principle to break off relations with and to wage the pitiless struggle against that bourgeois perversion of Socialism which is dominant in the leading official Social Democratic and Socialist Parties." \*

The parting of the ways begins with their contradictory theories of the State. *The State and Revolution*, by Lenin, provides the modern authoritative deliverance of Communism on the subject. He wrote it during the last summer of the World War when urging upon the revolutionary proletariat of Russia and of every belligerent country the turning of the international war into civil war. He took his stand on the ground occupied by Engels<sup>†</sup> that "the State is the product of Society at a certain stage of its development. The State is tantamount to an acknowledgment that the given Society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has broken up into irreconcilable antagonisms, of which it is powerless to rid itself. And in order that these antagonisms, these classes with their opposing economic interests, may not devour one another and Society itself in their sterile struggle, some force standing, seemingly

\* *The ABC of Communism.*

† Engels: *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, pp. 117-118 (6th German Edition).

above Society, becomes necessary so as to moderate the force of their collisions and to keep them within the bounds of 'order.' And this force arising from Society, but placing itself above it, which gradually separates itself from it—this force is the State."

Proceeding from Engel's position, Lenin on the authority of Karl Marx charged the State with being no longer a neutral arbiter and peacemaker between the classes but, with its army and bureaucracy, completely in the hands of the exploiters enforcing their oppressions upon the workers. With Marx he saw the course of events compelling the revolution to concentrate all the forces of destruction against the State and to regard the problem one, not of perfecting the machinery, but of breaking up and annihilating it "until not one stone is left standing upon another." <sup>6</sup> He regarded "the essence of revolution . . . not that a new class shall govern by means of the old government machinery but that it shall smash up this machinery and govern by means of a new machine." <sup>7</sup> "We are working," he insisted, "in such a way that the armed workers themselves shall be the government." <sup>8</sup>

Lenin believed the hour had struck for a wide assault on constituted States when in 1914 so many of the great ones engaged themselves in the fateful struggle that brought the very structure of them all under dangerous stresses. Refusal of European Socialist leaders to seize the crisis in their nations for throwing down their respective governments marked the breaking point with them, for him and for those who would follow him.

November 1, 1914, he declared the Second Interna-

<sup>6</sup> *State and Revolution*, p. 143.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

tional "dead, overcome by opportunism."<sup>9</sup> On the same day his Russian Party of Bolsheviks, later to designate themselves Communists, issued a manifesto<sup>10</sup> that furnished the platform on which, as the war went on, he made repeated efforts to erect what he could regard as a truly revolutionary international party. It declared the war to be the beginning of the disintegration of the capitalist system, in calling forth growth of the forces that tend to create an economic and political crisis, intensifying and accentuating the discontent of the toiling masses, and so leading them to civil war. The task therefore did not consist "in being afraid of civil war, but in getting ready for such a war and a proletarian revolution." All "consistent internationalists" were called upon to explain to the people the real character of the war, to expose the treachery of the Social Democratic Party leaders, to break off all relations with them, and to work among the masses under the slogan: "Down with the imperialist war. Transform it into civil war directed against your own governments."

By August of 1917 Lenin had reached a point that brooked no compromise. Two months before he was to demonstrate the correctness of his thesis for Russia at least by toppling over the Kerensky Government and beginning to disintegrate the old State mechanism, he declared impatiently:<sup>11</sup> "We shall go forward to a break with these traitors to Socialism. We are working for a complete destruction of the old machinery of government, in such a way that the armed workers themselves shall be the government." He scorned "the pleasant company" of those with "superstitious rever-

<sup>9</sup> Komor: *Ten Years of the Communist International*, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>11</sup> Lenin: *The State and Revolution*, p. 156.

ence for the State," quite willing to work for the rearrangement of forces within the State . . . the gaining of a majority in parliament, and the supremacy of parliament over the government, . . . in which everything remains within the framework of a middle class parliamentary republic."

" . . . All these gentry," he protested, "while playing a great, very often a predominant rôle in parliamentary work and in the journalism of the party, decisively reject the dictatorship of the proletariat and carry out a policy of unconcealed opportunism. In the eyes of these gentry, the dictatorship of the proletariat 'contradicts' democracy. There is really nothing seriously to distinguish them from lower middle class democrats. . . . So far from making vivid in the workers' minds the near approach of the time when they are to smash the old machinery of the State and substitute a new one, thereby making their political domination the foundation for a Socialist reconstruction of society, they have actually taught the workers the direct opposite of this."<sup>12</sup>

The tragic fate of the Socialist Revolutionary and the Menshevik Parties in Russia lights up luridly the point where their roads forked from that of the Communists. For many dangerous years the Mensheviks in full party unity with the Communists (Bolsheviks) in the Russian Social Democracy risked everything to undermine among the workmen the authority of the Autocracy. They enlisted for the seizure of power, class rule, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In 1903 a formation into oppositional wings took place, the difference at the outset being largely those of temperament in the respective leaders, that developed

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

logically into what were dubbed "hard" and "soft" methods in procedure. Collaboration continued through the agitational period, but after the March Revolution in 1917 the Mensheviks held out for working with other parties along democratic lines as opposed to force and the dictatorship. Lenin characterized them as having "rattled down, suddenly and without reservation to the lower middle class theory of the conciliation of classes by the State."<sup>13</sup> He and his fellow Communists forced them from every approach to influence, and when they resisted disrupted their organization, along with that of the Right Socialist Revolutionaries. The leaders suffered imprisonment, the cruelest exile, or death—as one of their appeals to outside moral influence expressed it, "for no other cause than remaining true to their ideas of democracy and Socialism."

Left Socialist Revolutionary Party representatives joined in the "dictatorship" coup and were admitted into the Communist Government. Within six months mutual incompatibility developed. The Left Socialists made resistance, were visited with heavy penalties, and took reprisals. In March, 1919, they placarded Petrograd with a proclamation<sup>14</sup> addressed to *Comrades, Workmen, Peasants, Sailors, and Men of the Red Armies*, protesting that the Petrograd Soviet did not express the will of their associated groups. They declared that it was not truly elected but voted in under threats of shooting or starvation and terrorism that completely suffocated freedom of speech, the press, and meetings of laborers.

"Let this fraudulent Soviet," the protest read, "be-

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> *The London Times*, April 10, 1919.

fore the laboring classes of Russia and the whole world without reserve or excuses, honorably answer:

“Where are the promised rights of the electors? At the factories and the mills, on the ships and on the railways, sit self-appointed Bolshevik (Communist) Commissars . . . crucifying the workmen and the peasants at their own sweet will. The Revolutionary Government over the masses has been seized by the Bolshevik agents.

“What has become of freedom of speech and of the press, particularly the press of the peasants, soldiers, and sailors? The laboring classes are not allowed to congregate. They are not permitted to publish their own newspapers and they may not utter a word against the Bolsheviks under penalty of being arrested and shot. . . .

“What has become of the pledge to abolish the death penalty? It is now in full force, at the front and at the rear, not for the bourgeoisie, but for the poor.

“The Bolshevik Party in their struggle with the workmen and the peasants are supported by the hired bayonets of Letts and Chinamen, under the traitorous rule of certain Russian officers who are now better off under Lenin than under the Czarist régime.

### COMRADES

“At the present moment, of all the wonderful edifice of freedom inaugurated by the October Revolution, there remains not a single stone, only lying words and tyranny.”

The breach between Communists and other Socialists has been no less complete in Germany where Com-



munism wears no masks. The lines of demarcation there have been marked more than once in blood with open conflict never far removed. The Social Democracy which Rosa Luxemburg, German Communist, called a "stinking corpse"<sup>15</sup> for its participation in the World War, went through to defeat with its nation, then led the nation in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic, and has been its consistent chief defense. The first armed Communist attempt to seize the power was in the Presidency of Ebert, Socialist saddlemaker. His military chief, Noske, suppressed the effort after vigorous fighting in Berlin and the other industrial cities. When the French occupation of the Ruhr brought the German industries to stagnation and added bitter suffering to the workers, the Communists set up a short-lived government in Saxony yielding only to the force of a Coalition Cabinet, the largest parliamentary strength of which was the body of Social Democrats in the Reichstag.

The Third International (Communist) authorities now rate the German Social Democrat Party "a clearly expressed counter-revolutionary force" whose principal rôle consists in "sabotaging the unity of the proletariat" against which they demand "imperatively strenuous struggle." They attribute the defeats of Communism in Germany directly to its "treacherous tactics," and to the fact that the majority of the working class has not yet accepted the lead of the Communists.

The fate of democracy in Germany for the next decades probably rests with the outcome of the contest now on in that country for the adherence of the workingmen who numerically make up one of the

<sup>15</sup> Komor: *Ten Years of the Communist International*, p. 5.

largest "blocs" of the population and voters. The Social Democrats accept the republican constitution. The Communists charge that Hilferding, when Minister of Finance, defended the position that the democratic State is not an instrument of the capitalists, but rather an impartial super-organization, and that therefore the Socialist contests within industry must be based on a State thus constructed. He recognized Capitalism to be moving from the domination by blind forces of power to the socialistic principle of systematic production, and that concurrently the Trade Unions were transferring effort from the direct class conflict over volume of production, working hours, and wages to the broader program of democratizing economics—affording all the factors in production their just shares in control.

The German Communist Party, under the tutelage of Lenin and the direction of the international revolutionary party he created, violently attacks this disposition of Capital and Labor to sit down and reason together, and attributes it to the influence of American Labor Union idealism and English Reformism though "glossed over with Marxist phraseology to veil the vile treason." In the eyes of Leninist Communism, German Social Democracy "mutilates" the class war theory. Kautsky to the Social Democrats was the authoritarian which Lenin became to the Communists. Lenin in a brochure<sup>20</sup> and elsewhere roundly denounced Kautsky and his teachings. He protested that the "late Marxist" did not "lead the recognition of class war up to the main issue, up to the period of crossing from Capitalism to Communism, . . . a period of violent class fights when inevitably there must be a new

<sup>20</sup> *Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Moscow, 1918.

democratic State for the proletariat and the general poor, and a new dictatorial State against the bourgeoisie.”<sup>17</sup>

The same issue of national democracy versus class dictatorship, with its corollaries, arrays against one another the British Labor Party and the Communist Party of Great Britain. In theory the contenders are wider apart than in Germany. The main body of British Labor is less committed to doctrinaire Socialism than the corresponding organizations on the Continent, while Communist fundamentals are uniform across all national boundaries, thanks to the Third International. This overseeing body of Communism at its first Congress<sup>18</sup> laid out for one of its tasks “coördinating the genuine revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of all countries for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship.”

The General Strike in Great Britain in 1926 brought relationships to the degree of strain at which the British Communists on instructions from Moscow could no longer support Labor’s Parliamentary candidates. A 1928 statement<sup>19</sup> of their aims and policies indicted the Labor Party and its leaders for failing to realize revolution from the Strike situation. The Communist strategists saw in that Strike the greatest example of class solidarity and of the power of the workers that there had ever been in Britain. They denounced the Labor chiefs for not having made even the simplest preparations, although it had been obvious that the Government was preparing seriously. The Communist Party had called for the following meas-

<sup>17</sup> *The State and Revolution*, pp. 45-46.

<sup>18</sup> Komor: *Ten Years of the Communist International*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>19</sup> *Communism is Common Sense*, published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, p. 16.

ures: "strengthening of the General Council (of Trade Unions); Trades Councils to embrace all sections (including Communists) of the movement; factory committees to strengthen Trade Unionism as a whole; arrangements with the Coöperatives for them to act as Labor's commissariat; the formation of Defense Corps to protect the workers' organizations; and a campaign to spread the truth about Labor among the Forces (military). "Yet," their indictment runs, "none of these common sense preparations for a great struggle had been started. And when the struggle was on, the leaders drew back in fear before the issues raised and called it off on the obvious swindle of a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' that bound nobody."

The Annual Conference of the Labor Party, on its side, in 1924, sealed previous decisions by that body not to admit the Communist Party of Great Britain to affiliation. Labor's Executive Committee submitted to the Conference in that year a carefully prepared report setting forth why the renewed Communist application for affiliation should be refused. Probably nothing at once so clearly factual and well reasoned on the diametrical variance of Communist political principles from those of democracy exists in the English language. After pointing out that unlike old autocratic Russia, with its feeble Duma, Great Britain had given almost the whole adult population the vote, and that their Parliament and governing system would respond to the direction of the working people, corresponding to their intelligent expression of desire for change through the ballot-box, the Committee exposed the abyss that separates the two movements: <sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Report of the Twenty-fourth Annual Conference of the Labor Party, London, 1924, pp. 38-39.*

"The Communist Party believes that Parliament and other Administrative Authorities are simply machines that should only be exploited to their own destruction; that there is no hope in the masses of the people rising to the height of their political responsibilities; and that, therefore, so soon as a minority in the community feel that they are sufficiently powerful to revolutionize the present political and industrial system, they are justified in using power, armed and otherwise, to achieve that purpose. Pending the speedy conversion of the masses, should they disagree with this procedure, the correct position is that they should be held down by force, deprived of liberty of speech, organization, and press; and such expressions in the direction of freedom of opinion will be dealt with as counter-revolutionary symptoms.

"The Labor Party holds a fundamental objection to tyranny, quite apart from the social, political, or industrial standing of the Tyrant. In its opinion political intelligence wisely directed is more enduring in its results than coercion, no matter how well-intentioned. It objects to the limitations at present suffered by masses of the people, but aids and welcomes their increasing desire for a freer and fuller social life. The advances made during its short existence form the justification for steady and continuous effort in the direction of securing the suffrages and support of the greater masses of the nation. Socialism that will secure the freedom under which men and women can develop their finest faculties and lead to a still higher social organization must essentially be based on freedom."

The Committee then reminded its constituency that these fundamental differences had been determining

hitherto in excluding the Communist Party from the Labor Party's forces; and that they had led British Communists to leave the Labor Party on their own initiative and to remain outside "until the Third International, from merely tactical considerations, dictated otherwise." The fundamental and unchanging character of the differences seemed further evident from the fact "that no person with a belief in Labor Party principles can become a member of the Communist Party" since Communists must renounce Parliamentary democracy. It was contended therefore that Communists could not honestly be members of the Labor Party. They could not have it both ways.

The Labor Committee then pronounced its matured judgment on grounds both of principle and of policy: <sup>21</sup>

. . . "Federation though the Party may be, it has principles at the base of its organization—principles that it is not prepared to forswear or ignore either at the dictation of an opposing international organization, or for mere tactical reasons.

. . . "We now witness the anomaly of persons, who left the Party because they disagreed with its principles and formed the Communist Party upon new and opposing principles, seeking to return to our ranks to revolutionize our policy."

"Their purpose, openly avowed, is to scrap our present methods and objects and transform the Party into a Communist organization.

"It is better that the Party should develop its strength on assured and steadfast lines, than it should seek to conciliate vitally conflicting purposes, or to achieve a fictitious agreement where none is really possible."

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

After full debate on a high plane the Party Conference with its system of constituency representation adopted by a vote of 3,185,000 to 193,000 the resolution "that the application for affiliation from the Communist Party be refused."

The Socialist Party of America, in common with parliamentary Socialist bodies generally, while vigorously advocating full diplomatic and commercial relations with Soviet Russia, has experienced disillusionment regarding the nature and beneficence of the rule of the Communist Party in Russia. In May, 1919, the National Executive Committee, in a pronouncement to the Workers of America under the title, "Shall America Betray the Russian Revolution," described the Communists' coup and program in these terms:

"Aroused to the realization of the great opportunity that lay before them, the revolutionary forces of Russia struck the blow for complete political and industrial emancipation in November, 1917, and proceeded to reconstruct the life of their people in accordance with those human principles that in one form or another have been the hope and the vision of the great prophets and teachers of all ages and peoples of the civilized world."

Nine years later (April, 1928), the Socialist National Convention joined "with the Socialist and Labor Parties of the world in demanding the recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia," but also united "with the Trade Unions, Socialist and Labor Parties, and humane people all over the world in condemning the Soviet Government of Russia in its policy of imprisoning and exiling Socialists and others because of democratic opinions opposed to the ruling of the Communist Party." The same resolution further stated: "A sys-

tematic policy of organized terror which stifles the initiative of the working class, which deprives it of the right of organization, the right of a free press and public meetings cannot be reconciled with the best interests of the workers and of Russia herself."

In November, 1930, the National Executive Committee, moved by the fresh political arrests and executions in Russia and the continuing process of exterminating Socialists by exile, declared: "Because the Soviet Republic claims to be a working-class government, this barbarous reign of intolerance and terrorism is peculiarly a betrayal of liberty and working-class ideals."

The American Federation of Labor and all its affiliated Central Trade Unions have had war upon them declared and prosecuted by the Third International and its subject American Section, the Communist Party of the United States. The gauge of battle has been taken up by this main body of organized labor in North America which is neither class conscious, a wing of Socialism, nor, as in Britain, chief constituent source of a political party. The observation may be ventured that within its own ranks it presents the most sustained and effective opposition to Communism among all the bodies resisting that movement on this continent. Convention by Convention, since the Third International in 1918 marked it and all non-revolutionary workers' movements across the world for control or destruction, the Federation has taken clear and consistent defensive and offensive positions, and its executives have pursued the lines of strategy laid down.

The technique of the contest receives some elaboration in the closing Chapter. The fact and nature of



the conflict come to notice here because again the issues between these opposing proponents of Labor's cause originate in the doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship as the instrument of an armed class force for overthrowing and shattering the institutions of democracy beginning with the State.

The 39th Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor in 1919 refused "its endorsement of the Soviet Government of Russia, or any other form of government in that country, until the peoples of Russia, through a constituent or other form of national assembly, representing all of the people through popular election, shall have reestablished a truly democratic form of government." <sup>22</sup>

The Executive Committee of the Federation reported in part to the 1920 Convention on its examination of the nature and tactics of Communism under the caption, "War Against Democracy": "Bolshevism arose as a repudiation of democracy when Lenin employed a company of armed sailors to disperse the constitutional assembly—which had been deliberately and fairly elected by the entire Russian people. The Bolshevists have never held one election under universal suffrage in Russia since that date." <sup>23</sup> The report cited further the statement of Lenin to the Soviet Economic Conference in January, 1920, that the pledge of success lay "in the autocracy of the chiefs of Communism and the Communist domination of the people." Its concluding paragraph charged the Russian dictatorship with destroying the opportunity of the people for democratic self-government and imposing "a brutal defenseless tyranny." The Committee on

<sup>22</sup> *Report of the Proceedings of the 39th Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor* (1919), p. 333.

<sup>23</sup> *Report of Proceedings* (1920), p. 95.

International Labor Relations concurred in the report and the Convention approved it with but four dissenting votes.<sup>24</sup>

The 42nd Convention in 1922 gave lengthy consideration to the inimical propaganda and plotting of Communism against the Trade Unions composing the Federation. The report of the International Labor Relations Committee directed attention to the declaration of the Third International that "especial attention must be paid to the American Federation of Labor. It must be broken, agitating with the energetic aid of the I. W. W."<sup>25</sup> for the creation of revolutionary Trade Unions."<sup>26</sup> The Committee found beyond dispute "the existence of a dictatorship over the Russian people . . . as the fulfillment of all the hopes of those to whom Communism is a Gospel" with no freedom of the press, of speech, or of assemblage. The Committee findings were sustained by the Convention voting without a roll call which was asked for by twenty-two members only.

The Convention of 1925 voted down almost unanimously a resolution offered in favor of the recognition of Soviet Russia and the establishment of full diplomatic and commercial relations. It afforded the occasion for the constructive statement of the Federation's own platform<sup>27</sup> as the grounds for "emphatic rejection":

"The American Federation of Labor stands unequivocally for democracy, for the right of people to rule themselves and to control their own destinies through political machinery of their own making.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 441.

<sup>25</sup> Industrial Workers of the World.

<sup>26</sup> *Report of Proceedings* (1922), p. 424.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, (1925), pp. 334-335.

"The American Federation of Labor opposes with all of the fervor of a high idealism every kind of autocracy, bureaucracy, or dictatorship, whether brutal or benevolent.

"The American Federation of Labor is emphatically opposed to revolution by violence wherever democracy exists and where the people have the power to modify or change their government through the use of constitutional means."

\* \* \* \*

"The American Federation of Labor opposes the whole Communist philosophy and dogma and the whole dictatorship in that unhappy and oppressed country."

\* \* \* \*

"The American Federation of Labor is democratic in faith and structure and it can never be otherwise. Democracy and autocracy can make no compromise. To compromise with this enemy is inevitably to the advantage of the enemy."

In 1926 the Executive Committee of the Federation again memorialized the Annual Convention concerning Communist philosophy as "directly opposed to that of the Trade Union movement," in rejecting "orderly progress and collective agreements under which sustained betterment may be developed." The Committee flatly stated: "There can be no compromise between orderly progress and disruptive tactics."

The Executive Committee reiterated to the 47th Convention one year later: "The American Federation of Labor will accept no dictation from Moscow. We will not compromise with Communism or communistic philosophy." The 1928 Convention unanimously com-

mended the Executive Council "for its firm stand against Communists in America."

The Socialist Trade Unions of the world have been equally explicit and firm in refusing coöperation and countenance to the Russian dictatorship, again on the ground of its denial of democracy. Through the Second International (Socialist) with which they affiliate, over the names of their trusted leaders (British, German, Swedish, Dutch, and Belgian) they spoke their mind, after observing three years the ruling methods of the Communists and repeated efforts to find ground for common action had failed:

"They trod the desires of the Russian people in the dust, and in place of democracy they established an armed dictatorship not of the proletariat but of a committee. Now they are attempting to impose their will and their decree upon the Socialist and Labor Parties of the whole world. They belong to the old world of Socialism. . . . They may have ended wage-slavery; they have established State-slavery and misery. They have robbed the workers of freedom of movement and of combination, and are preventing the creation of economic democracy." <sup>22</sup>

The Communists themselves soon after coming to power in Russia phrased more softly the dictatorial nature and purposes of their régime: <sup>23</sup>

"The Communist Party is that lever of political organization by means of which the most advanced part of the working class directs the mass of the proletariat and semi-proletariat along the right road.

<sup>22</sup> *Report of Proceedings of the 41st Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor* (1921), p. 101.

<sup>23</sup> III Comintern Congress, 1921.

“As long as the governmental authority has not been conquered by the proletariat, as long as the proletariat has not established its rule once for all and has not guaranteed the working class from the possibility of a bourgeois restoration, so long will the Communist Party by right have in its organized ranks only the minority of the workmen. The proletarian revolution in Russia has brought to the foreground the basic form of labor dictatorship, the Soviet. In the nearest future the following division will establish itself; first, the Party; second, the soviets; and third, the productive unions. But the work both in the soviets and in the revolutionized productive unions must be invariably and systematically directed by the party of the proletariat, i.e., the Communist Party.”

Practice of the dictatorship has fallen short of the theory in no particular. Indeed the thoroughness with which the higher strategy of Communism has been planned in general, and the daring with which the execution of its main lines have been undertaken in Russia merit a certain respect. Only downright earnestness, painstaking elaboration, and resourcefulness of no mean proportions account for the results. The development promised “in the near future” in 1920 moved with precision to a state of perfection in less than a decade.

The Russian subjects of the Communist dictatorship in the absence of a late complete census may be placed roughly at 150,000,000. The total membership of Soviet Trade Unions numbers more than 11,000,000 people, including several millions of peasants, employees, and other groupings that do not classify under the orthodox Communist definition of “proletariat,” inasmuch as this term connotes exclusively industrial

workers. Such workers strictly enumerated probably do not exceed 6,000,000. A genuinely proletarian dictatorship therefore would mean the complete subordination of 150,000,000 people to 4% of their number.

However only the shamelessly lying or hopelessly naïve Communists speak of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia as a literal condition of affairs. The halfway sincere ones frankly admit that a dictatorship of the Communist Party describes the reality. The Party membership April 1, 1930, registered 1,852,090.<sup>50</sup> Hard pressed with facts the more courageous can be made to go far enough to say in whispers between friends, that the Party itself since Lenin's death has been reduced to a machine obediently stamping at periodic conventions the resolutions submitted by its Central Committee, and just as obediently executing them in everyday life.

The personnel of the dictatorship thus reduces to a body of 71 full members and 67 alternates.<sup>51</sup> Yet even the impression these numbers convey is unrealistic, as former members of the Central Committee, expelled at one time or another for "right" or "left" heresies, inform the public. These deposed "proletarian aristocrats" do not hesitate to say that the directive rôle of the Central Committee is not much more imposing than that of the Congress of the Party. The real dictatorship they say is the almighty Political Bureau of the Party, composed of ten first line members and five alternates.<sup>52</sup> And finally, the cautious speeches of Bukharin and Tomsky, former high personages once with seats in the Political Bureau, convey something stronger than inferences that the Political Bureau

<sup>50</sup> *Economic Life*, June 26, 1930.

<sup>51</sup> *Pravda*, July 14, 1930.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

has its master though until 1930 he held no office in the Government. To this single personality then the whole of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submits—Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Party, uncrowned autocrat of “All the Russias.”

Vital interest and importance attach none the less to the composition, maintenance, and functioning of the whole Party body. To supplement general recruiting of new members, the Party leaders organize special efforts usually in connection with some Russian or international revolutionary event. An impending danger to the Soviet State or an anniversary of some prominent leader is used as a means of influencing reluctant workers and poor peasants to come into the Party ranks. The anniversary of Lenin's death in January of each year brings on a mass campaign to attract new proletarian members. Those who join during this period are called “The Lenin Recruitment.” *Economic Life* of June 26, 1930, published an article entitled “The Growth of Our Party in Figures.” It gave the membership as 1,852,090 on April 30 of that year, and showed a net Party growth since November, 1927, of 640,143 persons, or 52.8%, compared with an increase of 20.8% in the two years preceding.

The same paper analyzed the social composition of the Party as of April 1, 1930. Differentiated by social origins the workers numbered 1,181,642, the peasants 324,365, and employees 225,591. Occupationally there were 841,814 workers, 213,878 peasants, 509,203 employees, and 166,703 unclassified. The larger part of the peasants came from the agricultural collectives. Some were individual farmers. Of the workers 518,489 came from factories, 62,440 listed as agricultural and

forest hands, 19,346 as auxiliary personnel, and 64,313 remained unclassified.

*Pravda* of May 14, 1930, analyzed and presented trends in the Party's social composition, beginning with the new members of that year. To base the Party ever more securely on the proletarian masses of the Soviet Union is the chief membership concern of the leaders. The Party Central Committee had previously instructed the local organizations to raise to 50% the number of members actually engaged in industrial labor, toward the goal of insuring the numerical superiority of actual industrial workers. Predominance of these relatively staunchest supporters of the "Pure Leninist Policy," elaborated by Stalin and his associates, would be calculated further to safeguard the program. Intellectuals are accounted generally undesirable, and peasants the main source of "right deviation."

During the first three months of 1930 the membership according to *Pravda* increased by 200,000 recruits, an unusually high total for the short period. During the whole of 1928 the Party increased by 262,000, and in the whole of 1929 by 297,000. January, February, and March usually bring in the major quota of new members, acceptances under the "Lenin Recruitment," but twice as many new members joined during these months in 1930 as in the same period of 1929. The percentage of industrial workers among the new members increased also. They furnished 71% in 1928, then 76% in 1929, and 84% in 1930. The percentage of employees among the recruits decreased, equalling 7.5% in 1928, 3.4% in 1929, and 2.4% in 1930. The paper rejoiced that the ratio of actually engaged industrial workers in the total Party membership ascended nearer the 50% mark and predicted its attainment very soon.



The social composition of the new membership does not reflect accurately the social composition of the applicants. The *Pravda* figures represent the accepted element after all the undesirables and less desirables had been sifted out. With admission of new intellectuals almost prohibited and peasants taken only after thorough scrutiny and under many restricting conditions, the figures quoted establish beyond doubt that Party leadership has addressed itself to admitting workers mainly. Yet they do not indicate desire among workers to enter the Party to be so much higher than among other groups, in proportion to their ratio of the population and the percentage of rejections.

Mikoyan, an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Party and People's Commissar for Trade, speaking at a local Party conference in Moscow\*\* directed attention to the considerable increase in the membership of the Party and to "a radical improvement in its composition." In commenting on the rejection of applications he reported that out of each one hundred considered in 1929, for one reason or another, admission was refused to 16% of workers, 19% of peasant members of agricultural collectives, 55% of individual peasant owners, 74.5% of employees, and 47% of students and other groups. Twenty-nine per cent of all applications were rejected.

According to *Pravda's* analysis\*\* the village Party organizations admitted during the first three months of 1930 one-sixth of the total new membership. From the beginning of January to the close of March, 1930, the percentage of agricultural workers and hired hands (batracki) among peasant members of the Party increased from 11.3% to 12.6%. Among these 33,500

\*\* May 22, 1930.

\*\* May 22, 1930.

new peasant members 21,760 were actually engaged in agriculture. Of those 19,560 belonged to agricultural collectives. There appears to be a definite tendency to "proletarize" the peasant section of the Party also. The percentage of members of agricultural collectives among the Communist agriculturists increased from 52.1% to 72.5%. Among the important regional areas below this average, the Far Eastern appeared with but 50%, the district of Nizhni-Novgorod 49.7%, and of Transcaucasia 21.7%. Moscow district sensitive to the center reached 76.6%. The 200,000 new members included over 33,000 women, practically all of them workers and women members of agricultural collectives.

For an understanding of the political situation in the Soviet Union, it now becomes essential to observe the ways in which this concededly small minority, the Communist Party, with an enrollment under 2,000,000 members firmly holds helpless in its power the third most populous State jurisdiction on the globe. For practical purposes the Party internal controversies may be ignored and the organization considered a peaceful entity. How does it govern Russia?

Mid-January of 1930 the Central Committee of the Party structurally reorganized itself, and the local Party committees, in the direction of further consolidating the Party machinery. In the new form the Central Committee has seven departments.

One directs all the Party organizational work, studies the Party life, instructs and checks the local Party organizations, compiles statistical data, and appoints Party officials. Another trains and delivers all Communists appointed to administrative, economic, and Trade Union organizations.

The culture and propaganda Section directs the cul-

tural work of the Party, its popular education, and the press; organizes the Marxist and Leninist propaganda; ideologically educates the members of the Party; and appoints Communists in the educational institutions, press, research, and other cultural agencies.

The department of agitation and mass campaigns organizes and conducts all mass drives of both short and long duration, such as Soviet and Trade Union electoral campaigns, socialistic competitions, "flying squadrons, and shock troops" in their agitation and action for the reduction of cost of production, increase of productivity of labor, farm collectivization, increased sowing, and grain collections. It also supervises all voluntary societies. It appoints members of the Party to the officary of such societies and to management of the campaigns of these societies and of the Party. One of its units engages in mass effort among women workers and peasant women.

The fifth subdivision of the Central Committee is known as the Secret Department. The sixth is Administrative, and the seventh the Institute of Lenin devoted entirely to the compilation and study of his works. The reorganization of the local Party committees followed the same lines.

The current of the Party will flows through the Committee conduits just enumerated to a much elaborated mechanism of subsidiary societies and organizations that act as "conductors" to the masses. The Assistant General-Secretary of the Party, Kaganovich, also a member of the Political Bureau, reporting to the XVI Party Congress<sup>25</sup> on the organizational work of the Central Committee laid stress upon these auxiliary agencies. Several of them later will receive

<sup>25</sup> July 29, 1930.

treatment at length. They follow here in the order listed by the Secretary which may reflect what the Party considers their relative importance. The figures also are his. The organizations overlap considerably, yet each multi-joiner of them serves the purposes of his several memberships in the circle of his influence.

The Trade Unions headed the list with 11,585,300 members on October 1, 1929, an increase of 121% since 1922. "Osoaviachim," the Society to Promote Aviation and Chemical Defense follows which in 1927 had 2,950,000 members, now increased to 5,100,000 of whom 35% are workers. The International Society for Aid to Revolutionary Fighters (MOPR) appears next, its membership swelled from 3,631,000 in 1927 to 4,015,096 in 1930. The Society of Militant Godless ranks fourth. Its enlistment rose from 138,402 in 1928 to 2,500,000 in two years, accounted for by a recruiting process that made joining practically obligatory for workers and for employees in the Soviet institutions. Later under further pressure that high figure rose another million.\*\*

The roster runs on with the League of Communist Youth at 2,466,000 members; the Red Army standing at more than half a million . . .; the corps of Worker and Peasant Correspondents of newspapers numbering 532,000; the Pioneers (Children) that grew numerically from 1,653,701 members January 1, 1928, to 3,301,458 by the corresponding date in 1930; and the "Shock Brigades" of workers said to embrace over one million men and women. The total number of local Communist cells that constitute the peripheral organizations of the Party itself totaled 49,712 in the Soviet Union—24,094 in the cities, the others in the villages.

Stated comprehensively then, a network of ap-

\*\* See Yaroslavsky in *Pravda*, June 24, 1930.

pointees of the Party hold every key position in the administrative, economic, and cultural apparatus of the entire population. The Central Control Commission of the Party with its local divisions in turn supervises these appointees. Upon any of the people who venture to disobey or not too willingly accept the orders of the Party fall the penalties of the formidable and all-penetrating instrument of Terror, the O. G. P. U. This incomparable secret police system of all time has attained surpassing working perfection, explained probably by the ripe personal experience accumulated by the older Communists in their lifetime encounters with the Czarist police.

Search for the area where Party ceases and Government begins discovers none. The Party never really leaves go its hold. The organic State law commits all administrative functions to the system of councils called soviets which pyramid up by a theoretically representative process from thousands of locally chosen units to a single Federal apex. Free election of the local soviets by the voting population is prescribed. In the village and township soviets a majority of non-Party members frequently results, but in the higher stories of the Soviet tower these "show-window" members become progressively fewer, until in every city or district soviet a Communist majority unfaillingly emerges. The Communist members of each soviet organize into "fractions" and receive from the Party committee of their constituency minutest instructions regarding the attitude and action to take on every question. The Party Constitution, adopted at the All-Russian Congress of the Party in August, 1922, provides specifically for this practice in Section 24: "The

Central Committee directs the work of the Central Soviet of the Government and public organizations through Party fractions."

The Communist fraction represents the only organized group in any soviet. The non-Party members usually consist of half-literate workers and peasants, not permitted to create any political organization. "There may be as many political parties in Soviet Russia as can be imagined," said one of the Communist leaders in a witty mood, "but on one condition—that the Communist Party be in power and the others in jail"—a literal description of the political situation in the Soviet Union.

In the atmosphere of forbidden organization, the non-Party members well know what any resistance to Communist orders may mean. Even in soviets, where Communist fractions are the minority, they dominate no less completely.

The more than eleven and a half million members of the Trade Unions fit into a similar framework. On control of the Unions the Party has legislated explicitly. The XIV All-Union Congress gave this clear mandate in Resolution 38:\*

"The Communist Party, which is the organized vanguard of the working class, the director of the entire proletarian movement as a whole, unites and directs all forms and aspects of this movement, all the labor organizations toward the realization of the final purpose of the working class—toward the struggle for Communism.

"The Trade Unions will be able to perform their tasks only under the supervision of the All-Union Com-

\* *Stenographic Report*, by the State Publishing Office, Moscow, 1926, p. 986.

munist Party as the vanguard and the directress of the working class as a whole. The task of the Party on the whole and in individual Party organs is to secure the correct systematic supervision of Trade Unions, accomplishing it through the corresponding Communist fractions of the Trade Unions."

The members of the Communist fraction in each Trade Union unit receive their orders from the Communist cell of the factory or institution. The considerable number of non-Party Trade Unionists elected to the factory and institutional Trade Union committees (for appearances chiefly) function in the knowledge that should they dissent from the Communist orders they would be displaced immediately, lose their employment and, often as not, be jailed or exiled.

The controlling group in every Government institution, every business and industrial organization, every educational and research institution likewise consists of Communists. If without an actual majority they subject the other members to their will by threats of exercising the administrative power they derive from the Party. They hold this power so beyond successful challenge that attempts to resist their will have come practically to be abandoned. And such as sporadically appear issue futilely.

The reduction of political life in Russia to complete disorganization outside their own ranks presents one of the most brilliant tactical accomplishments of the Communists. They applied well their full knowledge of Russia and Russians. They recognized that no serious resistance could threaten Government power unless directed by political forces organized over the vast territory, where many distances to populous centers measure hundreds of miles with no other means

of communication than horse drawn sleds and carts. This justified to them and explains to the world their dispersion of the Social Democrat, Right and Left Socialist Revolutionary, and other non-Communist Parties, attended by the ruthless extermination of their leadership. As Kamenev told the XII Party Congress "in the Political Bureau is concentrated at the given moment for a given limited period of time the entire political will and thought of the labor classes." The "limited period" gives no signs of expiring, and so long as the Russian peasant and city populations can be kept politically disorganized the Communist political power has no cause to fear.

The Party constantly manifests its authority to be above that of the Government itself by short-circuiting orders straight to the State administrative organs without the trouble to convey them through the fractions within those organs, there to be labeled administrative orders. Sometimes it directs the framing of new measures, again the repeal of existing ones. In matters of extreme importance the Party associates itself with State organs in the utterance of legislation to lend the necessary moral unction.


Tomsky in the XIV All-Union Party Congress<sup>88</sup> referred to the Congresses of the State as "working under the immediate direction of the Party Central Committee." The X Congress of the Party and the All-Russian Conference of the Party "laid down the fundamental principles of the New Economic Policy."<sup>89</sup> in 1921. The XVI Party Conference in 1929 voted "to approve the Five Year Plan of the State Economic

<sup>88</sup> *Stenographic Report*, by the State Publishing Office, Moscow, 1926, p. 743.

<sup>89</sup> Rules of the Council of People's Commissars on the Enforcement of the N E P, August, 1921.



Plan Commission . . . confirmed by the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union," as "in keeping with the directions of the XV Party Congress." <sup>40</sup> *Izvestia*,<sup>41</sup> the Government's official organ,



Pravda

### ON WARM TRAILS

In connection with preparations for Party "cleaning" special investigating commissions have been organized in some places which secretly study the private life of Communists

said editorially: . . . "Realization of the Five Year Plan is impossible without assuring the correctness of the Party management of the State machine." In

<sup>40</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, May 3, 1929, Vienna, English Edition

<sup>41</sup> September 4, 1929

November of 1929, the All-Union Party Central Committee made it "incumbent upon the State Planning Commission, the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and the People's Commissariat of Education to compile within three months a five year plan for the training of specialists of higher and middle qualifications and for the construction of new higher institutions for technical training and technicums to answer to concrete requirements." A most striking instance of the Party legislating as Government was the decree on individual management in industry featured in the Chapter on Labor.

Supervision extends equally to the private life of Russian subjects. The eyes of Communist watchmen are upon them in the clubs, playgrounds, and apartments—all Communist ruled. A committee nominally elected by the tenants administers every house in the Russian cities. This committee has power to intervene in the minutest details of a citizen's daily life. Each house committee has at least one Communist or an agent of the secret police in its make-up. Party discipline binds every Communist to report to his Party committee anything he may hear or see that may be construed to be against the interests of the Party. Espionage by children is openly encouraged. In a number of cases they have reported their parents to the O. G. P. U. or to the Party or to the Comsomol Committee for "counter-revolutionary tendencies," "bourgeois leanings," and other sins unpardonable in a Communist society.

In a land where every citizen depends on the State as completely as Russians have been schooled to depend; where the State stands almost the sole employer

and distributor of goods and services; the sole publisher of newspapers, magazines, and books; the sole educator; where it owns the soil, mines, forests, transportation, industry, distributive machinery, and increasingly the agricultural establishment, the inmost penetration to the social and private life of the population obtains beyond the comprehension of people with normal individualistic tendencies—especially of nationalities with resistance like that of Anglo-Saxons to admitting the State within the circle of private interests and existence. The unyielding hand of the Communist State holds every Russian in its grasp from the day of his birth to the hour he is buried by the State undertaking monopoly. The Party by the apparatus of the State directs him throughout life, sometimes praising, more often punishing, but always attending and supervising the entire range of his activities, his mind, his soul, his dealings with his fellow men and with God.

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CHAPTER III  
PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

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*“The factories, workshops, mines, and other productive institutions will all be subdivisions, as it were, of one vast people’s workshop, which will embrace the entire national economy of production.”*<sup>1</sup>

*“Private ownership of the means of production must be replaced by social ownership.”*<sup>2</sup>

*“In the sphere of distribution, the task of the Soviet power at the present time is unerringly to continue the replacement of trade by the purposive distribution of goods, by a system of distribution organized by the State upon a national scale.”*<sup>3</sup>

*“The State budget will be a budget of the whole of the national economy.”*<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ABC of Communism*, p. 70.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 406.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 408.

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## CHAPTER III

### PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

THE Communist State as the exclusive producer and distributor of all goods is the basic proposition of Communism according to which the economic activities of the population in totality are to be determined and administered. Whatever deviation from this ultimate Communist aim may take place is to be accounted for not by desire but by the iron force of some economic or political necessity.

To effect complete ownership, control, and operation of national production and distribution the Russian Communists have made two approaches, divergent as the poles, and a third (second in point of time) which served as a bridge between the other two. The first movement in the vast complex undertaking assumed in 1917 that the physical appropriation of the materials, instruments, and processes of production and distribution alone would lead directly to mastering the problem. The second, known as the New Economic Policy, came on in 1921. The third took form and substance as the Five Year Plan for the period 1928-1933.

The leaders soon discovered the futility of the first procedure—undertaking to produce and distribute adequately by means of the economic machinery and personnel taken over from the overthrown order. The failure experienced was complete and freely recognized though the seizure of the banks, railroads, factories,

lands, mines, and all sources of production and distribution had strictly complied with the Party platform. But what did they receive? With the wholesale confiscation and nationalization process more or less accomplished, the new masters found themselves in the name of the masses in undisputed possession of an originally poorly built, inadequate, and now war-strained system of Russian economy—industrially incomplete and agriculturally partly dying out.

To seize the remaining estates of the landlords and distribute them among the peasants who had not enough land from which to produce a living was simple enough. To have in them a national economic asset afterward did not follow. The pre-war export of grain, the largest decisive item in the old régime upon which depended the stability of the monetary system and of the whole Russian economy, had been sustained in large part by the now ruined estates. The peasantry to a large extent poorly used the insufficient land they possessed before the war. Their dearth of land explained only in part the average lower productivity of individual peasant holdings. The backward methods of cultivation and the primitive implements still widely employed accounted much for the low level of subsistence.

Likewise the organization of industry into the one projected giant national shop, each part of which should correspond to the other parts and supplement them, speedily proved hopeless of realization with the material, human, and organizational inheritances handed down and as disrupted by the Communists themselves. While civil and foreign wars continued, the obligatory course was to get a maximum of manufactured goods from the industries as they existed, for the

Army first, then for the population; also as large an agricultural yield as individual peasants would produce and share. The makeshifts resembled not at all a socialized apparatus—a National Economy constructed as an entity, each unit working for the needs and advancement of society as a whole.

The driving force of the October, 1917, Revolution gave the "factories to the workers" slogan practical effect. The private owners thrust aside thanked fortune if they suffered no other penalty than expropriation. The workmen's committees dismissed the former managers and entered upon full operating responsibilities in the plant. Chaos ensued. The committees used up the raw materials on hand, then wondered where and how more might be procured. The sources of supply failed equally of articulation. As purchasers the workers' committees had neither cash nor credit. When goods were manufactured they found the markets uncharted seas. Industrial morale enfeebled by the World War strains collapsed in the revolutionary upheavals. The experienced and dispossessed sabotaged, and the labor masses loafed and talked themselves and the population dependent on them to the point of destitution. Mill after mill closed down. Their output fell to a fraction of the pre-war level. Forests of smokeless chimneys witnessed to industrial prostration. Endless queues waiting for goods to be rationed that did not exist or were hidden spelled out the plight of the helpless consumers. The famous slogan "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" in practice meant displacing wages with rations. The undertaking involved no less a feat than the enforced gathering up of the total industrial and



agricultural production of the land and systematically apportioning it out to the consuming millions.

Individuals received an allotment of food and other necessities according to class category in this order of priority—soldiers, workmen, Soviet employees, all others—except private traders, employers, and priests, who were left to shift for themselves. Professional people rated in the fourth bracket. The system broke down utterly from the sheer weight of machinery and too little to ration. Goods went into hiding or were surreptitiously exchanged. “Bagmen” constituted the bulk of railroad passenger traffic—city dwellers, men and women, sallying forth to villages distant scores and hundreds of miles where a relative, friend, or willing peasant would sell something for the sustenance of life. The War Commissar mobilizing the workers of Petrograd to stop the Yudenitch advance found them looking badly—“their faces were gray from undernourishment; their clothes were tatters; their shoes, sometimes not even mates, were gaping with holes.”<sup>5</sup> Multitudes of urban people dispersed to the country for indefinite residence, where food and fuel could be procured.

The Moscow Association of Musicians and Music Teachers appealing for relief in 1922 represented their essential nourishment to consist of cabbage, frozen potatoes, and scanty quantities of bad rye bread. Among the 2,000 members “500 were in bitter want of food.” The Council of Professors and Teachers of Voronezh University reported for that learned body that the personnel were without indispensable clothing and shoes, and “oppressed by starvation, without a hope of help from the Government.” Peter the Great’s

<sup>5</sup> Trotsky: *My Life*, published by Chas. Scribner’s Sons, New York, p. 428.

capital became reduced to less than half its normal population. Its library, the fourth largest in the world, went entirely without heat. Numbers of its older staff members died from their hardships. This center of a canal system to limitless forests took up the wooden paving blocks of some of its streets, and the governing officials tore down hundreds of its empty frame houses for the freezing inhabitants to burn. The very barges needed to transport fuel for coming winters were themselves cut down to the ice in which the Neva held them. The American Relief Administration in 1921-1922 for months choked to capacity one-half of the functioning rail transport of European Russia to move \$50,000,000 worth of food, seed wheat, clothing, and medical supplies from ports to the interior.

No importations flowed in to relieve the shortage. The declared purpose of the new régime to overthrow all other existing governments had been met by an international economic blockade of Russia. The rank and file of city populations were reduced to a subsistence level comparable to that of the "neediest cases" that across the world become the charges of charity. The general demoralization and suffering found ominous expression in a revolt of the Cronstadt garrison and numerous peasant uprisings provoked by grain seizures, and were heightened by the 1921 crop failure of famine-making proportions. At this stage the New Economic Policy was framed and enacted. It abandoned rationing, promised the peasants possession of their products with direct access to open markets, and liberated private trade and small industries.

The New Economic Policy, or NEP as it immediately came to be known, has been given the interpretation

that Lenin, acknowledging the impossibility to produce and distribute adequately under the system then employed, partly surrendered the purpose to organize the National Economy along the approved lines of Communism as undertaken in the early days of accession to power. Lenin however was not abandoning the fixed ultimate goal, but only the first naive way taken to attain it—workers' committees operating plants, appropriation of all surplus crops, general rationing, and the like. He saw the necessity of rebuilding the whole economic machinery. Going on with the economic fiasco in force when the NEP was proclaimed would mean sinking into a morass from which there could be no extrication except by the surrender of power. His trenchant sentence on what was taking place reads: "The NEP is retreat not defeat—*reculer pour mieux sauter* (recoil in order to leap better)."

The proclamation to inside Communist leaders meant just that—a tactical maneuver, dictated not by consciousness of the cause being lost but by the resolve to gain a respite and reorganize for a frontal attack. They retained what Lenin termed the "strategic heights"—finance, transport, the heavy industries, foreign trade monopoly. In reality the NEP was the prelude to a bold plan to rebuild basically in the years ahead the whole structure of production and distribution. They resorted to the old apparatus and personnel sufficiently to care for the minimum needs of the people while they were preparing afresh to press true socialistic reconstruction on sterner lines. Step by step Lenin's followers have advanced the gigantic scheme, never losing sight of two steering posts—transformation of the institutions and remaking the human material.

"OBJECTIVE REASONS" FOR FAILURES IN THE EXECUTION OF  
THE FISHING PLAN

Some fishing organizations try to justify the unsatisfactory tempo in the development of the work by strong winds which they allege handicap fishing.



HEAD WINDS

Pravda.

The course itself has had many turnings and detours. The steering engineers have found themselves free politically only. Life constantly corrected their economic experiments and overruled elaborate plans. Many pre-revolutionary industries failed to fit the new economic aims or obstructed them outright. Some required rapid development. Others could be contracted without much harm or closed altogether. Consumption had radically changed. The nobility and the bourgeoisie no longer existed as buyers. The peasantry emerged a hungry and insistent buying class. Yet by inertia for some time after the New Economic Policy came in, State factories continued making objects of luxury. The industries generally undertook production at the rate of consumption of the town and the village existing before the Revolution. Although they wished and purposed to make the State the exclusive producer and distributor this could not be realized quickly in all industries. There had to be give and take. They had announced the NEP as a policy for a long period, but within three years they again ruthlessly suppressed private wholesale trade, and dealt similarly with retail business in 1927-1928. Confronted in many cases by the alternative either of stopping production entirely or temporarily yielding it to private hands, they rashly took risks and brought on ruin of the industry. Hastily then they appealed again to private initiative to salvage the wreck. Such vicissitudes overtook the gold mines, the fur and fishing industries, and many handicraft industries. As soon as possible they again incorporated the enterprises into the State network. Agriculture treated in another Chapter proved the hardest nut to crack.

Socialization, or more accurately "statification," of

the National Economy as a whole advanced progressively during the NEP period. Neither of the two terms should be mistaken for what orthodox Socialism understands by "social ownership" of the means of production. The State is in possession of the factories, mines, and railroads instead of private companies. What has evolved in the operating pattern of Soviet industry differs little in its main lines from the internal organization of great capitalistic enterprises. The individual plants enjoy either negligible or no independence. The Government controlled Trusts or combinations in a given industry own and direct their respective groups of factories. The factory managers receive their orders from the Trusts which have worked out a production plan for each mill, supply it with funds and raw materials, and dispose of its product. Each Trust represents to an extent an independent economic unit, and competes very often with another Trust producing in a similar line. Opportunity for competition cannot be large with fixed prices for finished goods and a general shortage of both raw materials and of manufactures, yet the tendency has been manifested more than was to be anticipated.

In theory the edifice of Soviet Industry is impressive. The Supreme Council of National Economy, the Department of State for Agriculture, the Department of State for Finance, the Department of Ways and Means of Communication, the Department of Post and Telegraph, and the Department of Foreign Trade each submits the draft of its program to a State Planning Commission, the super-planning organ of the Soviet Union. The drafts are reconstructed by the State Planning Commission and authorized, in principle coördinated to prevent interference one with the other

and to secure perfect interaction between all parts of the total Economy.

Practically, difficulties arise. No matter how carefully the State Planning Commission maps out the lines of action the inner forces of each industry tend to act for themselves. There are arbitrary disproportions between branches. All do not feel at ease within the house where they live. Certain natural requirements cannot be overlooked though plans fail of realization. It is to be proved whether Russia in the immediately coming decades can exist as a highly industrialized country; also whether the land, even without the costly bourgeois aristocracy but with the no less costly Soviet bureaucracy, can pay for the long-term investments in the heavy industries and the present and projected expenditures for social purposes, or even the standard of living for the workers projected but largely unrealized.

The year 1928 saw the Communist grand strategy turn sharply from the New Economic Policy road into that of a Five Year Plan. The leaders on numerous occasions declared it to be "the cornerstone and the first step on the path to the definite socialization of Russia." Such a departure calls for sketching the general economic situation just preceding introduction of the Plan, the extent of socialization at the time of the launching, and what changes the Communist leaders then expected the Plan to effect.

In 1927-1928<sup>6</sup> the State Sector,<sup>7</sup> so called to designate the State owned industrial and agricultural enterprises, employed 15.1% of the total working adult

<sup>6</sup> The Soviet Union fiscal year at this time dated from October 1. After 1930 it will begin January 1.

<sup>7</sup> Waisberg in *Pravda*, April 20, 1929.

population from sixteen to fifty-nine years of age. It yielded 39.8% of the combined production of industry and agriculture and 56.9% of the marketable production; had in its possession 51.4% of the basic funds of the country; produced 69.5% of the total output of industry; and held the railroad transport and the credit system entirely in its hands.\*

The State Sector, together with the Coöperative Sector, which comprises the Coöperative organizations that in the Soviet Union are entirely controlled by the State and are considered by the Communists themselves State organizations, employed that year 18.3% of the adult working population; and 52.7% of the basic funds. The combined shares of the State and Coöperative Sectors in the national income equalled 52.7%. The share of the socialized Sector—the State farms and the farm collectives—in the total output of Russian agriculture reached 2%, thus crediting 98% to private peasant production.\*\*

“Acute” does not too sensationally characterize the agricultural situation of the period, not only by reason of the nearly complete domination of the private sector but more because of the steadily accentuated economic and social problems resident therein. The sown area in 1929 amounted to 98-99% of the pre-war sown area, yet the amount of grain collected was steadily decreasing. Before the war on the present territory of the Soviet Union, the yearly output of grain amounted to 81.6 million metric tons,<sup>8</sup> in 1926-1927

\* According to *Pravda*, December 16, 1930, the State Sector had become employer of 32.5% of the adult working population, and produced 90.3% of the total industrial output.

\*\* *Pravda*, December 16, 1930, reported this Sector, the producer of about 50% of the marketable production of grain in 1930, and of 44.3% of the marketable production of all agriculture.

<sup>8</sup> Metric ton=2204.6 pounds avoirdupois.



to 78 million tons, in 1927-1928 to 73.6 millions, and in 1928-1929 to 73.3 millions.

The trend in technical agriculture also was downward. Although the sown area had increased in the previous years the output was much less than pre-war. In 1928-1929 the sugar-beet area planted exceeded that before the war—771,000 hectares<sup>9</sup> compared with 622,000. Rykov, as Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, in his May, 1929, speech to the V All-Union Congress of Soviets reported the yield less than before the war. The cultivated cotton area exceeded that of the pre-war period by 20-30% but the product barely exceeded that before the war. The figures were 743,000 metric tons in 1913 and 781,400 in 1928-1929. The flax land sown decreased from 11,857,000 hectares in 1913 to 11,757,000 in 1928-1929 and the crop from 453,700 to 345,000 tons.<sup>10</sup>

The per capita production of grain by the agricultural population decreased still more ominously from 584.1 kilograms<sup>11</sup> in 1913 to 532.3 in 1926-1927, to 489.6 in 1927-1928, and to 484.4 in 1928-1929.<sup>12</sup> The decline paralleled one of the most striking developments in Soviet agriculture—the rapid partitioning of the individual peasant land. The farms of kulak proportions had become reduced in number to about 4% of the total of individual peasant holdings with the proportion tending toward further rapid decrease.<sup>13</sup> To escape the heavier taxation on a relatively larger holding the kulak family subdivided it. The smaller the individual land parcel became the less its output,

<sup>9</sup> Hectare=2.471 acres.

<sup>10</sup> *Pravda*, May 25, 1929.

<sup>11</sup> Kilogram=2.2046 pounds avoirdupois.

<sup>12</sup> *Pravda*, May 25, 1929.

<sup>13</sup> Waisberg in *Pravda*, April 20, 1929.

and markedly smaller the surplus that could be sold after supplying the consuming needs of the producers.

The threat of this trend to the nation's food supply and to the Government's grain export prospects is apparent. The individual peasant holdings before the Revolution, now in Soviet territory, numbered 17-18 millions. This figure had risen to 23,977,500 in 1925, to 24,596,000 in 1926, to 25,037,700 in 1927, and to 25,585,900 in 1928. The tax evasion movement toward further partitioning had not run its full course and the Government could not check it. That the Communist leaders would take measures to insure a mass production and surplus of grain and other products for city consumption and export, and to act politically to gain ascendancy over passive resistance by the peasants required no gift of prophecy to foresee. They were face to face with Russia's historic economic root problem—the peasant, the land, and his use of it.

The Five Year Plan as conceived marked out giant strides for advance in socialization for the fiscal years October 1, 1928-1933. It envisaged a sum total of 64.6 billion rubles<sup>14</sup> of new capital investments. For the five years 1923-1928 the corresponding figure was 26.5 billion rubles. A larger share allotted to industry squares with the cardinal point of Communist technique for Russia—its industrialization. The Plan scheduled industry to receive 16.4 billion rubles compared with 4.4 billions the five preceding years; agriculture 23.2 billion rubles against 15 billions in the other period; transportation 10 billions instead of 2.7; and electrification 3.1 billions in place of .9 of a billion.

The calculations provided for the annual output of

<sup>14</sup> One ruble at par equals \$0.5145.

industry to expand from 18.3 billion rubles in 1927-28 to 43.2 billions by 1933, thus tripling the pre-war volume. The agricultural production if realized would rise from 16.6 billions to 25.8 billions—an increase of 150% over production before the war. The ranking share of capital went down for multiplying the material means of production—power generating stations, metallurgical plants, mines, machinery, and chemicals. The principle of advancing substantially the share of the socialized Sector at the expense of the private Sector guided throughout. Granted the Plan came to full realization, that Sector would represent 63.6% of the total national assets, the Coöperative Sector 5.3%, the private Sector 31.1%. Originally the sector of agriculture to be socialized stood to mount from 2% to 16% leaving 84% still in the hands of individual peasants, but the second year brought developments that radically revised upward the farm quota to be socialized.

Feats bordering on the miraculous were involved in the Plan. Baker's *Economic Statesmanship* shows the main lines of Russian industry having advanced rather consistently at the rate of doubling between each of the decades 1883-1893-1903-1913. Kuibishev, head of the Soviet economic system, did not blink the hardihood of the undertakings in his comment that, although the greatest industrial development in the United States had been 8.7% in a year, "Soviet industry in these five years was to develop about 20% yearly."<sup>15</sup>

Other equally startling goals were fixed. The efficiency of labor must improve 110%, the cost of production decrease 35%, wages rise 47%, the working day in no industrial plant exceed seven hours.

<sup>15</sup> Speech at the V Soviet Congress, May, 1929, as reported by *Pravda*.

The realizations of the Five Year Plan to mid-year 1930, as seen by its creators and promoters, Stalin expounded in his seven-hour deliverance to the XVI Congress of the Party.<sup>1\*</sup> Some allowances in the size of figures and the interpretation of them may be due. His administration had its defense to make against the criticisms of the Right Wingers, and the Congress itself had a jubilee significance. Shifts in standards for comparison are to be observed also. Yet heavy discounting of the data cannot destroy the validity of the main trends to which he directs attention.

Stalin reported total values of all agricultural production (including forestry and fishing, etc.) reckoned in pre-war prices as 12,370 million rubles in 1926-1927, or 106.6% of the pre-war figure. The year 1927-1928 gave 107.2%; 1928-1929—109.1%; and 1929-1930 promised to yield 113-114%. It will be noted that the comparisons are in money values not in quantities.

The values shown for all Soviet industrial production (State, Coöperative and private) including flour mills amounted in pre-war prices to 8,641 million rubles in 1926-1927, or 102.5% of the pre-war level; 122% in 1927-1928; 142.5% in 1928-1929; and were estimated to be 180% in 1929-1930.

The car loadings of the Soviet railroads exhibited in comparison with the 100% pre-war level were:

1926-1927 .....	127.0%
1927-1928 .....	134.2%
1928-1929 .....	162.4%
1929-1930 estimated .....	193.0%

The increases in commercial turnover were displayed in comparison with the 31 billion rubles figure of 1926-

<sup>1\*</sup> *Pravda*, June 29, 1930.

1927 taken as the norm, the period itself being one of rising prices:

1927-1928 .....	124.6%
1928-1929 .....	160.4%
1929-1930 estimated .....	202.0%

The foreign trade totals presented for 1926-1927 amounted to 47.9% of the pre-war level; for 1927-1928, 56.8%; for 1928-1929, 67.9%; and estimated for 1929-1930, 80%. The diminution of grain exports is reflected here.

The picture of the total national income growth appeared, again in the prices of 1926-1927 (in millions of rubles):

1926-1927 .....	23,127	100.0%
1927-1928 .....	25,396	109.8%
1928-1929 .....	28,596	112.6%
1929-1930 estimated..	34,000*	120.0%

The basic changes of Soviet economy found expression in the growing importance of industry relative to agriculture, illustrated by the following table:

INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE IN THE TOTAL PRODUCTION OF  
RUSSIAN NATIONAL ECONOMY BY PERCENTAGES

Years	Industry	Agriculture
1913 .....	42.1	57.9
1927-1928 .....	45.2	54.8
1928-1929 .....	48.7	51.3
1929-1930 estimated..	53.0**	47.0

These figures prompted the Communist chief to observe: "This means that the specific gravity of industry begins to overbalance the specific gravity of agri-

\* Realized and exceeded by more than 2,000 millions, *Pravda*, December 22, 1930.

\*\* Realized in full, *Pravda*, December 16, 1930.

culture and we are on the eve of the transformation of Russia from an agrarian country into an industrial country.”

The figures given for marketable production further indicated industry gaining over agriculture, the shares of each being put down in percentages:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Industry</i>	<i>Agriculture</i>
1926-1927 .....	68.8	31.2
1927-1928 .....	71.2	28.8
1928-1929 .....	72.4	27.6
1929-1930 estimated...	76.0	24.0

Significantly the “heavy” industry (manufacturing the means of production), according to the statement developed at a much higher speed than the “light” industry (producing consumer’s goods). The comparisons are by percentages:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Producer’s Goods</i>	<i>Consumer’s Goods</i>
1927-1928 .....	27.2	72.8
1928-1929 .....	28.7	71.3
1929-1930 estimated ..	32.7	67.3

This faster tempo in the heavy industry accords perfectly with the Communist policy of making Russia an entirely self-supporting country in the sense of manufacturing producer’s as well as consumer’s goods. No less an authority than Lenin described heavy industry as “the real and only basis for the consolidation of resources necessary to build a socialistic society”—the “one and only one.” Its development therefore does not represent a result of the free combination of economic forces, but purposeful advance planning and direction.

This holds true also in the weight thrown on the balances to favor the so-called socialized Sector over

the private or capitalist Sector, which the Government temporarily tolerates until it can organize the production of corresponding goods in its own factories. The disparity of investment in millions of rubles by the Government in the two industrial Sectors reflects the objective kept in view:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Socialized Sector</i>	<i>Private Sector</i>
1926-1927 .....	1,270	63
1927-1928 .....	1,614	64
1928-1929 .....	2,046	56
1929-1930 estimated ...	4,275	51

The results of the policy appear in the figures submitted on the total production of Soviet industry in both its Sectors in millions of rubles:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Socialized Sector</i>	<i>Private Sector</i>
1926-1927 .....	11,999	4,043
1927-1928 .....	15,389	3,704
1928-1929 .....	18,903	3,389
1929-1930 estimated ...	24,740*	3,310

The achievements cited in the field of heavy industry included completion of several mammoth industrial enterprises—the agricultural machinery plant in Rostov, reputed the largest in the world with capacity for producing twice the machinery of which all the kindred plants of Imperial Russia were capable; the tractor plant in Stalingrad built with the coöperation of American engineers and opened in June, 1930, and scheduled to turn out 50,000 tractors a year; and the Turkestan-Siberian railroad, 1445 kilometers<sup>17</sup> in length. Projects named under construction, several well advanced, were the great power generating works

\* *Pravda* reported December 22, 1930, that 30.5 billions were realized.

<sup>17</sup> Kilometer= $\frac{5}{8}$  of a mile.

on the Volkhov and the Dneiper rivers, to feed electric power to Leningrad industry and to the Ukraine mill and mining district respectively; numerous new textile mills, mining, machine building, metallurgical, and fertilizer plants; additional factories for tractors in Khar'kov and Cheliabinsk; agricultural combine plants in Zaporozhie and Saratov; automobile plants in Moscow and Nizhni-Novgorod, the last-named building to a 100,000 yearly capacity; the huge Magnitogorsk steel plant in the Urals.

According to Stalin's information the Five Year Plan in the oil and peat fields will be completed in two and a half years. The general machine-building program will take two and a half to three years, the agricultural machine-building and electro-technical three years.

The optimistic forecasts have counterbalances. Ar-rears, some of them large, in the first half of the second economic year of the Plan remained to be overtaken during the latter half. According to a statement by Kuibishev <sup>18</sup> the increase in industry's total production the first half compared with the previous year netted 29.4% as against 31.3% set by the revised Five Year Plan. The cost of production should have decreased 7% in 1928-1929 instead of the 4.4% realized. For 1929-1930 an 11% cost reduction was demanded. The first half gave but 6%.

The Stalin speech referred to river transportation not exceeding 40-60% of the pre-war loadings, but *Economic Life* <sup>19</sup> reported that for the first five months of the economic year the loadings planned for the entire Soviet transportation system had been executed

<sup>18</sup> May 20, 1930.

<sup>19</sup> April 1, 1930.



only to the extent of 47%. Rukhimovitch, the new Commissar of Railroads, on July 13, 1930, through the newspapers gave what *The New York Times* Correspondent called "a terrific blast" on the "insufferable conditions" in transportation demanding radical reorganization from top to bottom.

Operation of the new Turkestan-Siberian railroad, the construction of which was widely and properly heralded as a major achievement, has brought much grief. *Economic Life* in August, 1930, published an account of the trials and shortcomings three months after the announcement of the completed project. The winter would find many of the locomotives without stalls. A combination of difficulties kept the dilapidated motive power in that condition. Only half of the needed telegraph lines had been laid and wire to finish the job was withheld. Plows and fences to cope with the coming winter snow were not in sight. Labor shortage of 8,700 men for crews, repairs, and construction existed. Of 646 skilled workmen sent to the railway 385 remained. During July, 768 men out of 1,343 engaged in locomotive and track maintenance quit work. Under the pressure for labor, drunkenness and other incompetencies can be little subjected to discipline. The fault of employees accounted for 88% of the accidents. Only one-fourth the required housing construction demanded was even planned, and the necessary lumber and nails for that quota had not become available. Unhoused workmen occupied 1,298 railway carriages and box cars, chiefly the latter. Requisitions for food and other products had been filled 40% during the second quarter. Except for bread the third quarter's requirements were unfilled. The sugar, tea, and cereal rations of the fourth quarter were to be reduced.

No textile goods would be received. There were no shoe or clothing repair shops. The entire situation was described as very critical.

Parallel press accounts of many of the great manufacturing projects cast heavy shadows over the more rosy early promises. The 50,000 capacity tractor plant in Stalingrad, impressively declared open in June, 1930, was scheduled to turn out 3,500 machines by October 1 of the same year.<sup>20</sup> The production was eight in June, none from July 1 to August 25. The paper *For Industrialization* discussed the same subject September 19, 20, and 23, reporting an output of ten tractors that were ready in August but none subsequently up to the last-named date of publication.

The quality of the industrial production also troubled greatly during this second year of the Plan having improved little if at all in the entire period. The leaders have not hesitated to decry both the quality of goods and the huge losses which were resulting. *Economic Life*<sup>21</sup> cites cases. The losses in Leningrad from manufactures, which did not answer even to the Soviet low standards, amounted to 100 million rubles a year. The textile mills of Tver had 400,000 rubles loss a year on the same account.


Rejections by the plant brokers in the machine-building plants of a single Trust (GOMZA) totaled 16,500,000 rubles in the past four years. The Ural milk separator factory had over 60% of rejected goods the preceding few months. *Consomolskaia Pravda*<sup>22</sup> declared the quality of industrial production on a low level and in many cases showing a tendency to further

<sup>20</sup> September 11, 1930.


<sup>21</sup> January 4, 1930.

<sup>22</sup> May 29, 1930.

THE CLOSING OF AMERICA AND . . . THE OPENING OF AMERICA  
(In U. S. A.)



THE OPENING OF AMERICA  
(In Soviet Union)



deterioration in both heavy and light industries. Indignation was expressed that among goods received from the factories as standard and passed by the factory brokers the below standard quality reached on various occasions still was from 8 to 50%.

Vice Premier Rudzutak told a Communist Convention in Kharkov in early June, 1930, that the quality of the industrial production was one of the most threatening conditions, resulting in a huge overhead for which the working class and the country as a whole have to pay. "In a number of factories," he continued, "we have a tremendous rate of goods rejected by factory brokers which in some cases reaches from 30 to 40%."

The results in improving the productivity of labor have been less than satisfactory also. A *Pravda*<sup>22</sup> article, entitled "Some Problems in the Development of National Economy in the First Half of 1929-1930," related that instead of the planned 25% increase in labor productivity over the average of last year the first six months gave an advantage of 11.5%.

These weaknesses can be attributed less and less to high sabotaging managers. The elapsed years of the Plan have been marked by untiring efforts to insure the communization of the leading personnel of industry and of other people holding key positions in Soviet national economy. In fact anticipatory to the Plan, a wholesale discharge of employees guilty or suspected of disaffection took place and their replacement with tested adherents was effected. Ordzhonikidze, Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, informed the XVI Party Congress that the higher executive personnel of industry was 76% Communist.

<sup>22</sup> May 17, 1930.

Kaganovich advised the same body that an investigation of directors of the Soviet industrial enterprises showed 93% of them Communists on December 1, 1929, and a Communist director in every enterprise with more than 5,000 workers. The percentage steadily lowers along down the administrative ladder until only 24.6% among operative executives are Communists, and 7.5% among research workers and experts without administrative functions.

In the field of distribution the elimination of private capital and its substitution by "statified" co-operative organizations have developed at full speed. Stalin's speech to the XVI Party Congress advanced the claim that the share of kulaks and city private traders in the national income, which in 1927-1928 amounted to 8.1%, decreased in 1928-1929 to 6.5% and in 1929-1930 to 1.8%. Other results of the measures against private retail trade appear in a table published in *Economic Life*:<sup>24</sup>

#### TURNOVER OF THE RETAIL TRADE DISPLAYED IN PERCENTAGES

Years	State Organizations	Coöperative Organizations	Private Traders
1926-1927 .....	14.4	48.2	37.4
1927-1928 .....	13.1	59.5	27.4
1928-1929 .....	14.0	67.4	18.6
1929-1930 estimated ...	12.7	76.6	10.7

With the "statified" Coöperative organizations gradually monopolizing Russian retail trade, interest attaches to the working of that prevailing system. According to *Economic Life*<sup>25</sup> the Coöperative organizations in the entire Union embraced on June 1, 1930, more than 44,000,000 members, of whom 14,000,000 lived

<sup>24</sup> October 1, 1929.

<sup>25</sup> July 5, 1930.

in the cities, 28,000,000 in the villages, and 1.8 million were engaged in transportation. In another paragraph the newspaper reported 79.8% of the adult city population and 39.3% of the adult village population members of Coöperatives April 1, 1930. The turnover of the consumers' Coöperatives aggregated twelve billion rubles in the current year.

The entire distributory system labors clumsily with the enormous tasks set before it. Of the consumers' Coöperative system, retailing to over three-quarters of the city population and to almost one-half of the village population, *Economic Life*<sup>26</sup> writes editorially: "We have heard signals of shortcomings for a long time. The work . . . is very unsatisfactory in the distribution of the enormous stock of merchandise concentrated in its hands. . . . Workers' centers are not supplied enough. Baking of bread and mass feeding are done so unsatisfactorily that most valuable food resources are literally destroyed."

While the Communist goal is to secure the maximum approach of producer to consumer and the complete exclusion of middlemen, the existing structure and functioning go far afield. Individual factories deliver their product to the Trusts of which they constitute a part. The Trusts do not market directly but hand over the production to syndicates. The syndicates do not sell the goods directly to consumers. They pass them on to Soviet wholesale organizations which relay them on to the Soviet retail organizations. When the purchases are being made through the system of Co-operative stores the syndicates sell the goods to the central body of the system, which resells to the regional Coöperative organizations, and they in turn

<sup>26</sup> May 18, 1930.

consign to district Coöperative organizations. Goods from the factory actually reach the consumer through from eight to twelve different handling organizations,

OUR FASHIONS  
AN OBSOLETE DRESS



Сомсомолская Правда.

Let us finish with price increases and queues.

each taking its meed of profit, accounting in large part for a chasm of discrepancy between the initial cost of production and the retail cost to consumers. Grain to reach consumers from the growers also runs the gamut two ways, and therefore through a similar chain of handling institutions. Further tribute is taken by incompetence. Graft continues widespread in spite of the desperate fight against it waged by the Government. The entire selling organization has been such a stronghold of bureaucracy as probably deserves to be characterized the most vulnerable spot in the Soviet Economy.

A 1929 report made to the People's Commissariat for Inspection in Moscow illustrated the mutual recriminations that reveal the state of affairs. The representative of the Coöperative organizations declared the factories did not give the proper assortment of goods and that the goods produced were most inferior. "From all sides complaints are literally pouring in against the unsatisfactory quality of goods," he protested. Lamp chimneys were cited for which there is a wide peasant demand as they are used in almost every house. The chimneys cracked when the lamps were lighted. The burners also were poor. The Trusts were charged with not keeping the terms of agreements concluded between them and the Coöperatives. Continuing the charges he said, "Usually the stipulated assortment of goods is actually changed by the Trusts from 60 to 80% and sometimes the change amounts to 92%, which means that we get only 8% of what we have ordered and 92% of what we never ordered and cannot use. Besides there are very long delays in the execution of orders—frequently from three to four months."

The representatives of the Trusts impeached the



Coöperatives with a complete lack of ability to sell the goods. There were no catalogues and no description of goods offered. The consumer especially in the village must pay without even seeing a picture of what he may be buying. The Coöperatives did not send to the village the goods for which the peasants asked. In the Volga area for instance they were interested in ready-made dresses, but desired very simple fashions. The Coöperative associations send to the villages suits intended for use in the town. The peasants do not wish do buy these goods. Concurrently the city population cannot get the goods manufactured for them because they are sent to the village where they become a dead weight. *Pravda's* editor on economics wrote on the "scandal" of the Moscow vegetable supply, charging that spoilage of vegetables sent into Moscow by the Coöperative producing organization ranged from 35 to 95% before reaching the consumer. He sarcastically commented that the four Coöperative links from the producers to the city blame one another and that all are correct.<sup>27</sup>

The overtopping Five Year Plan appeared to offer defiance to all known laws of safe financing. Rykov promised to get most of the funds from the incomes of industry and the economies in government expenses, which would reverse the direction of the flow at the time the promise was made. The socialized Sector then was taking more funds from the Government than it returned. Previous State budgets had been based on more than half of the income being realized from the private Sector. The Plan requiring vastly larger funds proposed progressively to annihilate the private

<sup>27</sup> Walter Duranty in *The New York Times*, July 13, 1930.

Sector and so automatically decrease income from that source.

Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Trade, in a statement printed in *Economic Life*, founded his financial hope chiefly on increasing export. In 1925 this was

A PERFUMED SUPPLY

In the Nizhni-Novgorod District the lumber workings are in danger. The supply of merchandise sent by the Coöperative stores to the workers shows all the signs of intentional mockery (cosmetics, perfumes, etc.).



*Economic Life.*

"IF ONLY YOU WOULD GIVE ME SOME TOBACCO"

42.7% of the pre-war Russian export, and by 1928 with tremendous effort had climbed to 59.2%. The meager surplus of grain per capita produced by the peasant population bore importantly on the outlook for early resumption of grain export, the old régime's heavy

reliance. A report made to the Communist Academy as published in *Pravda* indicated such surplus at the outset of the Twentieth Century to be about 300 kilograms per capita in Russia in comparison with 450 kilograms in Germany, 900 in Denmark, and 1,000 in the United States. The inference is that pre-war grain for export by Russia was obtained through a system that deprived much of the peasant population of needful grain and resulted in the chronically low subsistence of themselves and their animals. On this premise therefore, unless Russian grain production were to be largely increased any considerable export of it for the future would mean decision by the Communists to imitate the course of the former rulers in stinting the peasants, in one form or another, and meeting with success in the attempt.

Foreign loans in prospect were negligible for expansion of the proportions marked out. Experience had demonstrated the expected hunger of foreign capital for concessions in Russia was largely creation of fancy. Taken all in all it could be predicted that the backs of the entire population were due at best to sustain an immense financial burden through taxation and internal loans. Life has verified every such prediction and in addition brought into action forces probably novel in the economic world.

The Soviet economists assert that the 1928-1929 plan of the State budget was executed successfully in spite of such unfavorable conditions as a considerable rise of expenditures in the second half of the budget year; a large shortage in the receipt of taxes levied from private traders who were eliminated more rapidly than the Plan anticipated; an extremely strained situation in cash assignments conditioned by a lack of

currency in spite of new printings; and a very considerable percentage of Government bonds, floated under compulsion, being immediately mortgaged by subscribers at the State Bank. This entailed not only loss to a bond owner but reissue by the Bank from its cash reserve of the major portion of the value of the bond. Earlier loans due had to be taken up in the new and larger flotations.

During the interval from October 1, 1928, to August 1, 1930, according to the State Bank reports the circulation of bank notes increased from 1,063,000,000 rubles to 2,054,000,000; and of treasury notes from 710,000,000 to 1,533,000,000. Government fiat alone supports the treasury notes. The supporting reserve of the bank notes was maintained at the 25% ratio required by law only by employing "collateral for short-term loans"<sup>28</sup> for nearly 75% of the reserve. To protect their currency from the influence of the international money market which concerns itself with the real value of the currency as distinct from the official value, Soviet financiers have laid a strict embargo upon rubles being brought in from abroad. Very low quotations of the chervonetz or bank note issue (official value \$5.14½) result on the foreign underground bourses. The *Warsaw Courier* (Poland) in mid-September, 1930, reported the rate in that city at 67½ cents. Later the rate in Riga, Latvia, reached 50 cents.

The 1929-1930 budget accepted by the Soviet Cabinet amounted to 11,500,000,000 rubles, about 40% more than in the previous year. Where the corresponding income was sighted becomes a natural question.

<sup>28</sup> *Economic Review of the Soviet Union*, published by Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York City, Vol. 5, Nos. 18-19, October 1, 1930.

One answer appeared in *Pravda*.<sup>29</sup> Miroshnikov, an expert in Soviet finance, discussing there the 1929-1930 budget emphasized the rôle of the State budget in the redistribution of the nation's income. While the former budget comprehended 27% of the nation's income, this one constituted 31%. No matter how highly he would estimate the economic results of 1928-1929 and the prospects of the coming year, Miroshnikov wrote recognizing that the natural increase of budget resources alone could not cover the large increase of the budget. He explained that "approximately two-fifths of this increase, amounting to about 1,000,000,000 rubles, will derive from the increase in taxation, by the forcing of the income of the State."

This cryptic phrase, "forcing of the State income," brings into nearer view the hardships of the people who sustain the structure. The leaders increase the State income in part by pumping more out of the population. This is done in several ways. Bruchanov, Commissar of Finance,<sup>30</sup> estimated at the U. S. S. R. Central Executive Committee meeting that only one-half of the budget rise could be covered by the natural increase of the nation's income resulting from growth in the Soviet Economy. "The remaining 1.6 to 1.7 billion rubles will be collected by means of new measures," he explained, consisting of appropriation by the Government of about 250,000,000 rubles from the profits of the local industries; heavier taxation of State industry; abolition of some privileges enjoyed by the Coöperative associations; higher excises; and added taxation of the surviving private traders.

Internal loans amounting to about 700,000,000 rubles

<sup>29</sup> October 1, 1929.

<sup>30</sup> December 1, 1929.

were placed on the market in 1928-1929. The Plan for 1929-1930 swelled this figure to 1,355,000,000 rubles. "Three quarters of this sum," grimly adds Bruchanov, "have to be collected from workers and employees." The Soviet State debt to the population, which on October 1, 1929, amounted to about 2,000,000,000 rubles, would reach by October 1, 1930, on this basis 3,000,000,000 rubles borne largely by the city population.

Rykov speaking at the same Central Executive Committee session enumerated among "special measures to increase the State income beyond its natural growth" raising the excise on vodka; additional appropriations of the profits of the State and local industry; compulsory investment of the profits of the Coöperative associations in government bonds; and "the system of dual prices" established simultaneously with the introduction of bread and other foodstuff cards. Members of Trade Unions receive rationed foods at a given price. All persons without food cards pay increased prices to the State for the same articles. The difference between the higher prices paid by the non-privileged and the actual cost to the Government was expected to yield the budget about 200,000,000 rubles.

Another item for supplementing the income gave the peasants their turn through "self-taxation," a pleasantly termed, ingenious, and original Soviet idea. The well-known disfranchisement of the more prosperous peasants leaves all administrative and financial problems of the village to be decided by the poor and middle peasants. The president of the village soviet receives from the county seat an allotment of 1,000 rubles, more or less, to be collected in his village in addition to the regular taxation. He hastily convokes

a meeting of the voters and a schedule of "extra taxes" is submitted for approval, listing the wealthier peasants only who have no right even to be present. The Government has promised that the money thus collected will be used within the district where it is levied. The voters having nothing to lose and all to gain approve the list and the confiscation of the money or other property equivalent from the "self-taxed" peasants may proceed in the "legal" way. The Government gains by so much as is collected. Instead of having to issue the sum to the village soviet for expenditures it is extracted from the kulaks. Bruchanov reported to the Central Executive Committee on the same date that village meetings which had taken "self-taxation" decisions to bring a yield of 113,000,000 rubles had actually collected 105,000,000 rubles.

Some results on the income side for the first six months of 1929-1930 reached the public in May 1930.<sup>\*1</sup> The half year saw 49.3% of the annual schedule collected, in spite of the fact that industry failed to realize the expected results at the two points of lowering production costs and of increasing output to the scale of the Plan. The disappointments in industry were compensated by the private population. Agricultural taxes had yielded 40,000,000 rubles surplus over the estimate, private trade overshot 15,000,000 rubles, and the population at large other sums in income taxes. The surpluses in the first three types of incomes, Mindlin accounted for in *Economic Life* by "a pressure exerted on the capitalistic elements in the villages and cities . . . connected partly with the process of 'liquidation' of the kulak as a class in the districts of complete collectivization."

<sup>\*1</sup> *Pravda*, May 28, and *Economic Life*, May 30, 1930.

The flotation of loans fell short about 100,000,000 rubles. One may wonder when the limit of saturation will be reached in the imposing of internal loans on the urban population. The Plan presupposes issues to follow one another.

An enlarging rôle of the State Bank in the redistribution of the national income, fitting in with the Communist theory and practice of planned economy, has evolved into what is called "the unified financial plan." Kaktin, one of the financial leaders, made explicit in *Pravda*, November 29, 1929, that "the State budget becomes a planned mechanism increasingly substituting the market mechanism of redistribution of values in capitalistic countries." This statement faces up squarely to the question often put by outside observers of Russia: "What is the gain from increasing taxation of State industry or the Coöperative movement when it means simply transferring money from one pocket of the State to another?" The Soviet leaders make financial plans and budgets calculated deliberately to effect redistribution of the national income to further their aims. They are able to withdraw almost all the profits of some self-supporting industry manufacturing Russian consumers' goods and to reinvest the money in another industry which commercially has no immediate value but politically promises to make them independent of foreign imports. The unified financial plan conceives of all financial resources of the Soviet Union being mobilized by the so-called socialized Sector and used for investments in industry, agriculture, transport, defense, also administration of the State, reconstruction, and culture. It incorporates not only the profits and surpluses of organizations belonging to the



socialized Sector but also taxation income, and even the possessions of private individuals, in so far as these are ultimately collected by the Government in the form of internal loans and bank deposits.

Division of this aggregate fund into two groups takes place. The first group amounting to about 15% of the total embraces all resources obtained through channels other than the system of prices—agricultural and income taxes, loans, “self-taxation,” bank deposits, and membership shares in Coöperative associations. The 85% residue is accumulated through the Government selling goods and services to the population—a monopolist seller with the almost complete elimination of private trade and industry and the coöperative movement completely “statified.” Of the total unified financial pool amounting in 1929-1930 to 20,000,000,000 rubles, the Government expected to realize 16,500,000,000 rubles through the system of prices. The corresponding figures for 1930-1931 are 26,000,000,000 rubles and 22,500,000,000 rubles. A contributor to *Economic Life*<sup>22</sup> set up the claim that in 1930-1931 the unified plan will collect about two-thirds of the total national income of the Soviet Union. On the obvious fact of the concentrated power implied he commented: “The State and the local budget and all other financial plans combined in the unified financial plan have been put entirely at the service of the economic program of the Communist Party.”

“Credit reform” represents another outgrowth of the progressive nationalization of both industry and agriculture. The essence of it is the elimination of short term commercial crediting and the abolition of the draft or promissory note as an expression of value in

<sup>22</sup> June 26, 1930.

commercial relations. Every State factory and almost every Soviet institution maintains an account in the local branch of the State Bank. A special law obliges every Soviet institution to deposit all its cash resources with that local unit. The same State Bank likewise finances most of the industrial and commercial organizations. The Government department supervising the particular branch of industry fixes the prices for goods manufactured by every State factory in advance and communicates them to the State Bank. When the factory delivers goods manufactured by it to a customer, it notifies the State Bank whereupon the Bank transfers the corresponding credit from the account of the buyer to the account of the factory. When the factory buys raw materials the accounting procedure is reversed. An organization purchasing on credit issues no drafts or promissory notes as it need not pay any money to the seller, the accounts being adjusted in the State Bank office by means of transfers. If the account of the purchasing organization has insufficient funds the Bank can either give or refuse credit to it.

The Bank office, having advance information of the financial plan for each business organization in its district, is able to judge whether the development accords with the plan. If there is deviation, the Bank immediately signals danger to the Government department supervising the factory. Together with the unified financial plan the credit reform gives the central Government institutions absolute power over the financial and industrial life of the land. Not only are rigid plans laid down but the supervising organizations and the Bank automatically check their execution. The system goes beyond state capitalism to state dictator-

ship of a nation's economic life. Whether it is Socialism is debatable.

Stalin told the students of the Sverdlov University for preparing Party propagandists in February, 1930, the NEP would be abandoned when "we will have no need to tolerate a certain freedom of trade, when such toleration will give only negative results; when we can organize economic ties between the city and the village by exchange of products without commerce and its private traders, and without allowing a certain revival of capitalism." Four months later at the XVI Party Congress he said unhesitatingly: "We have already entered the period of Socialism."

It cannot be doubted that the fate of private trade in the cities, so far as Communist desires and purposes are concerned, may be considered sealed. The complete suppression of the individual farmer in the village has been determined upon with equal finality. The XVI Party Congress (1930), determining policies for at least another two years, voted unanimously the "liquidation of the kulak as a class on the basis of a complete collectivization of peasant economy." This intention of the leaders met a serious rebuke in the Russian village early in 1930. However the economic powers of the Government with its consolidated financial and industrial system operated with the daring and recklessness of the Communist Party, their disregard of hardship and suffering which may be inflicted upon the population, and their renowned use of force and coercion should not be underestimated. The socialization of the village may be pursued with less vigor and speed than the socialization of industry, but that it will be pursued there appears no reasonable doubt.

The industrialists and financiers of other lands will have their eyes much on the whole unparalleled experiment as the program unfolds. Should the development of Russian industry proceed at the same rate as during the first two years of the Five Year Plan, Soviet Russia will grow into a very real selling competitor in the world's raw material markets, and will approach substantially nearer that position in some lines of manufacture. State ownership of all industry and the monopoly of foreign trade will enable the Government at will to sell under the cost of production within certain limits of prudence. So long as the value of Soviet currency, with which labor and raw materials are paid, continues greatly depreciated outside and iron law holds it stable inside, that advantage will lie with the Communist State competitor. Indeed their economists reckon almost any price obtained in the foreign markets advantageous, regardless of the cost of the product, while foreign credits are imperative. With respect to the nearly unlimited maneuvering possibilities of this giant business, once it is in command of the total resources of the Russian people, it is difficult to visualize any organization conditioned to free competition maintaining itself as a successful rival.

Soviet experts inspired by the early successes of the Five Year Plan have anticipated the goals in some domains of industry being attained in four, three, and even two years, if everything goes right—crops, transportation, export insuring the necessary foreign purchases. Symptomatic of "dizziness from success," they went farther in 1930—so far as to prepare a fifteen year plan. This one reduced to modesty itself the one that two years before appeared fantastic. It has value

perhaps in directing gaze toward the heights to which Communist aspirations can ascend.

*Pravda*<sup>\*\*</sup> printed inconspicuously the "preliminary draft" as prepared by the staff of the State Planning Commission and seriously discussed in leading economic circles. It presumed that in 1939-1940 Soviet funds—the material body of the plan—would reach the 1930 dimensions of those in the United States, while the net production of industry and agriculture would amount to three times the American output. In fifteen years Soviet agriculture would be yielding 65,000,000,000 rubles. All of industry and one-half of transportation would be electrified. It scheduled Russia to be using in ten years 20,000,000 automobiles and 2,500,000 tractors; and in fifteen years 30,000,000 automobiles and 3,500,000 tractors. The aims summed up were "To catch up and to get ahead of the leading countries of world capitalism." It is noteworthy that in fifteen years the Soviet optimists did not expect the World Revolution.

To breathe again, one parachutes down to the Five Year Plan, well on the way to its age of majority. It has yet to demonstrate any material improvement over the NEP in meeting the day-to-day economic necessities of the population. The NEP unquestionably improved their lot over the destitution and misery in which it found them. The weight of testimony of those who have seen and experienced the "before and after" conditions convicts the Five Year Plan of having lowered the people's economic life during its first two years.

It put the cities back on bread cards immediately.

<sup>\*\*</sup> February 27, 1930.

Mikoyan, Commissar for Trade, predicted they would be kept in use several years. In the cities all major necessities in food and other domestic supplies followed bread to the card system. Butter rationed out in meager quantity at the rate of fifty cents a pound in the summer of 1930 cost \$4.00 on private sale and in the cities was procurable with difficulty. Other food commodities were comparably priced and as scarce. Entirely unbiased American visitors to the Caucasus during the first half of 1930 reported in person that they could get but little to eat—black bread and tea in the morning, and one other meal in the afternoon without meat, white bread, or sugar. It was impossible to buy shoes, rubber goods, and many other necessities.

W. H. Chamberlin of the *Christian Science Monitor* staff, ripely experienced in Russia, wrote March 21, 1930, to his paper: "Life for the masses is becoming harder and more strained, partly because of the more intensive work which is demanded, partly because, despite the figures of growing industrial production, there is no appreciable relaxation of the chronic shortage of many manufactured goods of broad consumption, but most of all because food is more and more being placed upon a rationed basis."

The day following he reported from an industrial city within 75 miles of Moscow, where queues were normal at three o'clock in the morning:

"Food is really the dark cloud on Kolomna's Communist horizon. The situation with several important food products such as meat, milk, and butter is worse than in Moscow where the shortage of these articles is keen enough. A quarter of a pound was the usual meat ration for workers; and this was obtainable, as a rule, only about every other day. Milk and butter were

almost non-existent, except for workers who lived in surrounding villages and had their own cows; at best, comparatively small quantities of milk could be had for young children. One got a vivid insight into the food shortage when the station restaurant offered as the sole items of its bill of fare, some unappetizing salt meat, preceded by soup made out of the same meat, or when a visit to a village tea room revealed as the only article of substantial food a concoction of pickled mushrooms."

In his final dispatch from Kolomna on the 25th of March, after noting that in the matter of housing changes seemed to be for the better, and that social benefits enjoyed far surpassed those of Czarist days, the correspondent registered "the general consensus that there was more to eat before the war than there is today."

The limit evidently had not been reached, for *Pravda* on May 17, 1930, gave the increase in nominal wages for the first five months of the current economic year as 9.1% while the index of foodstuff prices rose 15.5%.

City housing generally continues intolerable to decency and health. Revealing beyond volumes that might be written, is one of the answers to the question put to a Moscow class: "What is your idea of an ideal home?" One child replied: "A room through which strangers do not have to pass to get to their room." To a population in this plight the thumbscrews of taxation and enforced loans are incessantly and effectively applied.

The peasantry as a whole find the socialization of industry and agriculture going on at their expense as well. *Economic Life* \*\* sponsors the information that

\*\* October 3, 1929.

in 1927-1928 the difference between the level of industrial and agricultural prices was 127% which meant that the peasants overpaid from three to four hundred million rubles in buying industrial goods at existing prices and selling agricultural goods at the prices fixed by the Government. In 1928-1929 the Government was forced to increase grain prices by the peasants flatly refusing to sell to the collection agents. The increase left the difference between the industrial and agricultural price levels at 110%.

Some day either the economic torturing of this humanity or the reign of Communist theory must come to an end. Alibis cannot indefinitely be substituted for food. Only feeble flutters of capitalist and bourgeois resistance longer obstruct. The claim is advanced that the supply of marketable grain is being increased and brought under command. Will there be more to eat? Trotsky's realistic observation phrases well the supreme test that with any other than the long suffering Russian people could not be long deferred: "We are acquainted with the fundamental laws of history; victory belongs to that system which provides society with the higher economic plans."





CHAPTER IV  
DICTATING TO LABOR

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*“The Communist Party and the Trade Unions appoint their most trusted members to fill all the posts and to carry out all the functions.”<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> *ABC of Communism*, p. 187.

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## CHAPTER IV

### DICTATING TO LABOR

THE theory and practice of the organization of Labor in Russia has undergone marked transformation during the first thirteen years of the existence of the Soviet régime, though thus far without the Communist leaders having given up the general objective of bettering the conditions of the workers. The Communist Revolution advanced under the slogan of returning the land to the peasants and the factories to the workers. The workers as well as the peasants took this platform literally and with opportunity began immediately to give it effect. The factories physically passed over to the representatives of the workers under official sanction.

The taking over was not by the workers as a class but by the particular workmen and other employees in the given factories at the time. They organized what were designated factory committees, actually operated the plants, and sold their production in open market. In some instances, former owners were retained by the factory committees as necessary specialists, supplying the plants with funds or giving technical counsel or doing both.

Industrial failure resulted followed by swift evolution into an order that has left little semblance of "the factories to the workers." In rapid progression Soviet industry took on the characteristics of a State Capital-

ism with the factories belonging to the State and operated by a centralized Supreme Council of National Economy having District and Regional Councils of National Economy as branches. Later, factories producing similar goods have been organized into groups known as Trusts. These Trusts do not market their output directly. They find their outlet through selling syndicates organized for the purpose. Notwithstanding all assertions by the Communist leaders of control by the workers, the measure of operating authority enjoyed by the Russian working class differs little if at all from that of the proletariat in any country with highly centralized industrial management. The Communist rationalization is that, inasmuch as the Soviet State is the impersonation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, all factories belong to the workers. But in practice this doctrine translates into actions that call for a proletarian of highly imaginative mind to be conscious of ownership in a plant.

The initial Soviet Labor Code on the whole conformed to the propaganda promises of the Communist Party. Together with the voluminous additional central and local labor legislation, it embodied the basic idea of making the workers the plant owners. It gave very wide powers to the factory committees as bodies representative of the workers and employees. Indeed the predominant rôle was theirs far beyond the functions of labor. The Trade Unions actively participated in plant operation. Rights and privileges unheard of in Czarist Russia or in most capitalistic countries of that date were bestowed upon the individual workers, such as liberal vacations for each worker on pay and leaves of absence with payment of wages for women in late pregnancy and after the birth of a child. Man-

agement could discharge no worker without explanations, and even in case of one's proved unfitness he could apply to his Trade Union and be reinstated on the order of the latter. In the liquidation of a factory or an institution wages must be paid for six weeks from the time of the discharge. Two weeks' wages attended discharge for incompetency.

An admixture of conviction, of theory untested by experience, and of expediency furnished the motivations of this early labor legislation. It came out of the most turbulent time of the Soviet régime, with the sabotage movement of the intellectuals in full swing, wars on numerous fronts, and withal the working class itself by no means united behind the Communists. Political strategy took precedence over economic production and with the abandon characterizing Soviet legislators of the period the new laws gave about everything to the workers. They went beyond the boldest proclaimed Socialist labor programs in effective enactment giving the Russian worker, oppressed for decades, in a day the most exalted status in the labor world. Although whittled down later at a critical time the program afforded irresistible propaganda for firmly establishing Communist prestige and power among the Russian proletarian masses. The cost did not matter reckoned as "expenses of the Revolution," for which no sum could be too great.

Each factory and each institution elects yearly a local Trade Union committee. The voting takes place in a general meeting of all workers and employees of the factory or institution. This usually has been preceded by one of the Communist organizations of the factory or institution to make ready the nominations.

In the first years Trade Union committee elections expressed to a somewhat measured degree the will of the Trade Unionists concerned, though from the beginning the workers and employees disorganized and unaccustomed to choosing their representatives, in the overwhelming majority of cases, voted in by acclamation the list of candidates offered by the Communist organization. Later when bodies of factory workers, better grasping procedure, made attempts to elect those whom they really wanted to represent them, a wave of persecutions against independent Trade Unions and independent workers started immediately. In 1920 and 1921 Social Democratic and other workers unwilling to subject their interests to the Communist Party system and offering resistance filled Soviet jails. Trade Union "reorganization" swiftly ensued, which introduced into each local Trade Union committee enough Communists to give majorities in all voting. The process took nearly two years to complete under the leadership of Tomsky, who in 1929 was himself "reorganized" by the Party dictator out of the post of Trade Union chief for lack of the iron quality called for in another crisis.

A local Trade Union committee must consist of not fewer than three members. The leaders have a dislike for small committees and favor one committee for a group of small factories or institutions. The Communist organization of a factory is instructed to see that the local committee is tractable, which means Communist controlled. Each local committee of any importance has a Communist "fraction" which acts under instruction of the local Party committee to insure that the Trade Union committee will make no "blunders."

The local Trade Union elections have come to be

held wholesale. A week set apart in a given town or city for the purpose is featured by a campaign typically Communist with slogans, compulsory participation of Trade Unionists in the meetings, and Party nominations framed and submitted. Prompt "reelections" take place if any undesirable persons have managed to get onto committees through some carelessness.

Until 1923 Trade Union membership was legally compulsory for every worker or employee, likewise for all unemployed persons. Membership dues deducted from salaries by the management of the factory or institution and paid over to the local committees financed the Unions. They in turn send a percentage for the funds of District and Central Trade Union committees. In 1923 the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions announced Union membership to be optional, but non-members soon found themselves unemployed because at the same time the Trade Union headquarters instructed the local committees to urge dismissal of any worker or employee not joining the Union "of his own free will."

The line of employment at a given time determines Trade Union affiliation. All printers for example do not necessarily join a Printers' Union. If a group of them should be employed in a chemical plant they will be members of that chemical factory Trade Union. It follows that the varied personnel of a given factory belong to one Union. The determining principle is very strictly observed and an individual going with his specialty into this industry or that changes his Union with each move.

Each factory or institution as a rule organizes, besides the local Trade Union committee, what is termed a "Trade Union Active" or corps of delegates calcu-



lated to help the Trade Union committee in its numerous activities. A Trade Union committee usually has the following sub-committees or commissions (the names indicating their functions): Cultural, Library, Theatrical, Musical, Sports, Economic, Protection of Labor, Work among Women, Sanitary. The corps of delegates furnishes the members of these commissions.

Domestic servants in a given district have their Trade Union committee. They participate once a year in its election and pay membership dues for its support. Few of the committees in this field are effective. The hardships of Trade Unionism in Russia are probably most acute and spectacular in the area of domestics. Unemployment among servants until recently reduced the chance of securing a position to the hazard of a lottery ticket, thus positing advantages with the "unorganized employers."

Labor conditions in agriculture differ much from those in industry. For several years Soviet labor legislation touched them very little. Most of Russian peasant holdings have been individual enterprises with members of the family the only workers. The general policy of exterminating the wealthy peasant employers made of small relative importance such measures of protection of hired agricultural help as were proclaimed in the beginning of the Revolution. The backwardness of Russian agricultural workers still operates against Union organization and control. Checking up conditions presents further difficulties by reason of the remoteness of the territory from the industrial center which is the seat of the local Union.

Each town has a Trade Union Council integrated with its District Trade Union Council which articulates with a Regional Council, and this in turn is subor-

minated to the Council of its Constituent Republic. The body governing the whole Trade Union life of Soviet Russia is the All-Union (formerly All-Russian) Central Council of Trade Unions.

Numerically and otherwise the Soviet Trade Unions make up the strength of the Red International Labor Union, which attacks all Unions across the world that do not affiliate with it. The Russian Unions allot liberal sums for its activities from their membership dues and the Government subventions received by them.

Officially, Trade Union dues of all descriptions may not exceed 4% of the total earnings of a worker. The rate in normal times would hold more or less at this pegged figure. In the Soviet land however special projects calling for funds follow one upon another: now an internal loan; then again contributions to Chinese, British, American, French, German, or some other revolutionary movement. The custom to present gifts to leading managers of factories and institutions prevails and, as this personnel changes with disconcerting frequency, expenditure on gifts perceptibly invades the budget of a wage employee.

Many of the subscriptions have the nature of compulsion. The Soviet Press browbeats non-contributors as "traitors to the proletarian state" until they submit. Thus were labeled poor workers and employees who sold back to the State, though at a loss, the loans allotted to them. Distribution of the Third Loan of Industrialization among the wage earners was announced to them as "meeting their desire to spend one month's wages for its purchase." This draft of one-twelfth of a year's pay added 8 1/3% to the official 4%.

The Trade Union committees perform large labors

toward cultural development of the members. Union appropriations therefor reach considerable sums. Town or District Councils organize clubs, skating rinks, athletic fields, and theaters, normally with more success in the larger industrial cities than in the small towns. Councils in Moscow and some other cities operate theaters on a self-supporting basis. Trade Unions have extensively gathered sports into their hands. In cities like Moscow, Odessa, Kharkov, and Leningrad they have the best tennis courts, rowing teams, and skating and skiing facilities. The Trade Union sport organizations constantly struggle with the Government central agency for the development of sports, called the Supreme Council of Physical Culture, being much more efficient and successful in this field and others than the corresponding State organs.

The Party's determination of the political line of the Trade Union organization has far-reaching consequences. The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee reaches certain decisions laying down the principles of the work of the Trade Unions. The Communist "fractions" in the Trade Union organization give them immediate effect. No serious conflict therefore can occur between the Government and the Trade Unions. Both Government and Trade Unions obey the orders of the same commanding central body—the Party. This aspect of the dictatorship escapes notice often in the plethora of reiterated pronouncements about the workers' rule.


If mystery has surrounded the observation that strikes so seldom eventuate where conditions of labor in many respects are truly hard and wages severely insufficient, the Party mechanism perfectly explains

the phenomenon. Let the workers in some factory, dissatisfied with and impelled by conditions of labor, desire to declare a strike. Naturally they will first turn to their Trade Union for counsel and coöperation. The Union will not countenance a strike. The Union chairman as a Communist is a member of the same local Party Committee that established in the given factory the conditions of labor and the wages constituting the grievances of the strike-minded workers. If notwithstanding the lack of coöperation from their Trade Union they persist in pressing their demands, then the State machinery applies the pressures of its various instruments. The Union officials give the names of the most active workers to the O. G. P. U. This brings down on them police methods of compulsion. Simultaneously the Party Committee orders the manager of the factory partially to satisfy the demands of the workers. The Coöperative stores may reduce prices of foodstuffs and other goods and increase their supply, but refuse to sell anything to the agitators. Discharged and perhaps arrested, these will be replaced immediately by workers from other State factories.

Party speakers at meetings will be exhorting the workers that to strike is a crime against the proletarian State and treason to the interests of the working class, and threatening banishment to Siberia for those who do not submit. With the disaffected leaders by this time in prison, the will of the others to strike weakens and finally subsides. Such a sequence of events is not fiction. By exactly such methods the 1920 strike movement in many factories in Moscow and other cities was crushed. The engineers usually are made the scapegoats. Staged trials impeach them with hostile incitement of the workers.

So thoroughgoing an application of the dictatorship to the workers as to change their status from that of rulers for a season to subjects drew upon the supreme

### WHAT IS TO BE DONE?



*Economic Life.*

An Indecisive Manager: "Have I the right on my own authority to wake and to send him to work? Or perhaps the question of wakening should be agreed upon and coördinated with all other factory organizations? With a draft report to be submitted by the 1st of May?"

courage of the Party leaders. The tactics were consummately skillful. With time the political problem of attracting the allegiance of the proletarian masses became less acute and no longer required labor policies

of outstandingly propagandist character. The danger of the military situation had lessened. The political dominance of the working class over the population became quite firmly established. On the other hand economic conditions had become dire and the régime, relatively safe from military danger, proceeded under necessity to address itself to their amelioration.

Labor discipline judging by statements of the Soviet leaders themselves was farcical. Factories and institutions were enormously overstaffed—especially the latter. Many of them had no justification to exist. Numerous plants only burdened the treasury, either producing nothing or at costs to render impossible the sale of their goods. The strategists in the Government and Party knew the whole economic line must be reconstructed, knew also that this involved the radical reorganization of labor control with attending dangers. It meant, for the first time since the Revolution, launching an offensive against the Government's main body of support.

The steps in disciplining labor can be traced clearly from near the close of 1922, though several measures in this direction had been undertaken earlier. The political stage favored action. The Party had the press entirely in its possession. The Trade Unions had been brought under control. The last remnants of Social Democratic influence in the Trade Union movement had been extinguished and the leaders imprisoned or exiled. The forces started with such characteristically Communist drive and speed that the workers found many of their "revolutionary achievements" lost before they understood what had transpired. Fierce assaults against "deserters from the economic front," "rascals," "enemies to the proletarian cause," and "traders" fol-

lowed one another. The "finest flower of the revolution" that had begun just to feel at ease in their new station now found themselves receiving a handling that brushed off many of the petals.

They naturally turned to the Trade Union organizations for defense and aid. Against this move the Party leaders had well prepared. The Trade Union committees had received secret instructions in advance by no means to favor attempts to resist the new policy, and to do everything possible to bring success to the offensive. The strategy added luster to Lenin's reputation for prescience. In 1921 Trotsky advocated that Trade Unions be made avowedly part and parcel of the State machinery. Lenin bitterly resisted the idea and preserved their detached character, which now gave the Party great advantage in the first onset against the resisting Labor elements. The workers, relying on the Unions as their only representative organs, were unfortified organizationally in any other quarter, and when the Union leaders they more or less trusted openly associated themselves with the Government policy they had no other line of defense. This experience has been repeated uniformly with every issue drawn between the Government and the workers.

The first Labor Code had proclaimed the right of each worker to one month's paid vacation. Later when the period was reduced to two weeks, except for particularly exacting labor as in the mines, the Trade Union chiefs led in persuasion of the workers that this served their ultimate interests as the dictators of the State. In several economic drives—floating of internal loans, decrease of wages, mass discharges of employees and workers, increase of labor efficiency—the Trade Unions were unfailing agencies of the State and the

Party. In the one notable instance to the contrary, the resistance within the Union leadership was ruthlessly overridden by the Party chiefs directly removing the highest Union officials. The average worker has come to recognize the Trade Union as merely the tool of the Party and the Government.

The preliminary changes revising the Labor Code downward considerably curtailed the rights of the workers' committees, and increased the managerial powers of the plant administration by cutting down such privileges of the workers as immunity from discharge in stated cases. From these starting points a series of enactments followed—all in the direction of setting up strict labor discipline and making away with the "ruling worker" psychology of the earliest revolutionary years.

The Soviet formulation of industrial plant management had become triangular. It consisted of the management, the workers' committee, and the Committee of the Communist Party in the plant. The 1922 and later changes largely increased the authority of the Party Committee and incidentally the authority of management, for at that time the Government did not trust the managing personnel enough to leave to their decision even technical questions apart from the Communist Committee of the plant.

Correspondingly the powers of the workers' factory committees decreased. A major objective of the disciplinary movement in this direction came to light in the vigorous opposition set up by the Soviet leaders to "Control Commissions" that had been organized in most of the plants at the beginning of the Communist Revolution, having decisive powers not only over conditions of labor, but also in production, financing, and



marketing. The inspired press and leading economic institutions made it clearly understood that the proper domain of the workers' committees concerned affairs social and educational in character, rather than interference in operation and in the administrative functions.

To lessen opposition to this sacrifice on the part of the workers, certain compensatory measures were announced—the establishment of piece remuneration, a wage tariff differentiated by skills, budget provision for the building of houses for workers, other betterments of a social nature, and a general wage increase.

The drastic adjustments in industry dictated by economics instead of politics created at once an army of unemployed—a problem by no means solved years later. In 1925 its dimensions confronted the Unions and the Party with a crisis. Trade Union members having the right to ask for employment, when unemployed, were entitled to receive non-employment benefit. The unsettled conditions general in Soviet economic life with mounting unemployment raised the requirements for unemployment and social insurance to threatening sums. Action was necessary. The leaders promptly took it. They instructed the Unions to stop admitting new members. The labor exchanges launched a "cleaning" of the unemployed. Communist inspectors went to the homes of the unemployed. Such affluence as a pair of soft chairs and a sofa might establish the possessor as sufficiently well off to need no non-employment benefit from the State. This decision further entailed exclusion from the labor exchange—entirely cutting off opportunity for employment. It became almost as difficult to join a Trade Union as to become a Party member.

Joining has not yet become easy. For years one asking work traversed this vicious circle: a manager is ready to give employment; before employing he must have the authorization of the local Trade Union committee; the committee cannot authorize a new person to be employed unless a member of the Union; the aspirant asks for admission to the Trade Union; and is refused because unemployed. This reduced the official figures of unemployment, as non-members of Trade Unions were not accepted for registration at labor exchanges. It saved insurance allowances but consigned the rejected to a losing struggle for existence.

The disciplinary program as it further unfolded was prosecuted with astonishing energy. First objectives attained, the country's economic demands sharpened the proddings and added inducements. Incentives and compulsions to efficiency in factories and institutions commingled. Labor problems received large prominence. The daily press published for general information names of plants and of individual workers successful in fulfilling their assignments. Metropolitan newspapers discussed even small matters concerning the department of a factory to stir the ambition of the workers of the particular plant by showing them that the country as a whole had concern for their best services.

Pecuniary awards to plants for reconstructive achievements in their field have furnished stimulation at different stages. A sum for this usage included in the plant budget is distributed as bonuses to such individuals within the plant as have shown themselves most useful in the revival of labor discipline and the advancing of labor productivity. Decorations also are

awarded to meritorious individuals and plants, notably the "Labor Red Banner." Published "blacklists" expose plants that fail to gain efficiency and output.

Less spectacular but much more effective measures inside the plants supplemented the propaganda. The Supreme Council of National Economy gave each plant a standard of performance, stipulating fixed percentages for increase in production and for decrease in costs and absences. If the management and workers failed in performance the entire State machinery reënforced the local authorities, nothing loth to employ arrests, indictments, trials, banishments, wholesale discharges, expulsion from Trade Unions (with ensuing loss of civic rights), and other penalties.

New measures for bettering industrial returns filled the years 1929 and 1930. Obsolete equipment and unfamiliarity with the new industrial processes accentuated the Russian laborer's low efficiency arising from irresponsibility, meager education, and habitual drunkenness. To overcoming these mountainous difficulties the hard-pressed leaders must ever address themselves.

Inside some plants the old Control Commissions were reëstablished but with less power than originally attached. Their return was calculated to give opportunities to better acquaint the workers with the general picture, activities, and problems of the enterprise which employed them. Under the new plan the plant manager regularly reports to them on the development of the plant, its achievements, and hardships. Each plant has one or several "economic commissions" consisting of representatives of management and of the workers' committee. These have regular sittings to discuss methods for improving conditions in the various units of the plant, gaining

efficiency, and introducing new and better working methods.

The Government enlists the Communist Youth League in organizing "flying squadrons" to inspect plants and find out weak spots. Controversy flourishes over the real usefulness of these incursions. Individual workers and many of the Trade Union organizations charge them with bringing in more disorganization than the value of their findings justify.

Many Communist workers organize "shock brigades" pledged to demonstrate the extent to which efficiency can go and so arouse the ambition of less interested workers and bring the average to a higher level. The Government has featured this plan through nationwide conferences of the "brigades" to give some standardization to the movement and to spread it widely as a technique. The term "hard hitters" has come into use applied to those individuals and groups having the spirit to overcome all obstacles.

Much effort has been expended upon "socialistic competitions" between factories and institutions. Two or more plants manufacturing similar goods are linked in a contest to show others what can be done, given enough desire to achieve. Furthered by the press giving great prominence to reports on the competitions, the method has yielded results. Soon nearly every branch of industry promoted numerous "competition contracts" between individual plants, the ceremony of the contract taking on solemnity. The representatives of the contesting plants in the same industry assemble in Moscow or another industrial center from different parts of the country and formally sign agreements to conform to given standards in labor efficiency, reducing waste and absences, improving quality of manufactured

goods, and lowering costs. The competitions are phrased in the military terms so favored by Communist leaders. Reports from the "competitive front" have wide publicity and woe overtakes the plant that fails to redeem its pledges. Failure means investigation, removal of management, and repressions against both administration and workers' representatives.


Stimulations not quickening adequately the pace of improvement, the authorities had recourse to additional pieces of legislation, some of them having more bite than any of the forerunners. The four most important changes in the Labor Code from 1928 were decrees establishing the individual responsibility of plant managers, the introduction of continuous work, and the establishment of a new calendar. The last two innovations necessitated introducing a second and third labor shift in many Soviet plants.

The Five Year Plan of economic development enforced progressive increase in production. The Communists reckoned old machinery and inefficient laborers the chief immediate hindrances in the way of its realization. They recognized that a wholesale modernizing of machinery could not be effected under the rigid conditions of limited foreign purchasing power, and importation having to be confined chiefly to equipping the indispensable new industries. The Soviet experts accordingly focused attention on getting better returns from the individual laborers.

To this end they made two main moves in 1929. The first aimed at improvement of the internal organization of factory management and higher pressure on the individual laborer. This called forth one enabling act promulgated by the Government, another by the

The Azerbaidjan Oil Syndicate lags behind in the execution of the program

Рис К. ПОТОВА.



Pravda.

THE CORKS THAT SHOULD BE EXTRACTED

Central Committee of the Communist Party. Both in fact originated in the latter body. The other approach to increase the production of the workers undertook reorganization of the whole labor time structure.

The Government decree of the summer of 1929, just noted, was more or less punitive in character. It openly stated the intention to curb those not wishing to work or who were handicapping production. The act vested the administration of plants with far wider and more decisive powers. One of these established the right of the plant director to discharge workers. The Trade Union and Party organizations could appeal to the higher institutions, without however suspending execution of the dismissal. The preliminaries to these actions were attended with strong opposition even in the Communist Trade Unions. Tomsky was deposed from his presidency of the Soviet Trade Union Executive Committee for resistance to what he believed the excessive tempo of proceedings. In the apology to the XVI Congress, forced from him as penance, Tomsky dispelled all remaining doubt concerning the master and servant relations of the Party and the Trade Unions. He confessed the "error" of the Trade Union leaders at the time of the offense and recognized that it "compelled the Central Committee of the Communist Party . . . to remove all the leadership of the Trade Union Movement in the U. S. S. R."

Still more significant was the Party manifesto entitled "Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Regarding Measures to Improve the Management of Industry and to Establish Individual Management." This clearly defined the functions of the three constituents to the Soviet factory

administrative triangle. A definite curtailment of Trade Union and Party powers in the plants represented real revolution—in fact counter-revolution, so closely does it parallel industrial practice in the “capitalistic” world. “In the organization of the management of industry,” the manifesto points out, “it is important to understand that the administration (director) is directly responsible for execution of the industrial plans and all production tasks. The administration directs the work of the managerial apparatus, the organizational task, and the technical processes of production in the plant. All operative orders of the director are unconditionally obligatory upon the administrative assistants as well as for the workers, regardless of the position they may hold in the Party, the Trade Union, or other organizations.


“ . . . In appointing or dismissing a worker the director shall reckon with the opinion of the Party and Trade Union organizations. If the Party or Trade Union organization is not in agreement with the appointment or dismissal of workers, they have the right of appeal to the higher organization but the order of the director is to be executed.”

The manifesto specified the functions of the Trade Union organizations in the plants to be defense of the everyday cultural and economic needs of the workers, and energetic promotion of the productive activity and initiative of the working mass. It called upon them regularly to assemble to hear reports of the management and to study the data on production and make their suggestions. They were prohibited however to interfere directly in plant management and must under no conditions usurp the place of management. They would by every means coöperate “in the actual estab-



lishment and development of the individual management" and in increasing plant production and development and, in doing so, "better the material conditions of the working class."

The Party organizations which the manifesto terms "the stronghold of the Party, especially in the plants,"



TWO FACES IN ONE . . . OR HOW INDIVIDUAL MANAGEMENT IS VERY OFTEN ACCOMPLISHED IN THE TRANSPORT INDUSTRY

were set in their places also, yet without sacrificing final Party supremacy higher up. They were instructed to direct the political, social, and economic life of the plant in ways to insure fulfillment by the Trade Unions and managerial organs of the basic instructions of the Party. They must not under the directions given "interfere with the details of the work of the Trade

Union committee and the director, particularly with the operative orders of the management.”

The Party cells in all circumstances were enjoined from placing themselves in the position of the management in the appointment of administrative personnel and the allocation of workers in the several departments of the plant. For cushioning, characteristic of all stern announcements of the Central Committee of the Party, the preamble read that, having the aim of increasing the efficiency of labor of the individual workers, the measures contained therein were ultimately in the interest of the working class as a whole, in tending to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat.

A sample of the press barrage that was laid down around the resulting malcontents is an editorial from *Economic Life* dealing with the necessity of strengthening discipline in industry. The economic authorities were charging Soviet workers with not working intensively enough. To persuade the workers that alleviation of the conditions of labor sought by them was to their own detriment, the editor wrote:

“A group of hooliganing elements among the workers, who only recently entered production and undoubtedly are somehow linked with the kulaks, have tried by every means to destroy labor discipline. At the present time our fight for a strict labor régime has paramount social political importance. In the present situation the realization of our plan to increase production, to decrease costs, to improve labor efficiency, to rationalize production, not only has immense economic importance but to a certain extent it determines the stability of our class position in the village. Beyond doubt the numerous charges of a weakening

labor discipline, of absences, of bad management, etc., form a basis favorable for the work of the kulaks who try to incite enmity between the poorer peasants and the working class. Such facts help the kulaks to undermine confidence in the proletarian direction of affairs and to lower the average performance of the peasant masses in the development of agriculture as dictated by the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet power. Accordingly our fight for labor discipline at the factories is one of the forms of the class war."

Parallel with the labor discipline program, the Government undertook the two labor time measures that, if successfully carried through, must profoundly change life for the entire population and in the direction of its mechanization. To an extent they supplement one another. One introduces a continuous working week in all industrial, commercial, and agricultural enterprises, including governmental and other offices. The other changes the calendar. The Communist departure from continuous operation as known to Western industry consists in its application to institutions, offices, and collective agriculture.

Scrambling and reconstructing the calendar was done with true Communist disregard of traditions and customs. Five days of the 365 in a year are subtracted and set apart as the only permanent revolutionary holidays. Once in four years a sixth twenty-four hours will be observed as the "Day of Industrialization." The remaining 360 days divide into twelve months of thirty days each. Each month consists of six five-day weeks. Four out of each week are working days and the fifth a holiday—"the day of rest" to use the official terminology. The personnel of each industrial plant or

office is apportioned among five groups, each having a different holiday. Thus the plant or office operates every day of the five days of the new Soviet week. Only one-fifth the personnel of a given plant, institution, or collective have a common weekly holiday. The rest day recess consists of twenty-four hours instead of the thirty-six afforded by the old system. By the rearrangement the Government as employer loses no labor time. In lieu of four holidays a month of thirty-six hours each it now grants six holidays of twenty-four hours each. The continuous week schedule already embraces 67% of those engaged in industry.\*

Examination of the material state of the workers, the *raison d'être* of the whole colossal Communist experiment in the area of labor, will not seem inappropriate after more than a decade of ministry to their welfare by this materialistic and realistic movement. It begins with full recognition of the whole-hearted desire and purpose of the leaders to better the condition of the worker class, indeed to consistently favor it at the expense of all other classes of the population.

According to the *Soviet Year Book* wages in industry averaged \$315 a year in 1926-1927. Mikoyan, Commissar of Trade, addressing the Moscow local Party conference<sup>2</sup> in 1930 stated that two years before 52% of all the workers of the Soviet Union received in wages less than the equivalent of \$30 a month. In 1929 this group still embraced 36%. The wage increases of 1928-1930 being offset by the rising price of commodities registered slight actual gain.

"Real wages" as a term has a somewhat unusual connotation in Russia, modified by several conditions.

<sup>2</sup> May 22, 1930.

\* *Pravda*, December 22, 1930.

A large number of commodities are not obtainable for money. Others can be procured in limited amounts only as distributed by the Government in ration form. Besides the term "real wages" presumes the complete freedom of the worker to dispose of his money. While there are but a few Soviet legal limitations to this, practice in the flotation of internal loans and "voluntary" contributions toward causes "tending to the major Proletariat's glory" diminish considerably the amount subject to the worker's independent disposal. To be sure the Soviet economists would consider it something like sacrilegious to exclude such items in the computation of real wages. *Pravda*<sup>3</sup> presenting at some length, in relation to each other, the Five Year Plan percentages scaling up labor productivity and wages and lowering production costs showed performance falling short in all three respects. As already observed real wages held about level but *Pravda* believed "the general well-being of the working class somewhat increased in view of the fact that more members of the families of workers received employment."

A resolution<sup>4</sup> of the Moscow district conference of the Party reckoned the present average real wages of Russian workers at 139% of pre-war wages, while if sums expended for social insurance and the contributions of industry to the fund for improving the conditions of workers were taken into the computation, the percentage rose to 167% in comparison with the older level. No impartial study of all the facts in the case has been made. It is difficult to anticipate one being realized. From personal observation and the

<sup>3</sup> May 17, 1930.

<sup>4</sup> *Pravda*, June 6, 1930.

findings of other observers, one would hazard the judgment that the workers on the average are better housed than before the Revolution, not better clothed, and less well fed. In social protection and privileges they have markedly gained. The foregoing hold for the employed and the employable only. An unnumbered host of bourgeoisie and intelligentsia reduced to manual, not to say menial, labor for a living, and denied the favored classification along with the kulaks, endure at or below the line of barest subsistence. Compared with the industrialism of other Western peoples, that of Russia on the whole still yields its toilers a low compensation in terms of total well-being. Any small gains to the workers thus far do not nearly compensate the economic losses of the larger number of declassed.

Unemployment affords one of the most controversial questions of Soviet economy and social life. A favorite indictment of Communists against the capitalist world is that unemployment is inherent in its organization of industry. At the same time the number of unemployed in Soviet Russia has been withheld. Latterly when the official unemployment list shortened the Government published some concise data relative to it. These figures, it will be borne in mind, take account of those unemployed only who by their social origin, economic status, and many other conditions are eligible for registration at the labor exchanges. No one knows how great the number of ineligible had become. Many on the ground insist that the "registered" unemployed have constituted but a small portion of the total jobless mass in Russia. The periodic "cleanings" of labor exchanges threw out scores of thousands without any

hope for them to register anew. Initial registration was extremely difficult. The former prosperous section of the peasantry, all one-time traders, and a large element of the professionals have always been barred admission. The data to follow bearing on unemployment tendencies in Russia ignores all save the privileged registered section of unemployed.

Uglanov, former Commissar of Labor,<sup>5</sup> comparing employment conditions in Russia with those in capitalist countries, has shown the number of wage earners in all branches of Soviet national economy to be steadily increasing due to the rapid development in industry and the gradual introduction of a seven-hour working shift. At the close of the first half of 1929-1930 the workers on a seven-hour shift<sup>6</sup> equaled 32%. The Central Committee of the Communist Party has resolved that 100% of the workers in industry and transportation must be granted the seven-hour working day by the end of 1931-1932.

In December, 1928, wage earners in the Soviet national economy numbered 10,200,000 people, computable from the enrolled socially insured workers, since practically every wage earner was thus insured. In December, 1929, the enrollment was 11,475,000 persons. *Economic Life*<sup>7</sup> placed the total of workers and employees on industrial payrolls alone in 1929 at 340,000 higher than in 1914. The Five Year Plan called for 800,000 additional trained workers.

The Soviet economy has suffered long from a peculiar

<sup>5</sup> *Pravda*, March 6, 1930.

<sup>6</sup> *Pravda*, May 24, 1930. This paper on December 22, 1930, reported the percentage increased to 45.5.

<sup>7</sup> December 15, 1929. *Pravda* in December, 1930, gave 14,000,000 as the current number.

maladjustment. Coinciding with serious unemployment a shortage of trained workers existed which, according to Mr. Uglanov, in the economic year 1929-1930 amounted to 300,000 for the building and construction industry alone. On May 1, 1929, the unemployed registration at the labor exchanges numbered 1,700,000. On February 1, 1930, the figure had decreased to 1,200,000. Uglanov points out that approximately 150,000 of these were productively working in various collectives for unemployed. To the Uglanov figures apparently must be added unemployed youth, reported by *Comsomolskaia Pravda*.<sup>8</sup> These figures also show a tendency to decrease. October 1, 1929, there were 300,000 unemployed boys and girls below the age of 18 years. On April 1, 1930, the number was 230,000.

In this period the unemployment level fell most rapidly in industry. January 1, 1929, this group had 237,000 workers and 314,000 employees jobless. These had dropped to 187,000 and 171,000 respectively a year later. The Central Committee of the Party, December 9, 1929, issuing instructions about unemployment made the following analysis of the 1,298,000 unemployed registered at the labor exchanges August 1, 1929: Untrained manual labor 60%, intellectual labor 18.2%, and trained industrial laborers 16.3. Women constituted 46.6% and minors 14.8. Data by the Labor Commissar as of April 1, 1930, represented 1,080,000 to be the total registered unemployed with exultation that for the six months of 1929-1930 the official unemployment went off 40%. How much of the reduction came from "cleanings" by the labor exchanges did not appear, but no fair discount for this

<sup>8</sup> May 17, 1930.



device would go far enough to invalidate the claim of a real trend downward in official unemployment. A thoroughly constructive measure toward securing more qualified workers for industry has been the training of unemployed in that direction.

The 1930 late autumn Russian reports announced "no industrial unemployment," but a labor shortage, also a disconcerting labor turnover because of bad housing and other living conditions in the large construction areas. *Pravda* of November 2 said editorially "Unemployment in the U. S. S. R. is completely liquidated." The total situation gave the leaders opportunity promptly seized to stiffen discipline to a point hard to distinguish from forced labor. Unemployment benefits were discontinued. A decree of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, dated December 15, 1930, published in *Pravda* two days later, laid down "Regulations Governing the Employment and Distribution of Labor and the Fight Against Labor Turnover."

Under the new mandate all employment must be through the State labor exchanges. The Commissariat of Labor was given power to transfer qualified workers from one branch of the National Economy to another and from one plant to another. Transfers take place on the application of the economic organs collaborating with the Trade Unions, with ratification by the Council of Labor and Defense. Managements must release their workers as drafted. They may not lure workers from other employment without penalties. Living quarters, schooling for children, and travel expenses are to be assured the exchanged workers. Certain privileges reward long-time service. Those who leave

work in the industrial organizations of the socialized Sector without valid grounds will not be employable in industry or transportation for six months. Persons registered at the exchanges who refuse the assigned placement become entirely unemployable for a similar period.

Relatively to its resources the Government has expended heavily for unemployment benefits, although a small total in comparison with similar benefits issued to the unemployed in Germany and Great Britain. Uglanov reported the outlay by his Government for aid to unemployed the past seven years to be 616,000,000 rubles, not including funds spent additionally by the Trade Unions. The latter he estimated amounted to several scores of millions of rubles. Nor were the privileges afforded to unemployed in the forms of reduced railroad and steamship fares and lowered rates for apartment rent and other services reckoned into his money total. Also expenditures by producing collectives specially organized for unemployed remained to be accounted. The aggregate of these services if known and expressed in cash terms would substantially swell the Government figures.

A table below displays the Government expenditures for unemployment aid by years from 1924 to 1930 inclusive. Besides free medical aid and rent the cash stipend allowable to those registered at the labor exchanges ranges from \$4.00 to \$15.00 monthly, depending upon size of family and qualifications. If all the 2,000,000 registered unemployed during 1929 received allowances, the average benefit during the year on this bounty of the Government and the Social Insurance System was seventy-six rubles or at the rate of \$3.00 gold per month;

	<i>From Central and Local</i>		<i>Total</i> Rubles
	<i>Soviet Budget</i> Rubles	<i>Social Insurance</i> Rubles	
1924 .....	4,350,000	18,000,000	22,350,000
1925 .....	14,000,000	30,000,000	44,000,000
1926 .....	14,000,000	46,000,000	60,000,000
1927 .....	17,000,000	66,000,000	83,000,000
1928 .....	20,000,000	100,000,000	120,000,000
1929 .....	22,000,000	130,000,000	152,000,000
1930 in budget .....	35,000,000	100,000,000	135,000,000

The other forms of social insurance are more efficiently organized than for unemployment. These include the right to free medical help, sick benefits, and old-age pensions. Although the compensation services are by no means adequate the Government undoubtedly strives to bring them to a higher standard. The plants participate in the social insurance program, including that for unemployment. The workers bear the cost of the last plant item. The Unions also have certain protective features and benefits. The total cost accounting in the insurance field for Government, plants, and Unions nowhere appears systematized or defined. Nor is there a computation known to combine money grants and free service, all or in part, or indicating clearly all the items included or left out. Accordingly the official social insurance budget for 1929-1930 which reached 1,400,000,000 rubles is not to be regarded as all-inclusive. It takes in the above unemployment figures. The rest was spent in giving protection during periods of temporary incapacitation, old age, and sickness; and for the construction and improvement of hospitals, sanatoriums, rest homes, dispensaries, and kindred institutions.

Another sum, which workers are frequently reminded represents the Government's concern for their social welfare, amounted to 1,330,000,000 rubles assigned

during the two years 1929 and 1930 for building workers' homes. This fund subsidized the erection of "cultural institutions" such as communal kitchens and laundries, clubs, nurseries, and bathhouses to the extent of 110,000,000 rubles the first year and 220,000,000 rubles the next.

Soviet social protection is class conditioned and better fulfilled in the promise than in the performance, yet it merits commendation. It is sincere and basic in the Communist system, and apart from its narrow class limits presents something for the longer established orders of society either to emulate, or provide a better alternative than the tragedy of willing men out of work, sick, or infirm being dependent on charity.

Notwithstanding the surpassing energy aimed at bettering the situation of the working class, the entire Trade Union system pays the price of dictatorship. The domination of Communists kills the initiative of the rank and file of members, a spirit of deadly formalism and bureaucracy prevails among them throughout the land. Receiving most minute instructions for every event, action, and circumstance from the Party Committee, leaves few with a sense of responsibility for what they are doing. The leaders themselves recognize this and fill the newspapers with complaints about the indifference of the mass of Union membership.

The managements in turn realize they have no longer active resistance on the part of Trade Unions to fear and pay slight attention to even their moderate demands. A 28% maximum attendance of manager representatives at the conferences on production held with the workers, according to *Economic Life*, reflects

the indifference of the plant administrators to the workers' views. Here, too, are the early fruits of Lenin's "first phase of Communist society" with "all the citizens . . . transformed into the hired employees of the State."<sup>o</sup> The Trade Union officials (themselves Government employees) generate a bureaucratic atmosphere that so widely differentiates the Soviet Trade Union movement from labor movements in other industrial countries.

The general staff of Communism does not rest easily in the Trade Union situation. Neither in organization, functionings, nor inter-relations with the Government has stabilization been reached. Although Trotsky's proposal, that Trade Unions frankly be constituted part of the State apparatus, yielded to Lenin's theory of their independence, the actual alignments were determined by the pressures of opposing forces, and the results have proved the independence to be fictitious. The resolution of the XI Congress of the Party, presumably written by Lenin, had declared that Trade Unions "must be the closest and indispensable allies of the Government which in turn in all its political and economic work gets instructions from the politically conscious vanguard of the working class—the Communist Party."

A conspicuous test of the first magnitude came in 1929. In spite of the fact that for several years past direction of the Trade Union movement seemed securely concentrated in the hands of trusted Party officials, on the issue of "labor discipline" the Communist Trade Union leadership at its very top contraposed the interests of the working class as employees to the interests of the State business organizations as

<sup>o</sup> *The State and Revolution*, p. 131.

employers. Tomsky and most of his associates contended for the Trade Unions retaining a vestige of independence that would enable them to more or less successfully perform the professed task of defending the workers' interests. Not much of the story of the inner fight reached the public but it was serious enough to eventuate in the wholesale removal of the leaders beginning with Tomsky as chief. A deluge of incriminatory and defamatory articles in the press impeached them of flagrant deviation from the Party line. They were "counter-revolutionary," "opportunist," and "Rightist."

Recounting the struggle the report on the Trade Union movement approved by the Political Bureau and submitted to the XVI Party Congress,<sup>10</sup> charged that "the Trade Union organizations did not measure up to the new tasks which the Party set before them. The opportunist leadership of the old Executive Council . . . not only was unable to understand the problem of proletarian dictatorship in the reconstruction period and the ensuing tasks . . . but offered resistance to the Communist Party in the reorganization of the Trade Union activities and the elimination of their most serious shortcomings." The statement before concluding called Tomsky and his colleagues "the bankrupt leaders."

After the manner of standard Party tactics the press recognized in Tomsky's removal a signal for an attack against the Trade Union officials in general. Exposures made clearly contradicted previous optimistic accounts of the progress of Trade Union work as if to create the impression that the movement for several years had been in the hands of the most decided enemies of the

<sup>10</sup> *Pravda*, May 21, 1930.

working class. *Comsomolskaia Pravda*<sup>11</sup> furnished a fair exhibit from an article summarizing the results of the "cleaning": "Rust and pus were entrenched behind the walls of the Palace of Labor (Trade Union Headquarters). The presence of socially extraneous elements, the most complete detachment from production, a bureaucratic optimism, the beginning of bureaucratic degeneration—these are the basic ailments of the general staff apparatus of our Trade Union movement."

The XVI Congress of the Party in July, 1930, gave much consideration to Trade Union reorganization. The resolution from the Central Executive Committee accepted by the Congress assigned to the Unions tasks as far from "the factories to the workers" formula as is the East from the West. Their eyes were directed foremost to the development of socialized industry—by "all means and energy" to advance the socialistic competition and the shock brigades; to interest themselves more actively in the elaborated plans of the national economy and in the actual management of industry; to nominate new directors of factories and other administrative personnel selected from members of the shock brigades; and to "reëducate" the technical intelligentsia. Next was emphasized their participation in the socialization of agriculture by carefully preparing and selecting "thousands of proletarians as organizers and leaders of the collective agricultural movement." Other duties on the list included greater activity in improving the material conditions of the working class, helping the Government reduce the prices for foodstuffs and consumers' goods in the workers' budget, participation in the introduction of the seven-hour working day, "cultural work and

<sup>11</sup> June 1, 1930.

political education of the masses," and "the international work of the Trade Unions."

The resolution concluded: "The Communist Party organization must improve and strengthen their leadership in the work of the Trade Union organizations . . . and take care for a systematic supply of Party officials for the movement."

This is other language for the citation with which the chapter opens. It recalls a sentence phrased by Tomskey in 1925, the full meaning of which he waited four years to demonstrate at the cost of his seat: "The All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions works under the direct control of the Central Committee of the Party, under its sleepless observation."





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CHAPTER V

COMMUNIZING AGRICULTURE

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*“The land, sheep, horses, and cattle must all be at the disposal of society.”*<sup>1</sup>

*“Manifestly the peasants too would have in return to hand over their grain in an organized manner.”*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ABC of Communism*, p. 70.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166.

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## CHAPTER V

### COMMUNIZING AGRICULTURE

Most prophets of the tenure of Communist power in Russia have conditioned its length upon the winning or mastering of the peasants. The sheer peasant bulk in itself suggests to an observer such a condition of success. They constitute over 80% of the population—120,000,000 of them at least. Their influence psychologically and philosophically attested by its predominance in Russian literature, art, and music has outmeasured even their numbers in a long past. Most predictions of the ultimate failure of Russian Communism have been based on peasant individualism being proof against the prescribed communized economic order ever successfully incorporating them.

Reënforcing the peasant mass resident on the land are hundreds of thousands of families really rooted on the soil, whose branches are interwoven into the urban life by members, who either have become settled industrial workers or who shuttle between village and city for seasonal employment. The proletarianizing of these recruits is a process of generations before the village bonds are loosed. The realistic Communists do not regard them promising Party material.

The economic rather than the political aspect of the peasant position toward Communism's program is the crux on which to center attention. Politically the

muzhiks patiently for centuries endured the absolutism of the Czar except for sporadic outbreaking protests, economic in significance. That their part in government other than local was negligible mattered little. The political apparatus devised by the Communist dictatorship leaves them still a subject section of the population. Again their passivity has been trusted to keep them politically contented. Whether they will produce and deliver what the dictators have laid upon agriculture to furnish after the formula of the theoreticians is the issue.

The drama of "Communism and the Peasants" passed through three acts in the ten years beginning 1917. In the First Lenin won their non-resistance to his seizure of power in the name of the workers, soldiers, and peasants. The Second covered the period 1918 to 1921 featured by the refusal of the peasants to yield their surpluses to the State. In that last year the New Economic Policy raised the curtain on Act Three by liberating the peasants materially. They then prospered but the Government return on agriculture declined and grain requisitions again were instituted in order to ration the Army and cities and nourish the hope of export. The Five Year Plan from 1928 embraced agriculture and staged the Fourth Act. Looking peasantwise it accentuated the drive to increase yields and surplus by collectivizing the farms, and so to enter upon mass production and break up individual peasant independence. It marks the serious application of Communist theory to agriculture and promises before it ends to answer the question whether the Russian peasant farm and farmer can be socialized in time to undergird the structure of Communist economy in its towering experiment.



ПИС. К. ПОТОВА.

Pravda.

Although Lenin's coup in October, 1917, was of the cities and later invested the rural parts, Lenin completely outplayed the democratic parties in handling the peasants. The situation lent itself to his tactics. The peasants had been won to the popular Russian revolutionary movement, which came to power in March, 1917, by the promise that when the old régime was overthrown they would come into possession of the estates of the landlords. Of more land they and generations of their fathers had dreamed. The Revolution had come. The Kerensky Cabinet reasoned thus from a sense of Government responsibility: "You shall have partitioning of the estates. Only let it be done in order, after there is a Constitution, a Parliament, and the legislation of a land program that will be just to all." Under the demands of local situations however, "Land Committees" encouraged by a member of the Government were parties to much unofficial land seizure and distribution that took place during the brief Provisional Government period.

To these official counsels of orderly procedure in awarding the gains of the Revolution, Lenin for the Communists countered by vigorously abetting open immediate seizure of the estates that were not already distributed. In addition the millions of peasant soldiers at the front and in the training camps were swept with propaganda inciting demand for an immediate peace. Whoever was in Russia in 1917 and 1918 knows that the most successful of the slogans were those of "Peace" and "Land." Technically and factually the urban proletariat were the immediate instruments of the October, 1917, Revolution but the appropriation of power by the Communists was made possible only by meeting the demand of the peasants and weary

army to end the war at whatever price and to proceed with carrying out the pre-revolutionary promises. Moreover their moral influence served in the 1918-1920 years of civil war to keep the Communists in power. "Landlord" was and is still a sinister name in Russia—probably more so than "Factory Owner." The conspicuous attempts to restore a monarchistic or democratic government in Russia have failed because invariably they were accompanied by attempts to return the land to the expelled owners. Invariably such a move brought the peasantry, actively or passively, to the support of the Soviets.

The irresponsible division of estates, that began and advanced far with the Provisional Government helpless to arrest it, became complete with the new Communist power lifting the ban officially and validating the results. The pre-revolutionary statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture gave the peasants 82% of the arable land of European Russia. According to the Soviet publication "About Land," the transfers from "non-toilers" in thirty-six provinces of European Russia added 21,400,000 dessiatines<sup>\*</sup> to the 94,700,000 dessiatines of peasant holdings prior to the Revolution, increasing them 22.5%. In the same documents the author commented that the results disappointed many people and added: "A special inquiry has established the fact that . . . in the majority of provinces the addition does not exceed one-half of a dessiatine; only in a few does it reach one dessiatine." Many peasant holdings went into the partitioning. Zinoviev, addressing the Party members of the Third Soviet Congress in May, 1925, gave the "comrades in the Commissariat of Agriculture" as authorization for the statement that

\* A dessiatine equals 2.7 acres.



nearly as much land was taken from the real kulaks of Czarist days as from the landowners.<sup>4</sup>

Through 1917 and into 1918 the villages felt little of authority from "the center." The appropriation of the estates, agricultural implements, and personal belongings was effected in this period more in the fashion of unorganized plunder than of distribution. Unrestrained, vengeful peasant crowds very often destroyed the manor buildings, thoroughbred stock, machinery, libraries, and furniture. The values so demolished reached very large but uncomputed totals. The new authorities soon became aware of this devastation and made some of the largest estates Government property on the ground of founding demonstration farms.

Administrative lines shortly began to tighten peasantwise and led the Government into the second and less happy phase of relationships. Scarcely had the huge collapsed World War army ceased to be a burden when the Soviet Government, confronted with armed movements for its overthrow, proclaimed a fresh mobilization to defend itself. Wars on numerous fronts ensued. Diverse land regulations sprang up like mushrooms overnight over great reaches of territory wrested from Soviet rule.

New and powerful economic factors also invaded the village. Communist experiments set up in the cities had rural repercussions. One of the earliest came from the almost complete destruction of the distributive machinery. The closing of all private mills, companies, groceries, bakeries, and shops deprived the urban population of facilities to secure food. The reduced stores of foodstuffs and clothing existing in the cities, the Army

<sup>4</sup> *Zinoviev: Russia's Path to Communism*, pp. 36-37.

requisitioned. The peasants forbidden to market their products directly to the population demurred. The Government found itself in a corner. Compulsory seizure of the grain seemed the only way out.

A special Ministry, the "People's Commissariat of Food Supplies," was created. Thousands of armed food requisitioning detachments began operations throughout the areas subordinated to the Soviets. They assigned each village and each peasant a given amount of grain, milk, eggs, or meat to be supplied to the Food Ministry's local organization. The allotments were made not on the scale of the individual peasant's capacity to furnish but on the basis of the Government's need for distribution, with disproportionately small quantities of manufactured goods offered in exchange. Practically the system had little to distinguish it from outright confiscation.

For the time the Russian peasantry faced a dilemma. The Government did not hesitate to use force to get from them whatever was wanted. If on the other hand they turned to the counter-revolutionary movements, they saw the danger of the landlords returning. But by the end of 1921 after desperate struggles, the Red armies had completely defeated the opposing forces and the peasants found no choice left between evils. They belonged to Communist Russia with new laws and many regulations, and with events moving toward economic crisis.

The "middle" and "poor" Russian peasants had never produced on their own land or been able to retain for their labor on the estates more than enough to keep their families badly. The pre-revolution export of Russian grain had come principally from the big estates and "wealthy" peasants at the price of leav-

ing the per capita consumption of the peasant masses lower than in any other large grain-growing country. Much of the estate lands now transferred to peasant hands became subject to backward methods, poorer seed and stock, and less economical administration. Under the pressure of requisitions the peasants naturally decreased their sowings, aiming to produce only so much as would reach the minimum exempt from confiscation. Accordingly when drought struck the Volga and Ukraine grain provinces in 1921, a disaster that under other conditions would have been partly mitigated developed into an overwhelming catastrophe. The former holdover stocks religiously kept in the periodically afflicted regions for protection against crop failure had not been spared from the Soviet seizures, and there had been no sowings for surpluses in the more fortunate areas.

Thousands of villages were completely deserted. Their populations famished to the utmost traveled the public highways in attempts to reach the nearest town where nothing but the same starvation awaited. Hundreds of thousands perished. Millions more must have followed but for foreign assistance. The American Relief Administration alone succored more than 10,000,000 children and adults in the cities and villages.

The oppressions and calamities left the Russian peasantry in a most deplorable state. In many districts all their stocks had been confiscated, even seed grain for their fields. It became necessary for the Government to advance millions of rubles in practically free grain and in loans for machinery.


The total situation in city and country brought the Government up short, and the New Economic Policy

was proclaimed bringing the peasant a respite of freedom. To this time the political and administrative work of the Communists in the village had been more destructive than constructive expressed in confiscations, virtual warfare against the well-to-do peasants, the redistribution of their lands and wealth among the poorer peasants, and an offensive against the clergy who were considered the bulwark of the rural reactionary forces. In 1921 the Government recognized the private farmer as the only source of agricultural production at this stage. Forced to lessen the threat of continuing famine in the towns and to grow more grain for export, it gave him a freer hand. The abolition of quotas was announced and an agricultural tax substituted, in many cases lighter than had existed under the Czarist Government. In turn the energy of the individual peasant asserted itself. He increased his output in the hope of exchanging his products for agricultural implements, boots, clothing, and other goods which he badly needed for himself and family. Briefly the Russian village had the prospect of enjoying prosperity to the degree possible under the limitations of land, agricultural implements, and funds. The Communists found their power to hold the peasantry within bounds overestimated. To model the life of the urban population—confiscate banks and factories from their owners and concentrate production and distribution in the hands of the State—was easy in comparison. Likewise to constrain the peasant mass, the most conservative, ignorant, and obstinate of the Russian population, proved again far more of an economic feat than the Government could bring to pass, though possessed of the means of coercion and not unwilling to use it.

Natural economic laws and processes still over-matched the artificial system. The rising village prosperity gave instant impetus to the individualistic tendencies deeply rooted in these private producers. Class differentiation advanced by gigantic steps. The

ON THE PLATFORM OF PRINCIPLE

Some village Communists do not turn over to the State their grain surpluses and agitate against the grain collection plans of the Government.



*Pravda.*

"I HAVE WEIGHTY REASONS AGAINST THE PARTY'S POLICY IN GRAIN COLLECTION"

more resourceful peasants chose to sell their grain and other products to private traders who paid higher prices than the official collection agencies. The lack of manufactured goods for purchase and other deficiencies of the State system turned an ever-increasing amount of agricultural production into the channels of private trade. Monetary reform effected with changing currencies made the peasants further reluctant to part with their products except for goods in exchange.

The percentage of village Party members to exert the pressures so effective in the cities was incomparably smaller. With the peasant generally unterrorized the notion of establishing over vast rural Russia the same penetrating political and military control that existed in the cities appeared fantastic. Much later Stalin publicly acknowledged that beyond the numerical weakness of the Party among the peasantry it did not yet have a large clientele of active non-Party peasants "who could link up the Party with the tens of millions of peasants." He saw nowhere "such a definite palpable necessity for a non-Party corps of active workers as among the peasantry."

By the end of 1926 the Government was fully aware of danger in the rapid growth of anti-Soviet rural forces. The presence and activity of these elements in the village soviets and administrative machinery, the stubborn resistance of the "middle" and "wealthy" peasants to all attempts at grain collections in return for valueless paper money for which no manufactured goods could be obtained were in evidence throughout the land. Something like panic came upon the Communist leaders. Controversy over peasant problems brought on bitter struggles within the Party resulting in the expulsion of many noted leaders. Trotsky and the

associated "ultra Lefts" advocated resort to the former rigors of military Communism, with its confiscation of foodstuffs. "Ultra Rights" pressed for almost unlimited freedom for the individual producer in the village, maintaining that the kulak would imperceptibly grow into the socialistic system. One of these, Kalinin himself a peasant, titular President of the U. S. S. R., addressing the Central Executive Committee aligned himself as "the most decided enemy of administrative pressure and even to a certain extent of moral pressure in the matter of collectivization"—a position from which later he was forced to recede. Late in 1927 Trotsky was broken ostensibly on this issue. Having disposed of him politically, the Party rulers proceeded with rigor on a peasant program formulated on the Trotsky lines.

Meanwhile the underlying economic facts remained unchanged. Private producers supplied nearly all agricultural production and the Government dared not yet attempt the risky experiment of reorganizing rural economy lest the already insufficient food supply to the cities would further decrease, if not cease altogether. It applied various pressures. Open violence, disastrous as it had proved to be and solemnly renounced, still attracted because of its immediate results. Since Party interests and objectives alone make pledges of a Communist régime inviolable, confiscation reappeared several times to be forsworn at seed time. Up to 1927 fatal encounters and executions attended. Duress increased until peasants refusing to supply grain at the low Government fixed prices were declared enemies of the State and all their possessions taken. Other procedures were calculated to strengthen the poorer peasants politically. These took such forms as heavy taxation of the

In several instances members of the Party sent for grain collections start to demand, under kulak influence, a reduction of the fixed allotments to be collected.

Рис. ГР. РОЗЕ.



Pravda.

THE NEWEST MODEL OF A KULAK LOUD SPEAKER



prosperous peasants and simultaneous deprivation of civic rights; organization of the poorer peasantry against the others; general political educational activity; and the establishment of Communist Youth organizations in the villages.

Relationships could not exist much farther from "the close alliance between workers and peasants," which Lenin in perhaps the most conspicuous manifestation of his revolutionary genius had seen to be requisite to achievement of the social revolution. His followers were finding with time the conditions and influences pulling themselves and the peasants apart to be many, obstinate, and cumulative. To reach the solution, involved remodeling the psychology of both parties to the conflict, and signs multiplied that the Communists had undertaken probably their major task.

Actual village conditions up to the Revolution had advanced from serfdom but the distance to compensated living and labor was not yet in sight. Primitive and scant means of communication, blighting illiteracy, ignorance of economic laws, and utterly alien mindedness to a conception of the State as an entity toward the development of which every citizen should contribute suggest somewhat the dimensions and difficulties of the Communist educational undertaking in the villages. The undoubted awakening of the social instincts of the Russian peasantry on a wide scale by the Revolution in general, by the impact of the Soviet system in particular, had temporarily at least worked to intensify rather than to moderate resistance to economic changes. Ambition increased and the spirit of servility diminished.

Before the Revolution the Communists had almost no connection with the peasantry and regarded it a

non-proletarian class. The peasant was not yet trusted politically and knew it from many infallible proofs. Under the Czarist rule he had enjoyed a degree of local self-government, less from the inclination of the rulers to be liberal than because no government could penetrate intimately the life of those villages dispersed over an area from the German border to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic spaces to the Himalayas. The increase of his participation in the Soviet Government can be as readily overestimated as it has been greatly overadvertised. He has no illusions that his present administrative share is other than negligible and is meant to be so. He has seen Soviet policies uniformly subordinate peasant interests to those of the urban proletariat.

In the small provincial centers the ruling group is never appointed from people who represent the great peasant majority. The heralded functioning of peasant power beyond the village has fulfillment usually in solemn annual conferences, convoked to stamp resolutions previously adopted in a Party committee and often hardly intelligible to peasant representatives. Stalin himself in a set interview has given the picture of the most common political maneuvering in the village: "A small group of people connected more with the uyezd<sup>5</sup> and gubernia (province) than with the village population has been hitherto governing the villages in quite a number of districts. This state of affairs meant that those directing the villages relied especially on a lead from above, from the uyezds, and least of all did they look to those below them, the village population." Nationally it takes five times as many peasants as urbanites to be entitled to a seat in

<sup>5</sup> An administrative unit corresponding somewhat to a county.

Soviet representative bodies. The disparity, together with the pyramided system of lower bodies electing to the next higher one, easily manipulated, buries completely the political power of 120,000,000 or more peasants under that of the few millions of industrial workers in the grip of the only Party permitted to exist.

Culturally on the other hand the new rulers are at the opposite pole from the old Autocracy. The latter grudgingly yielded to the earnest educational efforts of the organized local administrations and societies that worked on and made advances despite hindrances higher up. The Soviet Government from the beginning has aimed to spread education in the villages as widely and as quickly as possible, both on its merits and as the indispensable vehicle for Communist ideology and technique. The practical achievements thus far in rural education have not been brilliant, yet the will and energy displayed have evidenced sincere purpose. Complete lower grade school facilities and an educational center in every village have been Soviet goals with reading room, literature, films, radio, and lecturers from the towns—all loaded to capacity with orthodox Communist freight to be sure, whether billed as politics, economics, social sciences, or religion, yet withal awakening and informing to the peasant mind.

Among the minority nationalities in the Caucasus and Middle Asia particularly, the Soviet system has stimulated society and noticeably enjoys substantial favor among the peasant populations, the Communist Revolution having had more to give them in the way of emancipation than in "Slavic Russia," markedly to the women in the so-called National Republics, who, until the coming of this new movement, had not

experienced liberation from near slavery in social, economic, and domestic life ages old.

Despite their having brilliantly carried along the peasants in the initial seizure of power in 1917, the peasant program of the Communists at the end of ten years not only ranked lowest in totality among Government achievements, but it was registering around its own lowest point. The low percentage of peasants (especially the youth) that had entered the Party and the Communist Youth League reflected how far they had failed to tame these supreme individualists and convert them to the new faith, or even to neutralize them. In general, relations between the Government and peasantry at large had improved not at all. Inimical acts on both sides tended to widen the breach. The contemporary Russian village in 1928 presented a scene turbulent with the commotion of new and old. Artificially divided by the Government into "classes," pushed much against their own will toward collective agricultural enterprises, heavily taxed, flooded by Communist and anti-religious propaganda the simple farmer folk stood distraught between conflicting forces at another historical fork in the road.

Essentially then at a stalemate with the peasants, economically and politically, the Party generals reached the decision to organize a new attack on speeding up "socialization of the village," which in the conception of the Communist leaders should embrace both economic reorganization of the Russian peasantry and its political remodeling. The new program by far the most determined, ruthless, and bold of all the rural undertakings found its full embodiment in the famous "Five

Year Plan" to develop wholesale the entire National Economy.

The new plan precipitated the fiercest struggle of the long series yet waged between the Communist Party and the Russian peasantry. It featured the year 1929 and the beginning of 1930. The last battle of the long war has not been fought and the unknown decision is in the distance. The event of 1930 on this "agricultural front" was a retreat by the Communist forces, without however dissuading the Kremlin leaders. The XVI Party Congress<sup>6</sup> resolved on continuance of hostilities until no more individually operated peasant farms remain in the Soviet Union territory.

This unprecedented drive for socialization of the village brought forth an avalanche of official pronouncements, speeches, and articles on the events, the results and the appertaining theories. The fact is Soviet peasant policy had undergone a very considerable evolution of theory, requiring effort by Stalin and his associates to convince the Party that the general plan and methods being employed by them in agricultural socialization squared with orthodox Marxian and Leninist doctrines. Hitherto relations of the Government with the peasants had followed Lenin's teaching that the Party must "learn to reach agreement with the 'middle' peasants without abandoning for a single minute the fight against the kulaks, and at all times leaning only on the 'poor' peasants." On the twelfth anniversary of the Communist Revolution on November 7, 1929,<sup>7</sup> Stalin in his famous article "The Year of the Great Turning Point" clearly stated the ruling policies in respect to the most important Russian problems. The deliverance assumed special significance

<sup>6</sup> July, 1930.

<sup>7</sup> October 25, Old Calendar.

because within the Party at the time an influential group of "Rightists" voiced serious apprehension about the feasibility of the official plan. They considered the wholesale collectivization of Russia under existing conditions next to insanity. On this issue the protesting wing, which included Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, Uglanov, and many other leading figures and who for a time seemed to be backed by the majority of the Party, was defeated and destroyed.

"The problem now," Stalin wrote, "is one of a radical turning point in the development of our agriculture from small and backward individual economies into large and progressive collective agriculture, into communal tilling of land, into machine and tractor inter-village stations, into agricultural collectives and associations based on the new technique, finally, into mammoth State farms equipped with hundreds of tractors and combines. . . . In the coming 1930 the marketable production of grain in the State farms and agricultural collectives will be over 50% of the total marketable production of grain. The new and the decisive in the present collectivization movement is that peasants join the collectives not in small groups as before but in whole villages, districts, and even regions.

"What is the meaning of this? It means that the 'middle' peasant is now joining the collectives. This is the basis of the radical turning point in the development of agriculture, which in my opinion is the most important achievement of the Soviet Government for the past year. . . . We rush at full speed along the road of industrialization toward Socialism leaving behind our age-old fabulous Russian backwardness. We become a country of metal, a country of automobilia-

tion, a country of tractorization. And when we will seat our Soviet Union in a motor car and our peasant on a tractor—then let capitalists who are so proud of their ‘civilization’ try to catch up with us. We will see then which countries should be classified as backward and which as leading ones.”


This strong mixture of socialistic with nationalistic aims sounds unusually sincere and affords insight into the aspirations of the Communist leaders.

On the date proclaimed the “Day of Collectivization” *Economic Life*<sup>a</sup> published a series of papers explaining the basic idea underlying the collectivization movement. One by Golendy pictured the State farms no longer small and rather sparsely populated islands in a sea of petty bourgeois peasant economies, but set among almost ten million former holdings now organized into large units and technically the best equipped. The spread of the collectivization movement he described in proportions “never dreamed of before” having hundreds of machine and tractor stations, uniting hundreds of thousands of peasant economies. These were regarded as liquidated for, he argued, “a peasant economy tilled by a tractor station ceases to be an individual economy. Its individuality economically disappears. It is engulfed by one communal economy and the ‘owner’ himself becomes a worker in a general collective economy.”

Golendy dealt also with the relations of the State to the remaining millions of peasants not yet included in the network of State farms, collectives, and tractor stations. Scores of millions of them he represented to be embraced within a system of “contractation” in which the State “not only and not mainly regulates

<sup>a</sup> October 13, 1929.

the agrarian relations but directly regulates the very agricultural production." A "contractation" agreement consummated between the State and such an association of peasant economies specifically defines what agricultural products the peasant association shall raise and how much, in what manner they will be raised, and the amount that will be turned over to the Government. "Contractation" further corrects "the anarchy of the market" by binding the salable crop to the Government at the fixed price for the district.



Pravda.

Another of the articles<sup>9</sup> made clear how far the Government was preparing to go in its rural economic advance. The account ran: "Grain agricultural collectives already have sixty-one machine and tractor stations. . . . The collective tractor stations are creating a real revolution in to-day's village. . . . To build on the peasant fields of the Soviet Union 3,000 machine stations managed by the population organized in large collectives, . . . this is the giant task of undoubtedly

<sup>9</sup> Blumenthal, *Economic Life*, October 13, 1929.



international historical importance which the proletariat of the Soviet Union now faces.”

The immediate motivation of the drive appeared implicitly in a speech Stalin made to the Marxian agrarians.<sup>10</sup> After quoting the statistician, Nemchinov, on the sources of Russian grain production before the Revolution—landlords 600 million poods,<sup>11</sup> kulaks 1,900 millions, “middle” and “poor” peasants 2,500 millions—he proceeded: “What changes occurred in the village after the October Revolution? I take the figures from the same table. Let us take 1927. How much produced in this year the landlords? It is evident that they did not produce anything and could not produce anything because the landlords were destroyed by the October Revolution. How much was produced by the kulaks in 1927? 600 million poods instead of 1,900 million poods. That means that after the October Revolution the kulaks became economically three times weaker. And how much produced in 1927 ‘middle’ and ‘poor’ peasants? Four billion poods instead of 2½ billion poods.”

These figures, cited to show that the “middle” and “poor” peasants gained from the October Revolution as their production increased, have very important implications. The 600 and 1,900 million poods of grain produced before the Revolution by the landlords and kulaks, respectively, represented very high percentages of marketable surplus offered for sale in the domestic and foreign markets. This was not holding true for any considerable part of the 4 billion poods now raised by the “middle” and “poor” peasants for two reasons. First, collecting marketable surplus from a small num-

<sup>10</sup> Moscow Conference, December 27, 1929.

<sup>11</sup> A pood equals 36.113 pounds avoirdupois.

ber of comparatively large producers is simple and easy in contrast to gathering an equal amount from innumerable small producers. The second constituted the real hazard of the Soviet Government—the reluctance of these small producers to release their grain at all. Whereas the former landlords and kulaks with marketable surpluses that exceeded many times their consumptive capacity were compelled to sell them or otherwise have a dead economic weight on their hands, the new producers' families were consuming most of their increase. The mass of "middle" and "poor" peasants, partly starved under the Czar and similarly starved under the Soviets, could very well use their entire crop and the task of extracting any of it from them at disadvantageous prices came to an impasse. To break it was undoubtedly the most determining purpose behind the urgent collectivization program. Outwardly directed against the kulaks, the total project included the economic subjugation of the whole anarchical Russian peasant population and making it an amenable force in the Communist system.

The term "War" does not connote more than the realities of the phase of the contest between the Government and the peasantry thus ushered in. It is a desperate sanguinary and ongoing one. The State directed against the disorganized, economically weak, and politically ignorant mass all the power of its Party, administrative, military, propaganda, and economic enginery. The assailed likewise employed their own familiar weapons and tactics. The sum total of immediate financial losses have not and probably never will be recorded. The fatalities among the combatants have not been published officially. Rather they have

been suppressed. Independently inquiring visitors during 1930 express their estimates in thousands.<sup>12</sup>

Legislative enactments followed one another toe to heel. Persuasion, threats, disfranchisement, violence, imprisonment, exile, economic and political boycott reënforced the laws and decrees. By the end of 1929 a new slogan came into use bringing ruin to millions of Russian peasant families and death to many. According to Stalin's admission, its practical application went much further than was planned but for any excesses he must bear the major odium, if any responsibility attaches to the language the ruler of a people uses. On December 27, 1929, he announced publicly<sup>13</sup> in Moscow: "We have changed recently the policy of limiting the exploitation tendencies of the kulaks into the policy of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class." Eleven days later *Comsomolskaia Pravda* quoted him as saying: "We now are in a position to launch a decisive attack against the kulaks, crush their resistance, liquidate them as a class and to supplant their production by the production of agricultural collectives and State farms." The annihilation of the kulak class as the direct aim of the collectivization policy was repeatedly emphasized by him and other Soviet leaders. An announcement of the Central Committee of the Party, published after economic and political pressures forced the Government into a temporary retreat, gives a summary of the compulsions employed to which little need be added:<sup>14</sup>

"Information received by the Central Committee regarding the development of the collectivization movement shows that, along with actual and very important

<sup>12</sup> Calvin Hoover in *Harpers*, October, 1930.

<sup>13</sup> In the Conference of Marxist Agrarians.

<sup>14</sup> *Economic Life*, March 15, 1930.

successes of collectivization, in various districts of the Soviet Union distortions of the Party line have taken place. First of all there is infringement of the principle of free volition in joining agricultural collectives. In a number of districts free volition was substituted by coercion to join the collectives under threats of 'dekulakization,' of disfranchisement, etc. Accordingly, in the group of the 'dekulakized' is sometime included a portion of 'middle' and even 'poor' peasants. In some districts the percentage of 'dekulakized' reaches 15% and the percentage of disfranchised peasants 15-20%. We know of cases of exceptionally raw disgusting criminal handling of the population by local functionaries (who sometimes in turn were victims of provocation by the counter-revolutionary elements), of marauding, of distribution of the property of the 'dekulakized,' and of arrests of 'middle' and even 'poor' peasants, etc.

"In a number of districts the preparatory work . . . is replaced by bureaucratic decrees of swollen figures and artificial inflations of the percentage of economies collectivized. In some districts the collectivization in a few days 'jumps' from 10% to 90%, etc. . . . In some places extremely repulsive compulsory communization of living apartments, cattle, poultry, etc., have occurred. . . .

"The Central Committee finally deems it necessary to brand as absolutely intolerable distortions of the Party instructions in the fight against religious superstitions. We have in mind the closing of churches by administrative power without the consent of the overwhelming majority of the population of the village, which usually increases superstition; also the prohibition of markets and bazaars in a number of places."

Stalin published in *Pravda*<sup>15</sup> "My reply to Comrade-Members of Agricultural Collectives." In this he formulated the "errors" committed by Soviet authorities in the collectivization movement: "There was a wrong attitude toward 'middle' peasants. Coercion was used in economic relations with the 'middle' peasants. . . . So long as the offensive against the kulaks was led in alliance with 'middle' peasants everything went well. But when some of our comrades intoxicated by success started to slip unconsciously from the road of offensive against the kulak to the road of fighting the 'middle' peasant, when these comrades striving to reach a high percentage of collectivization started to apply violence to the 'middle' peasant, to disfranchise him, to 'dekulakize,' and to expropriate him—then the whole offensive became distorted."

Five days after the publication of Stalin's famous "Dizziness from Success," in which the retreat was ordered, *Comsomolskaia Pravda* appeared with the following headlines:

#### COLLECTIVIZATION IN NATIONAL REPUBLICS

IT IS TIME TO STOP "MILITARY ORDERS"


DO NOT SUBSTITUTE THE PREPARATORY WORK WITH  
BUREAUCRATIC DECREETING FROM ABOVE

AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVES CANNOT BE CREATED  
THAT WAY

But wholly mild methods were not meant to be relied upon by the Communist leaders. They put into effect and with vigor a system savoring of the notorious methods of Nicholas I, whose Minister, Arakcheyev, "promoted" agriculture in Russia by using soldiers as

<sup>15</sup> April 3, 1930.

*Kulturträger.* On January 30, 1930, Voroshilov, Commissar of the Army and Navy, issued an order pub-



*Pravda.*

A TYPICAL BUM OF THE COLLECTIVIZATION  
MOVEMENT

An illustration to Comrade Stalin's article, "Dizziness from Success."

lished by *Economic Life*<sup>18</sup> under the caption: "The Red Army in 1930 Will Give the Country 100,000 Militant Organizers of Socialistic Agriculture." The order

<sup>18</sup> February 1, 1930.

gave directions: "To prepare all the privates and junior officers of the Army for active participation in the upbuilding of the socialistic village, in the mass collectivization movement, in the liquidation of the kulak as a class."

The *Workers' Gazette* of November 15, 1930, records the delivery of more than 100,000 "ardent workers" to the collective farms from the military class discharged the preceding year. The tone of the January order suggests that any kulaks "unliquidated" when the next class debouches will encounter treatment of which "ardent" is weakly descriptive. It read on: "The Military Revolutionary Council of the U. S. S. R. expresses its unwavering confidence that all commanding personnel and political organs of the Army will take up this most important task with their usual energy and in 1930 will give 100,000 fighting organizers of socialistic agriculture to our country."

In addition the Party Central Committee directed that 25,000 Communist factory workers be mobilized and sent to the villages to help local Communists in the collectivization program. The League of Communist Youth recruited members for the same work. The Trade Unions also contributed to the "shock" forces. The whole mobilization was rushed against the peasantry.

Concurrently the Government exerted pressure for "self-taxation" and for "contractation" of production with peasants who did not join the collectives. Neither met expectations. "Contractation" of the spring sowings that should have been completed by March had realized only 39% of the plan on March 20.<sup>17</sup> "Contracts" for flax had reached only 10% of the scheduled

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, March 20, 1930.

figure. The "self-taxation" quotas reflected diminishing sums and fell still lower in realization. The village votes for this form of mulcting the kulaks shrank from 115,000,000 rubles in 1927-1928 to 97,000,000 in 1928-1929, and the corresponding collections from 105,000,000 rubles to 75,000,000. In reporting the decline *Pravda*<sup>18</sup> added ruefully: "According to our information scores of millions of rubles collected for 'self-taxation' are still kept by the soviets (local) and not expended."

Among legislative measures to further collectivization, on February 1, 1930, the Government decreed<sup>19</sup> that in the districts of wholesale collectivization no land could be leased and no hired help used by individual peasants. The same decree gave the local soviets "the power in their districts to take all necessary measures to combat the kulaks up to complete confiscation of their property and their deportation from the regions and districts where they live." Their confiscated property with the exception of that part claimed by State and Coöperative organizations in payment of kulak debts owing them was ordered to be turned over to the agricultural collectives as "a contribution of 'poor' peasants and agricultural hired help joining the collectives."

February 23, 1930, a new law regulated the "unified agricultural tax." This increased levies on individual peasants and gave several privileges to collectives.

April 2, 1930, the Party Central Committee announced that for the next two years all communized cattle and poultry of collectives and their members would be exempt from taxation. The tax on the com-

<sup>18</sup> September 27, 1929.

<sup>19</sup> February 1, 1930.



munized orchards of collectives was decreased 50%. Peasants joining agricultural collectives were freed from their indebtedness to the State for services rendered them by State agronomists and from all fines and penalties inflicted by the courts. Collectives were relieved from any debts to the State on the confiscated kulak property turned over to them.

The Government used money freely in advancing collectivization. Stalin reported to the XVI Party Congress 76 million rubles assigned in 1927-1928 for agricultural collectives, 170 millions in 1928-1929, and 473 millions in 1929-1930. In addition 65 million rubles went to an omnibus "fund of collectivization." Taxation concessions increased the resources of collectives another 200 millions. Stalin estimated more than 400 million rubles were turned over to them representing the confiscated property of the kulaks. Mechanical co-operation extended consisted of 30,000 tractors equaling over 400,000 horsepower, not including 7,000 additional tractors put on these fields by State farms along with other help given in tilling the land of the collectives. In 1929-1930 the Government loaned collectives partly without obligation to return 61 million poods of seed grain. Thousands of agronomists and tractor mechanics were sent out as service experts.

This concentrated legislative and economic movement with threat of armed force, intended to paralyze all resistance by the villages, was countered by the opposing peasants characteristically. Having learned previously through mass executions that the authorities did not hesitate to employ armed force to crush them, they knew any attempt at wide revolt would be the course of madness, but individual terror was employed not seldom by protesting groups of peasants

killing Communist officials, members of village soviets, local correspondents of newspapers, and other Government agents. Peasant vengeance collected a heavy toll in this form. As in other years of acute tension only scattering fatalities were reported daily, but as the facts are gleaned from over the expanses of the Soviet Union the reckoning of victims mounts into shocking figures. Although the Government usually exacted for each killing of a Soviet worker a life for a life, the number showed a tendency to increase rather than decrease as the collectivization policy developed up to its 1930 climax.

The prevailing resistance was non-violent. Dragged into collectives hundreds of thousands refused to work and sow the land. Some openly defied the Government and risked the terrible consequences of "dekulakization" rather than join. Kulak penetration into the organs of administration was charged by the Government—also bribery of Soviet officials. Great numbers before joining slaughtered all their cattle, reasoning that it was better to get at least the price of hide and meat than to have the animals confiscated without remuneration. According to *Comsomolskaia Pravda*,<sup>20</sup> 917,900 sheep or 20% of the total number in the lower Volga district alone were thus disposed of from October, 1929, to January, 1930. "The slaughtering of cattle both productive and working has not stopped even now," added the newspaper. *Economic Review of the Soviet Union*<sup>21</sup> estimates that from this cause the total number of cattle declined from 67,230,600 to 51,823,100; hogs from 20,532,800 to 11,710,200; and sheep from 132,758,700 to 89,287,000.

<sup>20</sup> February 9, 1930.

<sup>21</sup> October 1, 1930.

Government <sup>22</sup> promptly reacted to this danger by giving the local soviets authority to refuse the right of tilling land to those kulaks who either killed their cattle or induced others to do so, also to take the cattle and agricultural equipment and to imprison the offenders for two years or to deport them from their



*Pravda.*

#### WHILE DISCUSSION IS GOING ON

The lack of understanding and the lack of desire to understand the significance and the character of our change in policy result in an openly opportunist "Rightist" policy of local Soviet representatives. They philosophize on the subject "What is a kulak?" while the kulaks, who fully understood the change of the Party policy, slaughter their cattle in the meantime.

residence. Admission to collectives was refused to those, who, before joining, slaughtered or sold their cattle.

By February, 1930, the situation began to receive serious attention at the top. Conditions evidently had become appalling. Thousands of collectives formed

<sup>22</sup> January 16, 1930.

under coercion and administrative decrees did not function and promised no grain production. The slaughtering of animals reached such proportions that the press warned about "live stock extermination." Individual farmers facing collectivization folded their hands and decided to do nothing. Feeding the cities and the Army became a more and more dubious prospect until much against their will the Stalin group decided on a temporary retreat.

Stalin's "Dizziness from Success" published on March 2, 1930, had the effect of an exploding arsenal. Emphasizing that 50% of peasant economies were already collectivized on February 20, he urged his followers to slow down the tempo, sternly denounced the "distortions" by local Communists, and reiterated that no compulsion be exerted to enlist new members in collectives. Among the abuses of power in forcing collectivization, in collectivizing by decree and organizing "paper collectives," he cited the case of Turkestan where in a number of districts there were attempts to match and surpass leading districts in the Soviet Union by "threats to apply military force," and "to deprive of water and manufactured goods" those peasants "who did not yet wish to join the collectives."

The retreat orders of the Party Central Committee<sup>22</sup> instructed the local Party organizations to discontinue the compulsory means of collectivization which had been employed in a number of places. They were directed to continue insistently the work of attracting peasants into collectives on the basis of free volition and to strengthen existing collectives.

Another mandate indicated that elements in the Army and other important quarters were protesting.

<sup>22</sup> March 15, 1930.

This required checking up the lists of persons "dekulakized" and disfranchised and immediate correction of the errors made in regard to "middle" peasants, former Red partisans and members of families of village teachers, Red soldiers, and Red sailors. Also exceptions to the rule of non-admittance of kulaks and other disfranchised persons into agricultural collectives were allowed for members of such families as "contain Red partisans devoted to Soviet power, Red soldiers, Red sailors, and village teachers on condition that they will vouch for the members of their families joining the collectives."

Prohibitions were placed upon the closing of markets and on all hindrances to peasants selling their products in the market. Reinstatement of the bazaars was directed. Finally the instructions prescribed discontinuance of "the practice of closing churches by administrative power" fictitiously justified as representing the free will of the population. They permitted closing a church only when the overwhelming majority of peasants actually desired it and then not before such decisions had been approved by the district soviets. "For insulting behavior in regard to religious feelings of peasants and peasant women," prosecution and most severe punishment were demanded.

It is extremely difficult to establish from the authorities with what losses the Soviet army of collectivizers retreated from the field. The figures are most contradictory and appear to be inspired by desires more than by statistical data. The day after the publication of the Stalin article putting the economies collectivized at 50%, *Pravda* published a speech delivered a few days previous by Kalinin in Voronezh in which he

boasted that agricultural collectives embraced "not less than 80% of peasant economies." Either the President's veracity or information might be questioned. "A month ago," Stalin found encouragement to write in *Pravda*, April 3, 1930, "we thought that in the grain districts we had more than 60% of peasant economies collectivized. It is clear now that in so far as the actual and in the least way stable agricultural collectives are concerned this figure was definitely exaggerated. If after the exodus of a part of the peasants from the collectives, the percentage of collectivization will be fixed at 40% in the grain districts—and this is certainly possible—it will be the greatest achievement of the collectivization movement at the present moment." Gubernann, five days earlier, evidently was still somewhat "dizzy from success" when informing the readers of *Pravda* that on March 1, "according to official information," 110,200 agricultural collectives embraced 56% of all peasant economies, and that on March 10 while the number of collectives decreased to 106,000, the number of peasant economies united had increased by 1%. The *Pravda* editor himself<sup>24</sup> used the following ambiguous sentence in his "Results of the Bolshevik Sowing Campaign": "One quarter of peasant economies of the Soviet Union embraced by agricultural collectives has sown 40% of all the sowing area." The collectivized 25% of *Pravda* probably represents about the point where the inside people believe the shaking-down process stopped, since it was confirmed by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Party December 19, 1930. It gave 24.1% as the percentage throughout the Union, including all branches (farm, cattle,

<sup>24</sup> June 20, 1930.

fishing and hunting); and 49.3% in the chief grain producing areas.

The mass exodus of peasants from the collectives after the coercion to stay somewhat relaxed actually created consternation among the leaders. With the local officials exhibiting some resentment at being blamed for the errors of the leadership, the latter saw fit to reassure the rank and file by belittling the importance of the retreat. "The stupidity of gossip concerning 'retreat,'" one leading organ<sup>\*\*</sup> protested, "is perfectly obvious. . . . There is nothing for the Party to retreat from. The Party never gave instructions to create agricultural collectives by violence, while repeatedly emphasizing the principle of free volition in the collectivization movement. The Party never gave instructions to 'dekulakize' the 'middle' peasant. . . ."

The 1930 spring sowing, on which depended the food situation of Soviet Russia during the third year of the Five Year Plan, promised to reach and to exceed the pre-war area for the first time. Collectives attained the mark set for them while the individual economies lagged behind. Accordingly Soviet spokesmen could appear before the XVI Party Congress with uplifted banners and help that body forget the reverses suffered before the major movement could be completed. While figures given may not be precise enough they may be trusted to reflect the trends. The report of the Commissar of Agriculture stated that on May 1, 1930, in the basic grain districts of producing regions, the collectives embraced 40-50% of peasant economies instead of the 2-3% of 1928; and that the spring sowing area of collectives had increased from 1.5 million hectares

<sup>\*\*</sup> *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, March 16, 1930.

in 1928 to 30-35 million hectares in 1930. As a result it was predicted that collectives and State farms would afford the substantial part of the 1930 marketable grain production, whereas two and a half years ago the overwhelming bulk of marketable grain production came from individual peasant economies including those of the kulaks.

The Party Chief himself dwelt at length on the success of his agricultural policies, and gave copious supporting figures. The sowing area of grain in 1929-1930 according to all expectations would make Communist history by rising above the pre-war level, illustrated by a percentage table of comparisons:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Sowing Area</i>
1913 .....	100.0
1926-1927 .....	96.9
1927-1928 .....	94.7
1928-1929 .....	98.2
1929-1930 estimated* .....	105.1

\* The Party Central Committee reported in *Pravda*, December 22, 1930, that the performance was 106.3.

Similar optimism permeated his statement comparing the total marketable and consumptive grain production:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Total Grain Production</i>
1913 .....	100.0
1927 .....	91.9
1928 .....	90.8
1929 .....	94.4
1930 estimated* .....	110.0

\* Performance was 114.98. (*Pravda*, December 22, 1930.)

Much less encouraging was the marketable amount in prospect, which despite the supreme efforts of the



current period was far under the 1913 level. "This is the basic explanation of our difficulties with grain which became especially acute in 1928," added Stalin. His comparative figures follow:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Marketable Surplus</i>
1913 .....	100.0
1927 .....	37.0
1928 .....	36.8
1929 .....	58.0
1930 estimated .....	73.0

Animal breeding appeared in a worse condition. The display below reveals the inroads made by the collectivization policy with a war year taken as norm:<sup>26</sup>

<i>Years</i>	<i>Horses</i>	<i>Cattle</i>	<i>Sheep and Goats</i>	<i>Hogs</i>
1916 .....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1927 .....	88.9	114.3	119.3	111.3
1928 .....	94.6	118.5	126.0	121.6
1929 .....	96.9	115.6	127.8	103.0
1930 estimated.	88.6	89.1	87.1	60.1

The marketable surplus of meat and fats in the cattle line was still falling steadily:

	<i>1926</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1928</i>	<i>1929</i>
Total number of cattle .....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Marketable surplus of meats and fats .....	33.4	32.9	31.4	29.2

The technical, or industrial, cultures that had been lagging showed improvement, according to Stalin's information regarding total production trends in the following crops:

<sup>26</sup> The figures from the *Economic Review of the Soviet Union* already given are later by several months and represent the more serious decline.

Years	Cotton	Flax	Sugar-beets	Seed-oil Plants
1913 .....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1928 .....	110.5	71.6	93.0	161.9
1929 .....	119.0	81.5	58.0	149.8
1930 estimated.	182.8*	101.3	139.4**	220.0

\* Performance 186.8, *Pravda*, December 22, 1930.

\*\* Performance 130.8, *Pravda*, December 22, 1930.

The two years 1928-1930 witnessed rapid growth of State farms, or "grain factories," conducted as Government equipped and capitalized industry with hired labor on former great estates, the products accruing directly to the State. In 1927-1928 the Government appropriated for their financing (excluding the short term credits) 75.7 million rubles. In 1928-1929 this budget item was 185.8 million rubles; and in 1929-1930 it rose to 856.2 millions. In addition these farms received 18,000 tractors with an aggregate capacity of 350,000 horsepower. The sowing area exhibit for these farms producing grain (in hectares) illustrates the program of expansion ahead:

1928-1929 .....	1,530,000
1929-1930 estimated* .....	3,020,000
1930-1931 " .....	7,660,000
1931-1932 " .....	12,480,000
1932-1933 " .....	18,210,000

\* Performance for the fall of 1929 and the spring of 1930 reached 4,800,000 hectares, and for the spring and fall of 1930 the startling figure of 43,400,000 hectares or nearly 2½ times the amount fixed for the entire Five Year Plan. (*Pravda*, December 22, 1930.)

The State farms conception, put into the concrete, means that a single one of these producing associations, the Grain Trust, if it materializes according to the Five Year Plan, will have a sowing area equal to the present sowing area of the Argentine; and that all the State

farms at the end of the five-year period will be producing grain on one million more hectares of land than all Canada now sows. The end kept in view is the elusive and all-necessary marketable surplus. In this direction the State farms were exhibited making gains in terms of millions of metric tons:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Marketable Surplus</i>
1927 .....	0.64
1928-1929 .....	0.79
1929-1930 estimated .....	1.80
1930-1931 " <sup>27</sup> .....	6.10

The very rapid development secured in agricultural collectives, the sowing area of which increased in three years more than fortyfold, was not matched by any such gain in the coveted marketable surplus, although Stalin professed confidence that they would produce half of the country's total 1930 surplus for marketing. The second column of figures below was displayed as the total grain sowing area of the collectives, both spring and fall, in millions of hectares. The third column presented their marketable surplus in millions of metric tons.

1927 .....	0.8	0.20
1928 .....	1.4	0.36
1929 .....	4.3	1.27
1930 estimated .....	36.0	8.20

The fate of 120,000,000 pieces of human material goes along with the millions of sown hectares and marketable metric tons. Communism has not finished with them. The dreamers and ruthless executives of the

<sup>27</sup> According to the Five Year Plan.

Soviet régime visualize the future Russian village a network of collective communities with land, cattle, agricultural equipment, and labor pooled in one unit for production of goods, the proceeds of which are to be turned over to the management of each collective unit to be shared in part among the constituent individuals. The collectives are to be united in a nationwide system with its district, regional, national, and All-Union committees, after the pattern of all other forms of Soviet organization. The Government variously subsidizes them on condition that the crops be turned over at officially fixed prices. The central objective is obvious—to manage vast agricultural Russia essentially as industrial Russia is managed with one headquarters giving production orders down the widely ramifying line of supervisory institutions, and collecting all the proceeds of production beyond the margin of existence for the growers.

*The Peasant Gazette*,<sup>22</sup> discoursing on the division of revenue in the collectives, leaves the reader reminded of the parlor game “button, button, who has the button?”—revenue being the button and the peasant “it.” The Commissariat of Agriculture has given some guiding principles. When the revenue is located, the distribution will be on the basis of labor days furnished by each member of the collective. Preliminary to that stage, “the obligations to the State” must be fulfilled—one-third of the gross harvest in “producing districts” and one-eighth in the others. Then the grain and fodder loans must be covered. Another 5% of the gross is allocated toward reimbursing the members according to the property brought by each one into the common fund—this “dictated by the necessity of attracting the

<sup>22</sup> June 19, 1930.

average peasant" into the collective. Next is set aside "sufficient nourishment for the farmers and their families," a store of grain for next year's sowing, and feed for the cattle and poultry. Other parts of the harvest go into escrow for the "permanent fund, social feeding, children's institutions, and those who cannot work." If, after having satisfied all these demands, a surplus remains "it must be sold to the State and Coöperative institutions." The regulations contemplate certain "non-agricultural earnings," the proceeds being earmarked for tax payments (both regular and "voluntary"), insurance, credits, loans, and other obligations, also sinking funds for improving production, buildings, and stock breeding. Any balances will go to the fund for payment to the member farmers for their work—according to labor given. The collective in general meeting is left to work out the details of labor registration and distribution of revenue.

The Council of People's Commissars, May 21, 1929, defined the kulak class now marked for complete "liquidation." A unified agricultural tax law promulgated in 1930, according to *Izvestia*,<sup>20</sup> gave Regional Executive Committees power to change the interpretation to meet local conditions. The definition of a kulak economy follows. To the unknowing it pictures for Russia abounding prosperity:

(a) Every farm on which labor is systematically employed for agricultural work, or small trade with exception of the cases when hiring such labor does not deprive the employer from voting rights.

(b) Every farm that has a flour mill, oil mill, mill for grinding wheat, drying plant for potatoes, fruits or vegetables, or any other industrial undertaking, the operation of which requires the use of motor power; every farm which has

<sup>20</sup> February 25, 1930.

water or wind mills with two or more sets of mill-stones; every farm that systematically rents complicated agricultural machines, with motors; every farm which rents regularly, or for a season, buildings for living or for other purposes.

(c) Every farm, the members of which are engaged in trade or usury or act as middlemen, or have any other kind of "unearned" income, including all the religious workers.

Mr. Paul Scheffer, until 1929, *Berliner Tageblatt* correspondent in Russia (for eight years) has given the doomed class human envisagement:

The house of the kulak, spoken of with envy by other peasants is very often a cottage. Two rooms and a kitchen is the greatest attainment; rarely there are spare beddings. They eat poorly in spite of their "wealth." While up to 1926-1927 there prevailed a certain rise of welfare in many villages of European and Siberian Russia, expressing itself by a modest variety of food in the hands of the better-to-do part of the village population, conditions of nourishment since 1928 can be described only as poor or very poor with all grades of the peasant population, induced by the uncertainty about the course of Party policy or, still more, owing to actual persecution and confiscation.

To be classed a kulak administratively it has been sufficient up to 1927 to have three horses and one cow, or two cows and two horses. "Kulakism" has been supposed to begin with a gross income of 600 rubles (\$300) a year. When the first persecutions started at the end of 1927, even at that time there were only a few peasant households having much more than 1000 rubles income. When the drive against the kulak began, its range was quickly extended against all peasants earning any surpluses over their personal needs. I found households hit by the most reckless severity of the Soviet organs and the Party at the end of 1928 who had never reached an income of 250 to 300 rubles. By these methods the term kulak has lost all its original sense. At any time the kulak has been a hard working man, tilling his fields with his family, by this avoiding as much as possible the necessity of hiring labor, being praised for

his efficiency in previous years by the Soviet leaders themselves and now utterly bewildered by the treatment extended to him as a "party-foe," and "exploiter" without any rights to his hard-earned property—all this being utterly beyond his understanding. In 1921 every peasant over Russia had about an equal chance to become a kulak, that is to say, a prosperous peasant.

Kulaks aside, the peasantry as a whole have resisted collectivization for many reasons. It obviously effects destruction of the individual holding and discourages initiative. While it may be expected to advantage economically a large number of the poorer peasants at the outset, it not only impoverishes those that are prosperous, but seems to many others to leave themselves without independence, ambition, or aspiration. There is general peasant distrust of the Communist Government which has many times broken its promises and oftener proved unable to realize on the promising schemes advertised. Finally tradition strong in the Russian village is affronted. Entering a collective means decisively breaking with immemorial customs that have made up the pattern of known life and are of its substance.

Nevertheless the communizing of agriculture will be pressed while Communist power to press exists. The line of the Party has been laid down that the road is not by way of the "poor" peasants alone, but via collectivized "middle" and "poor" peasants with the kulaks exterminated. Stalin, the Party's master and spokesman, holds "the agricultural collective, as an economic type, one of the forms of Socialist economy." In amplification he has expounded its philosophy:

"What defines the economic type? Naturally the relations of men in the process of production. Well

then, is there in the agricultural collectives a class of men who own means of production and a class of men who are deprived of such means? Is there in agricultural collectives a class of exploiters and exploited? Do not the agricultural collectives represent the communization of basic means of production and the land, which itself belongs to the Government?"<sup>50</sup>

In his vision, "agricultural collectives will become more and more mechanized and tractorized," their members—"middle" and "poor" peasants—"will gradually amalgamate in a single army of workers in a collectivized village."<sup>51</sup> And the XVI Party Congress submissive to his will so voted after the public spectacle of the conspicuous opponents of the policy, one by one, drinking the dregs of humiliation for holding and expressing other opinions.

*Comsomolskaia Pravda*<sup>52</sup> has expressed with eloquence the almost savage assaults that yet await the peasantry who still cherish desires for independence:

"The tractor is the revolutionary of the country. It destroys totally the old outworn useless household traditions. It gives a cruel blow to the owner, unites around itself the destitute, organizes a collective struggle on socialized ground. The tractor is a steel agitator of the collective farm of the communistic politic of the Communist Party."

<sup>50</sup> Address to the Conference of Marxian Agrarians, Moscow, December 27, 1929.

<sup>51</sup> *Pravda*, February 10, 1930.

<sup>52</sup> June 20, 1930.





CHAPTER VI  
CREATING COMMUNIST MENTALITY

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*“Communist propaganda has become a necessity for the whole society now undergoing transformation. . . . The whole mechanism of the proletarian State should contribute to the work. . . . The State propaganda of Communism . . . is a powerful instrument for the creation of a new ideology, of new modes of thought, of a new outlook on the world.”*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ABC of Communism*, p. 254.

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## CHAPTER VI

### CREATING COMMUNIST MENTALITY

THE Communist masters have set before themselves no smaller educational task than that of emptying every brain of all ideas in conflict with their program and refilling it exclusively with what is compatible with Communism. Command has been taken of every approach and instrument to the informing of every mind from infancy to the grave. They overlook no single means and risk no competition. Dictatorship has been set up over learning and thinking.

The handicap of the old mentality weighs heavily on the senses of these rebuilders of the people's thought-life. "In mud up to our waists," picturesquely describes the starting point as it looks to one of the revolutionary educators. In this phrase is vividly expressed the incomparable superiority in which he and his resolute comrades hold the society of their dreams. They speak and write ardently of "bringing in the new humanity" to displace an order "musty" and "decayed." The youth they would raise up to complete their creative work must be "lifted from a bog."

Reëducation begins perforce with establishing young and old in the fundamentals of Communist theory and method—proletarian consciousness, committal to the class war, acceptance of the proletarian dictatorship as the one trusted form of revolutionary power in the State, and sacrificial devotion to the new social-

istic upbuilding. Enlistment for world revolution as an ultimate objective and preparation for the "historic moment" to launch it never halt.

The graces exalted belong to collectivism versus individualism. The Eighth Conference of the League of Communist Youth pronounced the spirit of proletarian internationalism, of class solidarity, of discipline, and of work-loving principles the summation of virtues.

Private acquisitiveness is the cardinal sin. Smirnoff, a contributor to *Comsomolskaia Pravda*,<sup>2</sup> writing on "The Transformation of Man" and "What Place Must the Idea 'My Own' Occupy?" explores the outer reaches of this doctrine of property renunciation. After observing that the five year program had passed beyond argument and into great buildings of reënforced concrete, he deals with that part of the gigantic enterprise having to do with "the reconstruction of man." Coming to the problem of "my own," of objects of personal use in building the socialistic cities, he sees the citizens spared many troubles because the first care of the children, all requirements of nutrition, and the satisfaction of other necessities will be taken over by the community. Many objects of household use, very necessary at the present moment, he thinks will be fit only for the dustheap then; or they can be sold to those who will not have the joy of living in a socialized city.

He recognizes that it will not be possible to change the psychology of men immediately, so that they will wish no longer to be owners. Years will have to pass before this can be attained. Many wish to carry over into the new houses furniture, knick-knacks, and other "rubbish" which to him are inadmissible. "We consider," he protests, "that all soft furniture and all

<sup>2</sup> March 29, 1930.

ornamental furniture, which only breeds dust and spiders, must be completely forbidden to be transported to the new houses." Only the most needed articles will be permitted, specifically objects that further educational progress. Later on even these will become unnecessary in a community and may be removed also. There is a lament that the word "mine" has not been completely expelled, also prediction that in time it will cease to exist. While conceding that in the beginning such objects as have been brought into a communal house by individual members will not be looked upon as common property, he adds, "this is just where educational work will be necessary."

Two moods of Lunacharsky, Commissar of Education until 1929, and a recognized Party spokesman in matters educational, illustrate the conflict of Communist philosophy with that which it would uproot and replace. On one occasion he invoked the loftiest principles of social ethics. The school, the self-administration of the pupils, the children's organizations he would have all moving forward, building up life in a manner to guarantee the development of collectivism, a feeling of brotherly solidarity, and respect for personality. The children must be taught to place their own interests below those of the proletarian class and of socialistic upbuilding, and to respond with enthusiasm to every advance of the creative spirit.

On the other hand, parallel feelings of indignation and contempt must be developed toward such classes and social events as create division and separation, and put dangerous barriers in the path of the working class as they lead on to true earthly well-being. He required "active warriors not mollycoddles for teachers." Therefore many of the teachers troubled him. They had

honest philanthropic ideas, and first-rate methods. They worked very conscientiously. They accepted direction when it did not go counter to their pedagogical conceptions. But they refused to awake a class hatred in the hearts of the children, to tell them the bourgeoisie had to be completely destroyed. Their hearts were not wild enough for this and they refused to sow the seeds of wildness in the hearts of the children. They could go no further than to teach the children that they must love all people, and that therefore they must love Socialism as the reign of peace and love.

The Commissar then confessed to a dilemma: "We must state openly, such cannot work with us during the period when we must make an energetic attack against our foes. They may be good for time of peace but not now. Yet, if we send them away, we may find ourselves face to face with a great scarcity of teachers." <sup>a</sup> With time though, the dilemma narrows as the increasing supply of Communist-trained teachers enables the non-political ones to be displaced.

A major instrument of the State for creating Communist mentality and mental furnishings is the Commissariat of Education. It comprehends the utmost range of schools from nursery and kindergarten to university, all Art, Music, Sculpture, Ballet, Stage, Cinema, Museums, Libraries, and Literature penetrating every unit of society.

The complete school system monopolized by the State rates high as a channel of indoctrination. Lenin left the positive injunction to use it "to build up a Communist ideology among the children." The 8,000,000 enrolled Soviet school children receive social-political instruction one to two hours in a daily pro-

<sup>a</sup> *Teachers' Gazette*, July 27, 1928.

gram of class work under special teachers, all responsible Party members. This "political grammar" based on the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, takes the place formerly occupied by religious teaching. It is compulsory for all pupils from the first to the middle schools. The structure of the State is also studied. The middle school forms have a thorough discussion of world politics.

The formal rearing of conscious Communist citizenry receives dynamic reënforcement in the 3,301,000<sup>4</sup> boys and girls known as Pioneers, who make up the largest single children's organization in the world. This is much more than an agency of leisure time activities such as are the Boy Scouts and Camp Fire Girls. These were rejected as types for use in the new order, and Communist influences oppose them in every part of the world. The Soviet Union permits no organization of children other than the Pioneers. Varying with the many school areas it embraces from fifteen to fifty per cent of the school enrollment. In and out of school its members are the childhood "shock troops" of Communism. The seriously studied aim reads "to educate in Communism the present generation of children as the future fighters and builders of the world communist society." Membership is voluntary, and its privileges make a nearly irresistible appeal to city boys and girls.

The Party Congress of 1919 commissioned the Comsomol to elaborate and conduct a suitable program of social-political training for children. The Pioneers resulted embracing the ages from eight to sixteen. Comsomol eligibility begins at seventeen. Later, still

<sup>4</sup> January 1, 1930.





*Delton*  
29.  
Pravda.

BOY . . . SCOUT \*

\* Russian word used has also a pun meaning of "beast."

younger children than Pioneers were banded together and called "Octobrists" in honor of the month (old style) of the *coup d'état* in 1917 that brought the Communists into power.

Organizational control resides in the Central Bureau of Pioneers, on which sit a member of the Executive Committee of the Comsomol as chairman, and some of the most important governmental leaders, representative of organizations either needing or needed by the Pioneers, such as the Agitation-Propaganda Section of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, the Social-Educational Section of the Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Health Conservation, the All-Russian Soviet of Physical Culture, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. This governing body with Moscow headquarters convenes in annual and sectional meetings. The Executive, Agitation-Propaganda, Scientific-Methodic, and Publication Committees of the Central Bureau consist of members who are specialists and devote full time to their duties.

The Publication Committee and persons selected from the Commissariat of Education and the office of the Censor completely control the editing and publishing of all literature for children in the Soviet Union. The generally serious content of their production is politically flavored. Fairy and kindred tales have absolutely no place. Horatio Alger and Oliver Optic are held demoralizing. They have gone into the discard with competitive games and dolls. The heroes are revolutionaries portrayed in their childhood and youth. Stories exalting high Pioneer types have reached print also. Some of the games simulate class struggle or world revolutionary tactics. The repertoire includes

getting propaganda across another country's frontier, and supposedly hostile troops fraternizing in the trenches as proletarians.

Leadership of Pioneer groups is intrusted only to the Comsomoltsy. The slogan is "For every Comsomol center at least one Pioneer troop." Workshops, factories, stores, theaters, large dwelling houses, schools, clubs, Trade Unions, peasant villages, farm collectives, "grain factories," railroad stations, and government offices, foster Pioneer units with delegated Comsomol members leading the activities. Youngsters leading the younger ones make for vitality in the movement. Generally the leaders high and low take Pioneering seriously. Nationally known figures devoting numerous evenings to meeting with Pioneers, leading in discussion, explaining and pointing the way are not unusual events.

The program varies in accordance with local attitudes and customs, but the fundamental concept of training the future fighters and builders of the communistic State holds whether in Samarkand, Archangel, or Vladivostok. Accordingly, activities with economic—social—political motivation have preëminence. The rules face toward Marxian Socialist life as interpreted by Lenin. Study of Lenin's life and his great sacrifices, that the proletariat might win the right to work out its own destinies, light the pathway to belief in Leninism and its practice. The true Pioneer, younger brother of the Comsomol and the Communist, reaches out in comradeship to all workers in all lands for the uniting of their class against the masters. He observes proper health conditions to grow strong for the working-class struggle. Class consciousness created thus early in child life and continually fed is calculated to

render impossible compromise or work together, in other than momentary affairs with the enemy classes, since proletarian success depends upon the destruction



*Зенн 27*  
Pravda.

LENIN—OUR GREAT GUIDE

of the capitalist ruling class. As the Russian Revolution was but a step in the inevitable world revolution these children prepare for participation in it.

Climatic conditions make necessary indoor activities

mainly for six to eight months. During this time the troops organize into interest groups studying the radio, the aeroplane, the home, the school, the factory, the club, handicrafts of many sorts, botany, nature study, painting, needlework, playwriting, dramatics, singing and music, physical training, clay modeling—in fact activities in the larger centers parallel those offered in the best boys' and girls' clubs in other countries. The program content lends itself to corporate expression. Personal individual awards may not be given: the group works together for collective accomplishment.

The stirring events of the Revolution, recent enough to be kept fresh in the minds of the youthful leaders, are capitalized by actual opportunities to see and hear the men and women who brought about the Communist phase. Much preparation, marching, mass pageantry, revolutionary symbolism, and dramatics feature the political holidays celebrated as communistic. Other exercises hold the Pioneers equally close to the Communist movement and give them expressive outlet for the highly emotional natures they possess. Scarcely a fair Sunday passes but that Pioneer troops march through the city streets led by bugle and drum, evidently delighting in the demonstration. The leaders see in this one more display of collective effort. As they march the children sing revolutionary war songs, the Red International, and "away, away with priests, we'll mount to the heavens and throw out all the gods."

Hiking has the motive, beyond healthy recreative value, to present class conscious doctrine under favorable circumstances. The mansion of one of the former nobility, now the property of the Department of Museums, offers a desirable destination. Here the trained guide depicts evidences of the depraved life of idleness

and ease led by the former ruling class, illustrating how the master class everywhere lives at the expense of the toilers.

Probably the summer camp has become the most fruitful school of social-political education. The motto "Every Pioneer in camp every summer" marks the unattained goal. A factory, or local Comsomol defrays the expenses of a free camp. A Government Department like the Commissariat of Health provides grounds and permanent equipment. Latterly, self-supporting camps have sprung up. Boys and girls camp together with separate living quarters. The program is for both sexes. As camps are usually situated in the country and the season is the harvest time, Pioneers are frequently detailed for several hours work each day in the fields. In accord with the Communist program of active agitation in the country to win the support of the peasants, the Pioneers have developed their program of "face to the village." There city Pioneers aid their peasant comrades to make the program strong.

All has not gone smoothly in Pioneering. From July, 1926, to October, 1927, the membership slipped 180,000, attributed by a correspondent in the organ of the Comsomol to inexperienced leaders, unqualified pedagogically and otherwise, absence of buildings and equipment, inadequate funds assigned, and too little attention given to the Pioneers by the senior organizations including the Party itself. Development and disintegration often appear to run parallel. It has been officially recognized that the popular figures overstate the actual situation. In one of the districts, for example, organization reports gave the number of troops at twelve, whereas investigation found only two. In the Ural district, out of seventy-seven groups organized,

seventy-one disappeared within a few months. This district received 7,126 new Pioneer members in 1929 and lost 6,649.<sup>5</sup> Madam Severianova, chairman of the Pioneer Central Bureau, reported that almost one-half the children who were questioned for the reason of their withdrawal from Pioneering answered: "It is too boresome."

Notwithstanding limitations and vicissitudes, the power of its drive is incalculably great by virtue of its organizational monopoly and its weight as an influence penetrating all child life and wedging multitudes of children off from parental loyalty and immunizing them from the ideas, forms, and habits of which the family has been the nursery. A manual of instruction for youth organizations commends obedience to those fathers only "who have a proletarian, revolutionary point of view, who consciously and energetically defend the class interests of the proletariat," and adds: "Other fathers must be educated by Communist children. We do not hold to parental respect as a general principle." The Pioneer "Foreposts" within a school exercise great influence in it by creating the atmosphere, ruling over the other children, and making reports on the program and the teacher to the supervisory authorities.

Pioneers take the pledge:

I, Young Pioneer, swear before my comrades that I will constantly uphold the cause of the workers and I associate myself with the struggle of the workers and peasants of the whole world. I will obey the orders of Lenin and fulfill the duties and obligations imposed upon me by the law of the Red Pioneers.

When troops meet the salutes exchanged are: "Be ready for the struggle for the working class": "I am ready."

<sup>5</sup> *Comsomolskaia Pravda* reporting on the 1929 Comsomol Congress.

*"The Party, the Comsomol, and the Red Pioneers,"* published by the Russian Comsomol in 1925, sharply defines the supreme educational objective of both the youth and children's movements:

"The Communist youth movement is an integral part of the proletarian movement. Its aim is to educate a Communist and to make of him a valiant fighter for the interests of the working class. This education requires the incorporation of children into the social life, into the struggle of their class. Its final purpose, like that of the adult proletarian movement, is the suppression of the ruling class, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the construction of a Communist society. . . . The Pioneer movement is not an institution for children, but a children's fighting organization under the direction of the Party and the Comsomol."

The League of Communist Youth, abbreviated for common usage to Comsomol, dates from 1918, embraces the youth of both sexes, and numbers 2,466,000 members\* of whom 34.8% are of the workmen class and 13.4% farm laborers.

It is a strictly Party organization with limited admission, has outspoken political character, and wields large influence in State affairs. The unit organizational spread equals that of the Party. Nearly every tiny village in Russia registers one, and each village has at least a Comsomol nucleus or cell. The Union-wide articulation likewise follows closely that of the Party. The village groups tie into a district organization. In this district center almost every institution and factory will have a Comsomol nucleus, all subordinated to the district committee. The district committee functions

\* Reported July, 1930.



under the direction of a regional committee located at the seat of the corresponding State Administration. In turn a committee, comprehending several provinces or an entire national republic, imposes its power on the regional committee. At the top rules the All-Union Committee, a strong Party-controlled political organization, and itself having no small influence within the Party.

The Comsomol has a strong press, including several dailies, weeklies, and monthlies—twenty-six publications in all with a circulation reaching millions. The official daily *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, issued in Moscow, ranks as one of the best in the Soviet Union. The monthly *Young Guard* sustains the reputation of getting out the best pieces of fiction by contemporary Russian writers. The several Comsomol publishing houses display forceful activity in producing political literature, fiction, scientific works, and sport books.

The Comsomol program throughout is heavily charged with doctrinal and tactical teachings whether by lectures, cinemas, discussions, dramatizations, or readings. All utterances of voice and print reflect undeviating determination to revolutionize the thinking, attitudes, and actions of the clientele. In ethics they square with Lenin's "moral sense" which he taught to be entirely subservient to the interests of the class war of the proletariat. Manuals of instruction for youth organizations maintain that ethics were never anything but rules for class defense.

Comsomol discipline subjects the members to a regimen very much resembling that of the Party. The Party leaders use them actively, especially in enterprises for which the Party does not care to take responsibility in advance. The Party later takes the successes

under its own protection, and pronounces the failures adventures of "irresponsible youth."

Theoretically, the Comsomol represents the elementary political organization in which strict selection governs the entrance of applicants for membership. Rigid requirements for entry exist though often disregarded. They include presentation of proofs that the candidate is of proletarian origin, that his ideology is untainted by bourgeois prejudices, and that he is prepared for acts of self-sacrifice, if such may be needed in the interests of the movement. But mere Comsomol membership does not automatically entitle the individual to enter the Party. Again rigid investigation and selection take place. Many Comsomoltzy are finally vetoed for Party membership and some do not apply.

This iron-bound body of the Comsomol over-rides the heterogeneous mass of Russian youth, flavors its intellectual food, defines its mental and ethical standards, and exercises all the youth leadership that has expression. In general, this body of chosen and guarded youth direct and the masses of youth submit. Neither the direction nor the submission is perfect and complete, yet prevailing enough to establish the principle and to produce impressive effects.

The Red Army affords another contingent of youth for indoctrination while in the ranks. The soldier's discipline requires the several hundred thousands, called up each year from the wide spaces of the entire Union and the many nationalities, to learn to read if they cannot when they are drafted, and to assimilate copious political instruction. In these recruits, especially fertile soil for Communist culture is believed to be at hand, since only the workers and peasants are

given arms and military training. To supplement the formal political tutoring, a system of fraternizing with stronger Communist elements is organized. Each Workmen's Club "adopts" a military unit with the object of furthering indoctrination, organizational processes, and understanding between the workers and the peasant mass from which most of the Army comes. The ranks hear ceaselessly of intrigues, threats, and maneuvers by their class enemies within and outside the Union, and of themselves as the defenders of the workers' cause and its fatherland. Each battalion has its Party cell for internal political control. The selection and training system results in the officers' corps being Communist in the majority.

The Trade Unions constitute the largest body organized and in theory readily accessible to political instruction. This is an integrated part of the total educational program of the Unions and the principal one. In 1920 Lenin named the Unions the "School of Communism" to serve two ends—"training directors for the many State economic and political organs and reaching the masses with knowledge of Communist policy." The Government's Central Committee of Political Education maintains working relations with the educational organs of the Unions. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions since 1923 has formed workers' clubs on a large scale, one function of them being the political education of the members, another "to strengthen the relationship between the Unions and the masses." Their educational technique embraces countless lectures, discussions, streams of literature, "red corners" in the factories, reading rooms in neighborhoods and villages, posters, guardianships over near-by villages by large-scale plants, and varied other

contact methods. Women and children receive special attention, likewise the minority peoples who are regarded as backward in working-class theory and action. Much criticism of this Trade Union educational program reaches public attention, indicating it to be unsatisfactory to the leaders both in extent and quality.

The Russian Trade Union press mobilizes scores of newspapers and reviews with a total circulation that leaves no literate worker beyond the reach and influence of their barrage of Communist ideology. Local press columns serve areas without the specializing publications. Talks, reading aloud, cinema, and radio give the Communist bread of life extensively to the workers unable to read.

In the medium of the press as a whole, called by Stalin "the sharpest and strongest weapon" of the Party, Communism has a monopoly of access to the nation's mind no less absolute and more penetrative than that achieved through its multiple organizations. Expansion of the periodic and non-periodic press has left far behind every other Soviet development. Each more or less important town has its daily newspaper, while the central papers published in Moscow, Khar'kov, Minsk, and other political centers have regional and country-wide vogue. The circulation of the dailies in April, 1930, totaled 22,000,000 copies.<sup>7</sup>

A Soviet daily newspaper is more than a medium for transmitting news items and comments on them. Such central papers as *Pravda* (Moscow), organ of the Central Committee of the Party, *Economicheskaja Zhizn* (*Economic Life*) published in Moscow by the Council of Labor and Defense and various economic

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, May 5, 1930.

Departments of State, and *Proletarii* (Kharkov), voice of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, have the character of daily issues of the gospel for systematic instruction and direction. Their editorials are not personal effusions on topics of interest, but invariably represent the official point of view of the Party, and are absorbed as explicit Party instructions. Political, economic, and social information has obtained more predominance during recent years. Foreign news uniformly receives special interpretations tending to show the evils of capitalism and the inevitability of the final triumph of the proletarian cause. Special feature articles appear comparatively seldom, and then usually as denunciations of corrupted officials or exposures of "cruelties" of the capitalistic world. Single copies of a Soviet newspaper carry more statistical information than an American newspaper prints in a fortnight. An article not solidly packed with figures is considered "trash." Communist newspapermen speak with contempt of the "yellow" capitalist press, especially of America, which pays so much attention to spectacular murders, gangland, weddings, divorces, and other events of personal character. The lives and experiences of individuals are of no interest to Soviet newspapers published for the education of the masses. They choose to be concerned with matters that have "social importance."

Every large population group has newspapers published for it in the political centers. Moscow has "*Pravda*" for the Party members; "*Izvestia*," official organ of the Government, for the general public; *The Workers' Gazette* and *The Workers' Moscow* for industrial labor; *The Poor People* and *The Peasant Gazette* for the peasantry; *Our Gazette* for civil service


FREEDOM  
OF PRESS

СВОБОДА  
ПЕЧАТЫ



WORKERS  
PRESS

РАБОЧАЯ  
ПЕЧАТЬ



ЖЕНА-37  
Продол.

IN COUNTRIES OF "CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION"

employees; *Labor* for members of Trade Unions; and *Coöperative Life* for the constituency of the Coöperatives. The smaller centers as a rule have one daily newspaper for the entire population, always published by the local committee of the Party.

The Communist Party has the dailies and nearly all the periodic press firmly in hand. Every one of the chief editors of a newspaper, no matter how small it is, and the overwhelming majority on the editorial staffs are Communists and Comsomoltzy. A special department of the Party Central Committee keeps constant vigil over the press. Party Committees prepare the more important material on international and national affairs and the newspapers publish them as editorials. Government agencies supply all the news after passing it through the "Communist prism" and reissuing it with content and interpretation best calculated to bend the reader's mind to form. To use one of their euphemisms, "the facts of life are systematically recorded in our press every day." "Tass," the telegraphic agency of the Soviet Union, has a monopoly of incoming foreign information and of the more important internal news. Other agencies for Republics gather and distribute domestic news. Crowning this centralized system of news supply, a government censor in the printing office must pass the copy before it goes to press.

Soviet Russia in addition to the newspapers just recounted has a large so-called "local press"—newspapers published for and by individual factories, agricultural collectives, and the larger institutions. It is an information system peculiar to the new social order. This "local press" still develops rapidly both in numbers and influence. At the beginning of 1929, according

to official data, about 400 factories printed such newspapers. On May 1, 1930, the number exceeded 1000, circulating daily over two million copies.<sup>8</sup> The figures do not include around 500 other local newspapers published in agricultural collectives.<sup>9</sup> The "wall" newspaper production is also out of the calculation, and almost every factory and organization in the Soviet Union conducts one, usually typewritten, duplicated, and posted about the place.

The "local press" organs receive their news and articles mostly from "worker and peasant correspondents"—thousands of people who send in daily contributions to local and central newspapers also, informing of the life and conditions in their factory or village. These correspondents are a phenomenon almost unknown elsewhere. They may be remotely compared with the contributors of "letters to the editor" that appear in some American newspapers, but the Russian space given to material from these sources in both central and local papers is immeasurably larger. *Pravda*<sup>10</sup> gave the number of these correspondents in May, 1929, as beyond the million mark. In 1929 the *Workers' Gazette* received 57,728 contributions from 17,134 worker and peasant correspondents. The *Gudok* (*The Whistle*), a Moscow newspaper for railroad workers, in the same year had 60,000 correspondents who contributed 236,532 articles. The *Peasant Gazette* receives over one million letters annually from its correspondents.

The range of what *Pravda* calls "The Fighting Weapon of the Party" will appear from its own daily circulation of 945,000 in May, 1930, and the *Peasant*

<sup>8</sup> *Pravda*, May 5, 1930.

<sup>10</sup> May 5, 1930.

<sup>9</sup> *Economic Life*, May 5, 1930.



*Gazette's* 1,700,000. The Five Year Plan proposes to greatly increase the newspaper's use. It lists the annual circulation of newspapers to rise from 4,000 million copies in 1927-1928 to 13,800 millions in 1932-1933, and magazines from 282 million copies to 1,960 millions.<sup>11</sup> The newspaper gains the first two years exceeded the average rate necessary to attain that goal. The number of magazines in the minority languages alone rose from 130 to 357 between January, 1928, and March, 1930. The entire press ensemble employs fifty-eight different languages.<sup>12</sup>



ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО 1930  
STATE PUBLISHING HOUSE 1930

(Advertisement in *Pravda* of a book of satirical verse denouncing Trotsky.)

<sup>11</sup> *Economic Life*, May 5, 1930.

<sup>12</sup> Kaganovich reporting to the XVI Party Congress, July, 1930.

The governing régime makes constant practical use of this press apparatus. Not one opposition organ is tolerated, either outside the Party or within. Trotsky's illicit publishing was the climax of his offenses that visited on him first exile to Turkestan and then banishment from the land, which he had done so much to deliver over to Communist power. Any emphasis called for by a given situation gets instant release far and wide and with the desired intensity—soft or low, tremolo, staccato, or profundo. Now some recalcitrant member or faction of the Party is pilloried and the associated unorthodox ideas blasted. A mining crisis in England, featured as an omen of capitalistic collapse and oncoming world revolution, can be capitalized into millions of rubles raised to support the strikers through popular appeal and by inescapable Trade Union and club assessments. Each serious diplomatic controversy yields a breeze to fan Soviet loyalty. A corporately owned British or American string of newspapers may employ a like technique, but the unique efficacy and power here reside in the absence of any corrective or neutralizing expression whatsoever. There promises to be no relenting. The XVI Party Congress charged the Central Committee "to take measures toward furthering the part the press should play in the deployment of the socialistic attack."

Another high mark toward perfection in propaganda has been set by Russian Communists in the field of literature beyond the current press. They dominate printing to the last piece of type. An early act on accession to power confiscated all paper supplies and the important presses. Until recently a few small private publishing houses existed, engaged principally in print-

ing child literature and *belles lettres*. Notwithstanding that every book published in Russia has to be censored, the "die-hards" found that "inimical ideology" somehow had penetrated into books from private and even State printeries. An intensive campaign followed during 1928-1929 that left hardly a trace of private book making. The new volumes multiply. During 1929-1930, over 39,000 titles including pamphlets reached the public. Publishing in the national Republics is noteworthy active. In 1929 Ukrainia put out 7200 titles, White Russia 1150, Uzbekistan 1230, the Transcaucasian Federation 2750, and Turkmenistan 405. The Central State Publishing House produces in more than fifty minority languages.<sup>18</sup>

Few of the pages outside the fields of pure and applied science, printed since 1917, spare the reader from political indoctrination. Even children's books are frowned upon as useless that do not perform that function. A supervisory State Scientific Council passes on all school textbooks to insure doctrinal purity. "It is not the rich who feed the poor, but the poor who feed the rich" typifies many practice texts in grammar and orthography books. Arithmetical problems are ingeniously contrived to teach Communist principles and technique. Fiction offers no exception. Authors of political, educational, or economic works may proceed as far as criticism of the mechanical defects of Communist policies but not of Communist principles. These are inviolable. Opposing older works in the libraries have been destroyed or suppressed, also corresponding materials in the museums unless they can be turned to account against the old order and other systems. The daily calendars note revolutionary events for most of

<sup>18</sup> *Pravda*, May 5, 1930.

the days of the year. For adequately celebrating those that rise to the holiday level, prepared manuals give elaborate instructions to schools, clubs, reading rooms, youth and children's organizations. Songs and music of revolutionary merit abound to heighten the effect of these and other events, private and public.

The very sources of knowledge are being purified or adulterated, depending on who passes judgment on the nature of what is taking place. Ten volumes of a thirty-volume Soviet Encyclopedia have been published, the contents all elaborated from the Marxist viewpoint. From the beginning the Communists denied the principle of scientific apoliticism. They hold that every research worker must be either friendly or inimical to the Party and its program. Communist Commissars appointed to all scientific institutions undertake to insure their research activities against deviation from the orthodox Communist line. Obstinate old scientists have been expelled, the hesitant held in line by threats of expulsion, and any findings off the straight path of Communism met with severe criticism and rejection. Red research institutions sprang up, and later the old line academies were invaded and communized. *Comsomolskaia Pravda*<sup>14</sup> believes "our forces have increased so much that we may and must lay stress on greater intolerance toward creative methods which are alien to the dialectic materialism of Marx and Lenin."

The exclusive State radio system affords straight propaganda as its major function. Its material equipment is yet limited but, given time and income, service on the air will compass nothing less than speaking to every neighbourhood from the centers. Infinite possibilities await exploiting not only across the Union but

<sup>14</sup> May 17, 1930.

over its borders. The present microphone reach on short wave lengths from strategic points on that longest frontier in the world can give Soviet expounders of Communism the gross populations of Europe and Asia for audience. They already address those of the nearer territories including Manchuria. The resulting protest of Germany met the explanation that the Soviet broadcasters were serving the German-speaking Russian population.

The stage and screen to the maximum practicable are appropriated as channels for Communist ideas and emotions. The *Red Gazette* of Leningrad<sup>15</sup> announced a competition opened by the State Opera and Ballet for the best libretto for a Soviet opera to picture the years of the civil war or to deal with the question of the social upbuilding. The theme while modern must have interest that would not soon be out of date, be founded on an intensive study of everyday life without interfering with the whole scheme of the scenario, contain scenes of assemblages and battles in which the masses take part, and be easily understood by the audience as pantomime. "The Red Poppy" adventured in the ballet field with success. Some old operas—"Life for the Czar" and others—have been prohibited.

Revolutionary ideas rule painting and sculpture. The stones are made to cry out the new order. Monuments and buildings voice it. Distinction has been attained in Lenin's mausoleum. Of the Soviet films, some technically excellent, a Russian-speaking American professor,<sup>16</sup> after patronizing a few "was discouraged from going to more of them because of the unceasing propaganda, from which there seemed no

<sup>15</sup> November 9, 1928.

<sup>16</sup> Harper: *Civic Education in Soviet Russia*, published by University of Chicago Press.

escape." To render them safe for Communism, a political editing department undertakes to treat foreign films on which there remains a decreasing dependence, yet enough to be greatly deplored. Relatively slight moving picture impact has been made on the villages because of lack of facilities.

The Communist remakers of the nation's mind have encountered two major adverse factors—illiteracy and the family institution holding over from the old order. On both, vigorous attacks have been made. In 1921 the Central Committee of the Party definitely recognized popular education, both in preparing workers for national economy and in propagating Communist ideology among the masses of population and youth, to be a matter of deep concern to the Communist Party and a "Communist task."

The Russian people do not yet have a functioning system of universal elementary education. Much local pressure before the Revolution had somewhat favorably influenced the inertia and fears of the Imperial Government in that direction. The representative Duma in 1911 advanced through its second reading a bill of great liberality, combining several previous laws on universal education. Intervention by the State Council mutilated the act but did not hamper increase in the number of primary schools. "The Ministry (of Education) continued to enter into separate agreements with individual *zemstvos* and municipalities, thereby carrying forward its scheme for universal primary education."<sup>17</sup> The date set for its completion was 1922, when there were to be 317,000

<sup>17</sup> *Russian Schools and Universities in the World War*, published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by Yale University Press, pp. 10-13.

school units for 15,852,000 children. From the time of its inauguration in 1908 to 1914, the number of schools increased 49,458, or at the rate of more than 8,000 annually. These schools, together with the nearly 100,000 previously established, raised the capacity to 7,478,000 pupils mostly of the lower primary grades. The lion's share of credit for the progress belongs to the democratic forces then widely resident in the nation and gaining power. The war sadly checked their educational program, and Communist ascendancy has eliminated them from such participation in the people's affairs.

The Soviet Power with sincerity and zeal early scheduled its system of universal elementary education to arrive in 1925. The famous Lenin proclamation, announcing determination to eradicate illiteracy, assumed that by 1927, the tenth anniversary of the Communist Revolution, the Soviet Union would have no illiterates, and that concurrently the inflow of new illiterates would be stopped by the universal system to have been installed. The slow rate of liquidating illiteracy and of supplying schools found the Party Congress of 1930 rededecreeing the act for universal elementary instruction. The new program fixes 1936-1937 for its completion. The quantitative indices of the Five Year Plan, by which to measure performance in respect to the elementary education feature, indicate it to be considerably in arrears.

The ten years ending 1929 have seen 9,000,000 adults made elementarily literate. What *Comsomolskaia Pravda*<sup>18</sup> calls "recurrences of illiteracy" somewhat offset the result. After attendance in an illiteracy liquidation school, without practice in reading and

<sup>18</sup> December 25, 1930.

writing, many forget what has been learned. A continuing influx of child illiterates, in the absence still of universal elementary schooling, further materially retards solution of the problem. Withal there has been a highly creditable net gain. *Pravda*<sup>19</sup> records that from 1897 to 1920, illiteracy among men decreased from 67.3% to 55.4%, and among women from 89.3% to 74.2%. During the following six years, 1921-1927, the index for men dropped to 41.8% and for women to 66%.

That organ, nevertheless, thinks the tempo of the fight against illiteracy outrageously slow. It reports an investigation made at the beginning of 1929 in Moscow as revealing this work "in an absolutely abnormal situation," with 75% of the buildings where teaching was done having no necessary equipment and "serving no good purpose." The schools to liquidate illiteracy put through two million people in 1928-1929. The 1929-1930 plans provided for teaching six millions.

Almost every section of Soviet officialdom deplors the slow progress in mass education. The Five Year Plan calls for the increase of village reading rooms from 21,876 in 1927-1928 to 38,283 in 1932-1933. Their function defined elsewhere is "to help form a proper communistic attitude toward social and political events on a world scale as well as in the Soviet Republic." The number of libraries is to be augmented 50%, clubs and "Peasant Homes" 25%. In 1927-1928 the Soviet Union had 8,521 cinematographic units, including the traveling small units in the villages. In five years these should number 34,699, while the two million radio receiving sets grow to forty millions. Progress in these lines registers far behind expectation. Bubnov, Com-

<sup>19</sup> October 19, 1929.



missar of Education <sup>20</sup> in the R. S. F. S. R., <sup>21</sup> lamented in September, 1929, that the reading rooms, which he called "propagandists of the new socialistic society in the villages," decreased in the three years from 1925-1926 to 1928-1929, and gloomily compared the greater number of churches representing in his opinion "propagandists of the old, dying but still desperately resisting capitalist, clerical, and kulak world."

The elementary education of children also shows the increase in enrollment to be falling below the mark. The execution of the building plans for elementary schools drags, complied with in Siberia during 1928-1929 to the extent of 37.7%, in the Central region 45.4%, and in the Northern Caucasus 46.9%. The Government itself is much blamed. Only 183½ million rubles of the 224½ millions estimated for elementary education in the R. S. F. S. R. were actually assigned.<sup>22</sup>

The R. S. F. S. R. situation is considerably better than in other Republics. The Government statistics here give 81% of children of the ages eight to eleven as having places in the elementary schools in 1928-1929, which means only 19% remaining untaught. This figure represents progress however and the Five Year Plan if carried out would leave only 6.2% of the children in that territorial area unable to gain admission to elementary schools.

Bubnov, in the interest of realism, analyzed the official figures downward, considering that numbers of pupils remain two years in one grade, and that many elementary schools have a considerable number of children older than eleven years. By his calculation

<sup>20</sup> At the Moscow District Convention of Trade Unions.

<sup>21</sup> That part of the Soviet Union known formerly as Great Russia and Siberia.

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda*, September 8, 1929.

only 55% of R. S. F. S. R. children aged eight to eleven were provided for in 1927-1928, 60% the year following, while 14% will still be left out in 1933-1934. Many children enrolled do not attend beyond the second form. A large number drop out after the first year. The village teacher problem has many difficult aspects, one being a wage 20-30% below the pre-war compensation, which educational authorities then disparaged as the barest living wage and often less than that.

Communism entertains many grudges against the family of whatever pattern it encounters in the social orders it labors to destroy. The reason becomes clear enough in the light of its educational objectives, over against the background of its ideological enmities, as reflected in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Russian League of Communist Youth prepared for the Eighth Conference of the League:

“Never has the problem of remodelling human material stood so sharply before us as at the present state of our socialistic upbuilding. We must eradicate old traditions, habits, and customs. . . . The old order of things has been undermined, but not done away. Contemporary children grow and receive their education in an atmosphere of opposing influences, the decaying small-minded bourgeois and capitalistic elements still filtering in to poison the consciousness of the children with anti-proletarian ideas.”

Thus the family as a basic social unit and institution known throughout the civilized world presents itself to Communists in the aspect of a last citadel of hated influences to be reduced to a name before their sway over a people's intellect can be absolute. It shelters and nourishes ideas, sentiments, and modes of action

which they taboo, and passes them along generation to generation. To them it is among the most powerful incentives in contemporary society to the acquisition and possession of private property. It is much decried also as the nursery of individualism. Goikberg, well known Soviet jurist, in *The Right of Marriage*<sup>23</sup> contends that the Communist Party must replace the family to extinguish that close love of parents for their children which makes them want to keep their children near them and produces egotists.

Russian Communists do not monopolize these views of the family. November 16, 1924, *L'Humanité* reported from a Women's Communist Congress in Paris the statement that "no revolution will be possible so long as the family and the family spirit exist."

What Communism will leave to the family as a social institution promises to be mere vestiges. Its theoreticians present "the social education of the children, carried to its logical conclusion," as the really radical way out of the problem created by the existing family. Concretely this calls for the separation of children from parents to an extent that will prevent the latter exerting any educational influence over them. In principle there is no shrinking from this course whatsoever. The chief deterrent has been economic.

The housing construction in new industrial cities tends to enforce the mode of domestic life that will cut parents off from the function known as the rearing or upbringing of their children. Likewise in the farm collectives, wherever Communist pressure can effect them, communal kitchens, eating places, nurseries, children's quarters, and schools will re-

<sup>23</sup> Moscow, 1922.

move the young beyond the continuing intimate tender brooding relationships that have given meaning to the word home at its best. The present R. S. F. S. R. Commissar of Education<sup>24</sup> joins in the pressure for "petty individual households to be transformed into immense socialistic households." When new cities are built, the problems of the accessory equipment essential to the change he predicts, "will occupy the very first place." An *Izvestia*<sup>25</sup> article stoutly claims "society can give to its children much more than the best of mothers in every separate case," by taking the educational responsibility "from the cradle to the university." The Communist Youth organ<sup>26</sup> describes this cultural method as "uprooting the last remnants of capitalism, . . . a socialistic reconstruction of everyday life," for destroying "the strongholds of the old individualistic order of things."

The new marriage and family law, framed, widely debated, and enacted in 1925, left both institutions floating on little else than the unstable element of sexual affinity and satisfaction. It abandoned obligatory civil registration, the earlier single legal requirement to marriage. *Izvestia*<sup>27</sup> summarized a public debate on the proposed enactment in which Krylenko, the dreaded chief prosecutor in the high Soviet Courts, advanced the view that prevailed in the final legislation. He saw it touching virgin soil regarding marriage and the family. The church had no business to interfere in the matter, and as to civil registration he inquired: "Wherein lies its necessity, importance, or even

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, March 7, 1930.

<sup>25</sup> June 21, 1930.

<sup>26</sup> *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, March 16, 1930.

<sup>27</sup> November 17, 1925.

usefulness? Why should the State be concerned with who marries and with whom the marriage is accomplished?" He conceded a value for it in protecting the interest of the child and the weaker party, but insisted it remain only a right, not an obligation. Looking forward to the full attainment of the new order of life, he continued: "Marriage will become free from all secondary considerations, among others of economic ones."

Where civil registration has been the option chosen, divorce is effected by either party appearing and retracting. Men and women so minded stand in line before the proper officers as compunctionless as those in the bread queues.<sup>28</sup> The March, 1928, divorces in Moscow exceeded the marriages registered. The *Leningrad Red Gazette*<sup>29</sup> reported 6,896 marriages in that city for January and February, 1928, and 5,007 divorces recorded in the six Government Registry Offices.

Vital consequences issue from these transient marriages. Meager incomes, much unemployment, overcrowded dwellings, and fleeting marital life multiply the economic hazard of childbearing. Contraception and abortion are both disparaged on grounds of Party welfare but practice of the latter is legalized and extensive. The *Red Gazette*<sup>30</sup> published Leningrad statistics of this operation carried out in hospitals after authorization by the proper commissions. In 1926 there were 19,253 requests and 17,053 authorizations; in the first half of 1927, the corresponding figures were 14,186 and 11,732. Prostitution has become menacing despite the first assertion of its utter aboli-

<sup>28</sup> Hindus: Marriage in Russia, *Asia*, July, 1929.

<sup>29</sup> April 19, 1928.

<sup>30</sup> November 10, 1927.

tion and inability to survive Communist conditions. A writer in the same leading newspaper of Leningrad <sup>31</sup> has cried out against it as "the modern plague of our socialistic society" and located the roots of it in "divorce and the facility of obtaining it." The broken families liberally recruit child homelessness. According to a report received from the Presidium of the Children's Committee and acted upon by the Commissariat of Health, <sup>32</sup> of all children needing protection, those worst conditioned were the ones abandoned by parents. Those coming from the village girl mothers and women forsaken by their husbands represented the larger number.

But Communism's dealings with the family have their primary significance in the calculated paralysis of the home's social influence. The State policy to alienate the one from the other has effected rupture between Russian parents and children never so wide and deep as now. In Communist families alienation is often pronounced. In the families of intellectuals and among the peasants the break is almost complete. Against the older generation, unchangeable overnight or in ten years, youth comes on with entirely different orientation. They set up new and hostile standards under the persistent persuasion that they can learn nothing from their parents, and that they should consider them as spiritual enemies. Press reports call attention to child runaways on a noticeable scale. A conference of "The Friend of the Children" Society <sup>33</sup> reported that 50% of the younger ones among the child victims of "homelessness" were such because of conflict between "the environment of the children and

<sup>31</sup> October 10, 1928.

<sup>32</sup> *Red Gazette*, Leningrad, April 3, 1928,

<sup>33</sup> *Izvestia*, November 13, 1928.

their demands for culture." In plainer language the case was stated thus: "The child wants to become a Pioneer, to study, not to believe in God; but the family lives in the old manner. As a result . . . flight from home."

Family life, as understood in most civilizations, with a certain mental and spiritual communion between parents and their children, has nearly ceased to exist in Soviet Russia. Even when no open animosity arises, friendship is absent—two camps that cannot and do not wish to understand one another, the parents suffering as the State encouraged estrangement hardens, the children resenting any word of admonition as an attempt to violate their proclaimed independence.

It would appear that the partisan history of all time has been exploited and outdone in the measures employed to enforce intellectual dictatorship over a nation. The system cannot be surpassed in inclusiveness or detail. One does not know which to appraise more highly for effectiveness, blockade established against old ideas, or the prevention of escape from the new. The situation purposively created thwarts any desire or attempt to live politically unconscious. Taps of political education, fed from the Party fountain-head and subject to its pressures, drench the last soul among the populace, admitting neither forgetfulness nor peace.

A course like this pursued without surcease over a period of years cannot but leave upon the mass mind heavy deposits of manufactured knowledge and conviction. Reiteration of Communist precept and line without rejoinder must eventually burn out of consciousness the old mentality and establish the new

among millions, even of adults. That any of the young resist it partakes of the marvelous. On the other hand, against old and young the Party registers complaints over the shirking of duty toward the political grammar menu. Failure to subjugate some minds probably springs from a surfeit of one mental diet. Upon how much superficiality of mere assent to enforced ideas, the outwardly impressive intellectual structure rests, it remains for future strains to reveal.

If it be asked what inspires zeal like this for furnishing humanity with a regenerated mind, the inquiry column of the weekly periodical *The Godless* (*Bezbozhnik*)<sup>34</sup> furnishes an answer and touches a high point as a confession of faith.

A questioner, Voronin, asks: "What is the aim of our life? Is it only that after many sacrifices we shall be turned into manure for the earth, because we cannot make everybody happy and content?"

He is told that for the bourgeoisie the only justification of living is children in whom one may see the continuation of his own personality. For the childless even that satisfaction does not exist. A good member of his own class, however, feels that he belongs to a great army. If he dies, the class remains.

For the proletariat, the class interests grow to be the interests of the human international. Therefore, an enlightened social worker does not ask himself why he is living. "Why?" "For the sake of rendering the life of all easier, of course: for the upbuilding and re-fashioning of a new life. The program of the Communist Party is the answer to the question as to the aim of our life."

<sup>34</sup> June 3, 1928.





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CHAPTER VII

COMMUNISM AND RELIGION

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*“Religion and Communism are incompatible both theoretically and practically.”<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> *ABC of Communism*, p. 256.

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## CHAPTER VII

### COMMUNISM AND RELIGION

THE acts of Communists toward religion in Russia, against which almost world-wide current protest prevailed early in 1930, normally expressed the doctrinal nature and program of Communism. No change in purpose resulted from the publicity given it. Nothing promises to alter it so long as both Communism and Religion coexist. The tempo of the anti-religious movement may vary, dependent upon other business on hand being more or less urgent and certain considerations of expedience. The winter of 1929-1930 saw it accelerated. This made it conspicuous. Pressures from outside and within slowed it down, and the world public became more nearly aware of the realities in this range of Communist philosophy and action.

Communists themselves bear less responsibility for the extensive confusion and misunderstanding concerning their anti-religious motivation and objective than foreign observers who have undertaken to discover and state them. The former in their expositions of doctrine and of policy uniformly and openly declare mortal enmity to all religion as such, but most non-Russian, non-Communist expositors have appeared indisposed to take the Communists literally at their word.

The passing reporters have accounted variously for

the attack on religion by the present rulers of the Russian people. An explanation often advanced is that the official Orthodox Church was an ally and partner of Czarism, is still at heart monarchical, and continues in the hands of counter-revolutionary clergy and laymen. Anti-Semites have seen in the assault something inspired by hostility to Christianity on the part of Jews in the high places of Party and Government. Religious liberals envisaged an old ecclesiastical system under the hammers of a new social order. Some of these expressed the hope that there would be no relenting until the blows had beaten out all corrupt or outworn elements. An economic expert of the 1925 British Trade Union delegation came forward in *The New York Times* with the view that only "the social organizations and objectives of the religious communities, as distinct from their ritual and rights of worship, were being repressed." Still others represent the Soviet Government as acting merely to separate Church and State while maintaining religious freedom, and observing State neutrality in respect to religion itself. Spokesmen for the State have lent themselves to this interpretation, falling back on a Constitutional clause as proof text.

A pathetic figure called up to witness for them was Metropolitan Sergius. Under that technique of unceasing mental and moral torture, with physical duress not withheld, which foreshortened the Patriarch Tikhon's life and breaks all but the stoutest hearts, the harassed occupant of the Patriarchal Office in Moscow signed a prepared statement that all punishments inflicted upon clergy and Church officials were for infractions of State laws and regulations and therefore not persecutive in character.

The deeds of the years elapsed since the Communist Soviet reign began in October, 1917, afford abundant data by which to test the foregoing and other theories and claims. The examination may well begin in the relationship of State and Church in which the civilized world recognizes large scope for governmental action without the invasion of fundamental human rights. Many peoples know from experience that complete separation of the Church from the State does not in itself imply unfriendliness to religion in principle and may further its health and progress.

On gaining power in Russia the Communist Party proceeded to set up a State apparatus which, in its initial divorce from religion taken with subsequent strictures, has left nothing to the imagination. Whether the requirements of the laws go beyond neutrality and impose needless restrictions and excessive hardships, private judgment may determine after knowing and weighing the facts.

The basic legal structure of separation nationalized the property of all religious establishments. The churches may be used as places of worship by local groups of not less than twenty believers under meticulous rules. They may not conduct schools. Even classes or groups for religious instruction are prohibited for the ages under eighteen years. The Orthodox Church possessed and operated about the best of the pre-revolutionary presses. These were seized making the availability of all religious publications, even the most elementary and essential, dependent on the Government printeries and the favor of their Communist controls. Bibles and religious books found in the presses at the time of their confiscation were dismembered and used as wrapping paper. A foreign

relief committee bought thousands of paper sacks as late as 1923 made from finely illuminated Bible sheets, as the only supply in the market for the delivery of food supplies to the beneficiaries. Destitution has resulted in the most necessary literary materials, such as service books and testaments, that has steadily grown more acute. The new State stopped financial support abruptly. Under nationalization, the income from the once highly profitable candle factories, the hostelries for pilgrims, and other commercial means of Church financing automatically ceased. Disfranchisement overtook the clergy. The rationing systems of goods distribution, both before and after the NEP, left them unrecognized as people who wear clothes and eat.

The 1929 decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic regarding religious unions laid upon them restraints old and new. Rights are conspicuous by their absence. No contractual powers remain to a local religious congregation. Individuals or a committee may act for it in a business capacity within the limits "closely and directly connected with the teaching and ritual of the given religious denomination." The district in which the members of the particular group live and the place where the Church is situated delimit the field of activity of ministers and religious instructors concerned. A religious community is forbidden to establish mutual aid funds or Coöperatives; to give material aid to its members; to organize special meetings for children, youth, or women for prayer or other purposes; to have general meetings of groups, circles, or departments for handworking or other labor: for

literary, Biblical, or other religious study: or for other purposes; to conduct excursions, playgrounds, libraries, reading rooms, and sanatoria; or to afford medical aid. The solicitation of gifts and the making of assessments are permissible among members only. Uses of the funds must be confined to church maintenance, ministerial salaries, and support of the executive organs.

Other regulations render impossible the creation and maintenance of an effective central general agency for any of the religious bodies taken regionally or nationally. Congresses or conferences may be called and organized on securing special permission from the designated State authority. More often than otherwise the permit is not forthcoming. One of the largest Communions, waiting several years for the desired authorization, in 1930 was still waiting. Another as a price of permission to assemble was required, along with its sincere avowal of pacifism and disarmament for mankind in general, to exempt its own land and the Communist Government from the ideal program and to vouch wholesale for the righteousness of the ruling régime, particularly in respect to the guarantees of religious freedom. Such a religious congress, if and when realized, creates organs to carry out the resolutions but neither the congress nor organs enjoy juridical rights. They may not organize any obligatory collections, or any kind of a central treasury for voluntary gifts; receive or possess any religious property; or enter into business transactions.

Thus far it may be contended that the State had done no more than to define and delimit the expression and program of religion, compatible with the new order. But it could not stop at that point and be the



servant of a Communist Party, and of that power alone. Hostile aggression was delayed only for considerations of expediency or perhaps of strategy.

The schools furnish a vantage point from which to observe the waxing deployment of Communism on what its partisans picturesquely call "the religious front." The educational goal of Communist tacticians contemplates nothing less than the mass mind remade and refurnished. When the children and the schools would be turned to this account was bound to be a mere question of time.

During 1928 the always wholly subservient press whipped up the Party demand for intensifying anti-religious instruction in the schools, not as a specified subject but for tactical advantage to be interwoven through all the courses. An order was given to all pedagogical institutes and faculties to observe the work of the teachers at this point to see that it did not stop at neutrality. The *Red Gazette* of Leningrad prophesied the scholastic year 1928-1929 would be distinctly anti-religious.

The Commissar for Education from 1917, until relieved in 1929 by a more aggressive executive (chief of the political work in the Army) during his last year in office sounded the call to press the anti-religious fight along the entire school line. He explained how action and achievement had dragged hitherto because so large a body of the teachers personally remained religious. He estimated the believers still at one-third to two-fifths of the available. His pronouncement through the official *Izvestia*<sup>2</sup> came in unmistakable terms. He noted that with the passing of time the Soviet authority, the proletariat, and the Party had

<sup>2</sup> Lunacharsky, March 26, 1929.

advanced much in the socialistic upbuilding of the country. Conditions had ripened for revising the platform previously accepted that the School should be non-religious simply. The State had grown much stronger. He saw the old type of Church organizations crumbling away—Orthodox, Mohammedan, Jewish. The sectarian spirit increasing very strongly, on the one hand caused the faithful (Orthodox) to waver in their beliefs, but on the other instilled a new form of religion. Many more newly educated and anti-religious teachers were at hand to replace the old incumbents. All of this made it possible for the School to advance more rapidly. More open attack was obligatory.

The Commissar did not advise that all religious teachers be systematically dismissed at once but declared them anomalies in a Soviet school to be replaced progressively as those anti-religiously bent came forward. A teacher refusing to comply in this respect was to be looked upon as "a deserter on the religious front."

Continuing, Lunacharsky characterized as criminal the position that struggle consisted only in fighting the Orthodox Church and passing by the sectarians or the Mohammedans and the Jews. He observed that often leaving a religion comparatively less numerous without attention caused disastrous results. The impression became current that only the Orthodox Church was persecuted while the sectarian spirit grew stronger and various religious denominations more influential. "Happily," he prophesied, "all such stupid rumors will disappear of themselves with anti-religious activity smiting all gods equally, attacking all churches, all forms of religious falsehood, not excluding the most

purified and refined manifestation of divine adoration or of mysticism.”

Long before this unabashed renunciation of neutrality in the schools came, evidence accumulated that the Communist ruled State was not resting content simply with having placed the religious societies under heavy disabilities. The Scientific Society “Atheist” of Moscow published in 1926 *From Religion to Atheism* containing 1,498 titles of anti-religious pamphlets and books; and fresh production was going on unabated. Although it had formerly received and executed orders for Bibles and other religious publications, later it yielded to the inspired protests of its workmen against such issues pleading also scarcity of paper. To impress managers with the Government will in the matter several dismissals occurred for handling religious printing orders.

In 1926 such demand for any kind of religious literature prevailed and so little other work for printing shops existed that Trade Unions supported by the Kiev government sent to Moscow a statement that if the printing houses were to be kept going they should be permitted to publish religious literature. Moscow replied by sharply criticizing the authors of the statement as unworthy members of the laboring class, and warning that if any such publications were undertaken the staffs of the offending printing establishments would be remanned by members loyal to Communist principles.

The State by military regulations atheistically indoctrinates the annual recruitment of Red Army young men, several hundred thousand strong. Prohibitions of the display and sale of Christmas trees and toys and the goods of other festivals are acts of Govern-

ment. Many arrests and punishments in the period of the civil war to which Church leaders were subjected undoubtedly resulted from offenses that any government would suppress with real severity, but long after the disappearance of any ground for fearing counter-revolutionary Churchmen, if such remain, there goes on a systematic process of arrest and exile for the priests and bishops who attract attention by their spiritual leadership. A single district in the Ukraine ten years after the Revolution had fourteen thus sequestered in twelve months.

*Poslednie Novosti*, a Paris newspaper of the Russian Émigrés in Paris, published on June 3, 1930, a circumstantial roster of current cruel oppressions inflicted upon Orthodox bishops. Some cases of recent origin or continuing from an earlier time follow. In 1928 in Nikolsk (Vologda Province) the agents of the O. G. P. U. killed the aged Bishop Jerothenus. His body disappeared and was never given over for burial. On one of the uninhabitable islands of Solovki Archbishop Peter of Voronezh died in exile on January 27, 1929. December 28, 1929, Archbishop Illarion exiled since 1922 died in prison in Leningrad while on the way from Solovki to a new destination of exile. Archbishop Boris of Riazan severely ailing in health also died in exile in 1928. The canonically legal locum tenens of the Patriarchal Throne, Metropolitan Peter, 60 years old suffering from angina pectoris and pulmonary complications has been without interruption either in exile or in prison since 1925, and from 1927 beyond the Arctic circle in the "tundra" of the gulf of the river Ob. The nearest inhabited spot is a small town—Obdorsk, 200 kilometers distant. Metropolitan Peter lacks not only medical aid and the most necessary

medicines but the most primitive comforts. Though the three years of exile to which he was condemned have long expired he is not recalled. As yet he has been tried by no tribunal and no accusation has been presented arraigning him. The Metropolitan of Kazan, Cyrill, aged 65 years, has been in exile since 1922. Since 1927 he has been living at the mouth of the Yenisei in the Polar region in the huts of the Samoyeds. Bishop Parthenius of Ananieff and an accompanying priest were severely beaten in January, 1930, on their way to exile to the Kirghis region. Archbishop Cornelius of Ekaterinburg, far advanced in years, suffered exile to the Karel region in 1927, subjected to forced labor in the forests.

Over the years the dispossession of religious unions from their churches, synagogues, and mosques (which in each instance to be legal must have State countenance and confirmation) has proceeded at an accelerated rate of attrition. The law recognizes various grounds for closing, destroying, or assigning to other uses the houses of worship and prayer. It provides also for hearings and appeals. Forfeiture impends for failure to make repairs or to pay taxes and insurance or the reduction of the union to fewer than the legal minimum of members. The State or its subdivisions may appropriate the buildings for public use. An insurance award for a burned church accrues to the State and may be diverted to other cultural objects than its reconstruction.

Press accounts like the following offer familiar reading:

"The general assembly of all the villagers of Ostapovitz and of the Jewish industrials of the little borough Kusmino has unanimously decided to close

the church and the synagogue and to give them over to educational needs."

"The factory, 'The Red Rose,' contains 2,600 workmen. Of these 1,800 are women and half of them exceedingly unenlightened. This makes the work of the 'Godless' very difficult. Still the question of giving the synagogue for the installation of a club for the Jewish workmen was voted during the meeting of the group of the 'Godless' in the Educational Committee and the Club."

"Only old women attended the church in Zhmerinka. Following an educational campaign it has been closed and a sport club will be organized in it. The synagogue also will soon be closed and a bathhouse established there."


"According to the desire of the people, three churches have been closed in Rjevsk, two in Vratho, two in Dmitreivsk, and in the village Jacovitz. The church in Barnaul has been razed to the ground. The church building in Shenkursk in the Archangel province has been turned into an electric station."

*Izvestia* <sup>a</sup> reported "354 churches closed in 1928, also 38 monasteries, 50 synagogues, 38 mosques, and 48 other religious houses. Ninety-one of these buildings were used for clubs; 95 for schools; 29 for other educational institutions; 22 for workmen's homes; 16 for houses of culture; 12 for dispensaries; 23 for hut reading rooms; 21 for 'people's houses'; 12 for kitchens; and 8 for museums."

The same paper stated that in the course of 1929 253 additional houses of prayer were to be closed, but the pace increased, spurred by the Society of Militant Godless and the implications for religion in the farm

<sup>a</sup> March 22, 1929

collectivization feature of the Five Year Plan. *The Godless for Workmen* <sup>4</sup> considered the idea of a col-



lective farm with a church and priest "something fit for a humorous journal."

<sup>4</sup> No. 2, 1930.

A furious wave of church seizures began in 1929 and reached a peak early in 1930. The war cries of this period associated clergy, churches, religion, and kulaks in the opposition to farm collectivization. In places all church bells were taken for metal in the "cause of industrialization." With official figures of church seizures for 1929 unavailable, the *Moskauer Rundschau's* <sup>6</sup> addition of the current press accounts netted 1,119 churches, 126 synagogues, and 194 mosques. The last figure calls for the comment that the anti-religious wave reached a mark high enough to submerge the cautious policy that hitherto had temporized somewhat with the Mohammedan religious population from considerations of domestic prudence and of the propaganda effect on Moslems across the Asian frontiers.

The speeding-up carried over into 1930 with momentum behind it. The *Godless for Workmen* <sup>7</sup> announced that in the Riazan district alone in a short time 192 churches were closed practically without previous agitation. The anti-religionists transformed 31 into cultural centers and locked up many. The Moscow Union of Militant Godless <sup>7</sup> began a widespread campaign for closing all churches in the capital, in the regional centers of the province, in the villages where the workers live, and in most of the collective farms. Other voices raised the issue of closing all the churches of the land within the lifetime of the Five Year Plan. The responsible secretary of the Central Committee of the Society of Militant Godless sounded a caution.

In April the tidal wave receded by the command of Stalin and the Party Central Committee who took

<sup>6</sup> A newspaper published by the Soviet Government for the information of foreigners.

<sup>7</sup> No. 7, 1930.

<sup>7</sup> *The Godless*, February 16, 1930.



warning from a rising public wrath expressed in reprisals, especially in the villages. Despite their denials, they were not uninfluenced by the protests of the world outside.

A memorandum<sup>a</sup> sent to the Government's representative for contact with the religious bodies, "Regarding the Needs of the Orthodox Church in the USSR.," by the Metropolitan Sergius (the same who testified to the absence of religious persecutions) brings to the light a wide range of disabilities visited upon the churches, clergy, and members. Relief is sought in twenty-one directions, including the lowering of insurance assessments on the churches, especially in villages, "sometimes so exorbitant that it deprives the community of the possibility of using the church buildings"—the valuation and the rate standing on a par with buildings that bring in revenue; discontinuance of the requirement that the churches pay 5% of the entire revenue received by all ecclesiastics for services performed in church or outside assessed on the ground of "artists performing musical pieces"; suppressing as a double taxation on members the assessment of the churches for special obligatory agricultural collections, such as for tractors, industrialization, and government loans; removing from individual members of parishes liability to fines and confiscations for non-payment by the churches of assessments; protecting members of parish councils, church wardens, church guardians, and other persons ministering to the needs of the local church from indiscriminate rating as kulaks with consequent heavier taxation burden; insuring that, when Orthodox communities or the clergy send in their complaints, local representatives

<sup>a</sup> *Izvestia*, February 19, 1930.

of justice will not refuse them lawful protection of their rights when the latter have been infringed by local administrative authorities or by some organizations; recognizing the rule that before closing a church the decisive factor be not the desire of the unbelieving part of the population, but whether or not there are believers who desire and are able to use the given building; also if a church be closed, that the members of the Orthodox community retain the right to invite their priests to perform all manner of family rites in their own homes; preventing local authorities from refusing petitions for registrations of congregations and from forbidding even their taking any steps toward registration; directing that income taxes be not fixed in an arbitrary manner, quite surpassing all possibility of payment as in the instance of Bishop Zarubin in Ijorsk who was taxed \$5,150, with an additional \$3,500 as an advance for the following year; and that taxation of the clergy generally be fixed on a par with other persons of liberal professions; when forced services are being fixed, limiting them to reasonable dimensions in contrast to the priest in the village Liuki of the Votski district who was sentenced to fell, saw into timber, and cart away 200 cubic sajen \* of wood; according ministers of religion the right of having their home within their own parish and near their church; permitting the children of the clergy to study in the 1st and 2nd grade schools, and that those of them who by autumn, 1929, were registered as students of the Higher Educational Institutions should not be expelled simply because of their origin; admitting to the Art Workers and other Unions, professional or voluntary

\* A sajen equals 343 cubic feet or a little more than two and one-half cords.

singers who take part in church choirs as a means of earning money; granting the petition to open in Leningrad the higher theological courses of the Orthodox Patriarchal Church, and allowing to the Patriarchate the issue of some sort of periodical publication, if only a monthly bulletin in which the decisions, pastoral letters, etc., of the central Church authorities could be published.

Notwithstanding that the decree of 1918 separating the Church from the State and the School from the Church concerned "all churches, religious groups, denominations, persuasions, and unions," for a time the evangelicals (or "sectarians" to distinguish them from Russian Orthodox Christians) enjoyed relative leniency. It was calculated their gains would be at the expense of the old Church and that they would not become in themselves a considerable religious force. The widespread vigor of the evangelical movement however, with new and effective methods and the consequent rapid multiplication of their groups, brought down on them later the heavy hand of opposition.

The 1929 law, restricting the activities of religious bodies to the divine service or its equivalent, aimed quite specifically at the popular sectarian innovations. A noisy press barrage for several months preceded the launching of the new oppressive measures. Reiterated calls for repressing the sectarians as counter-revolutionaries reached the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. Inflammatory captions were featured until the Party members and their following were aware that action was expected. The headlines read: "Religious Infection," "In the Camp of Our Enemies," "The Nests of the Baptists in Moscow," "Religion Ready for an

Attack," "130,000 Bibles—Spreaders of Evil," "The Militant Religion is Attacking Us," "Agents of Capitalism Financed by Rockefeller and Ford."

In due time the blow fell. Dr. J. H. Rushbrooke, Commissioner of the English and other Baptist bodies to the Russian believers of that persuasion, reported the immediate sequences:

"Arrests and exiles have become frequent. Places of worship have been arbitrarily closed. . . . Educational opportunities are denied to the children of Baptists. Not only preachers but in many instances simple members of the churches are deprived even of the ordinary ration of bread. To the attacks in the press they are not allowed to reply in the secular press. Of their own paper, they have been forced to reduce the number printed from 25,000 to 2,500 and to submit to rigid censorship. Their license to print Bibles is withdrawn, their preachers' school is closed, their secretary has been arrested and also their treasurer. The position is very grave."

He then comments: "The excuse of politics cannot stand. Russian Baptists have no reason to regret the passing of the Czarist State or to desire its return. They have loyally accepted the Soviet Constitution. It is not a crime to believe in God."

No misconception is more unfounded than that these anti-religious manifestations have Jewish enmity to Christianity for their inspiration. Judaism experiences the attack in full force. The separation of education from the synagogue strikes the Jewish religious system a blow more immediately devastating than a Church experiences which places more dependence upon ritual and worship for its approach to the young. With the

near destruction of private trade, Jewish shopkeepers became declassed almost *en masse*. The ensuing poverty in turn financially impoverishes their religious societies. Under the caption "The Destruction of the Russian Jewry," *Die Neue Welt* of Vienna states that the Hebrew language is not officially forbidden, neither is it allowed—another heavy handicap on religious instruction. The new Soviet libraries contain no Hebrew books. To read one in an old library requires a permit rarely granted. Writers and publishers in the Hebrew language meet with arrest under covert charges. Importing Hebrew books is legal—yet none get through the censorship. Priceless Hebrew tomes have been seized and are reported found in the official channels of foreign trade.

Professor Kroll of Paris, jurist and scholar, in December, 1930, declared to the Conference of the American Jewish Congress to Deal with the Suppression of Judaism in Russia that "no pogrom dealt such destructive blows to the Jews of Russia as those inflicted by the Bolshevist revolution" though without rifle shots, sword blows, conflagration fires, or groans of slaughtered victims.

The seizure of their sanctuaries goes on apace—in 1928 fifty-nine synagogues and forty-three prayer houses were closed, or nearly 14½% of all such seats of Jewish corporate worship. The next year the number closed raised the total to over 30%—leaving only 894 of the more than 1,400 in the Ukraine in 1914.<sup>10</sup> Conversion into museums, clubs, or places of business usually follows a "demand of the toiling masses of Jews." The Society of the Militant Godless moved to secure the chief synagogue in Moscow as its head-

<sup>10</sup> *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, December 31, 1929.

quarters but the recession of the closing movement came by Party order before this act was consummated. Some of the most famous Christian churches have become anti-religious museums.

Until 1930 a particularly bitter and ingenious assault upon Jewish religionists and their institutions was led by apostates from their own number who constituted a special unit of Communists known as the Yevsekzia (Jewish Section) now discontinued. They set on foot such campaigns as one to abolish Kosher food throughout the land. They assailed circumcision as a barbarous custom although the practice gains abroad as a medically sound operation. Party members are expelled if the rite is permitted in their family. They thwarted the provision whereby foreign Jews would have supplied their Russian brethren with matzoth for the 1929 Passover feast. The authorities were induced to raise the import bread tariff on the commodity 1,500% as a luxury. *Emes*, the Party organ of Jewish Communists, denounced the use of matzoth as akin to counter-revolution and demanded that the rabbis who initiated the importation project be punished for asking aid from abroad.

The control and supervision over their cemeteries have been taken away from the Jewish religious communities. Children absent from school on account of a religious holiday expose themselves to expulsion and, in localities, to the loss of their bread cards. The educational preparation of rabbis is made impracticable by reason of the age limit when religious instruction may be given youth in groups. The number of rabbis in the Ukraine diminished from 1,059 in 1914 to 830 in 1930.<sup>11</sup> Under these compounded adversities Professor

<sup>11</sup> *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, April 17, 1930.

Kroll foresees that "together with physical degeneration the Jews are threatened in fact with actual spiritual degeneration and with a decline of Jewish culture leading ultimately to a state of brutality."

Strictly these actions, legal and otherwise, may not signify "persecution of religious belief." No Soviet citizen has been constrained by laws and penalties to accept or deny infant baptism, the filioque clause, or the apostolic succession. Technically the multitude of penalties paid in the area of religious life and its expression have been for acts against the law—but a body of law that if observed would leave no room for religion to survive suffocation. The issue of obedience to a law the end of which is spiritual death for minister and flock came out squarely in the trial of the Roman Catholic clergy in Russia in 1923. One year's enforced labor penalizes the religious teaching of children under eighteen years of age in State or private educational institutions. The courts interpret this as applying to Sunday Schools and to priests teaching privately a group of children.

To return to the trial—the prosecutor put his questions to the accused priest Fedoroff, Exarch of Russian Catholics of the Eastern Rites, who answered: \*

Q—You know that the decree forbids you to teach children?

A—Yes—in school.

Q—And how many children have you taught at home?

A—One, two, sometimes more.

Q—And the maximum?

A—The number has been as high as ten.

\* National Catholic Welfare Council News Release, 1923.

Q—And it wasn't a school?

A—No.

Q—Then what was it?

A—As a priest it is my duty to teach children. It is necessary at the request of the parents. I have no right not to teach.

Q—I place the question directly. Is such a teaching of a group of children a school or not?

A—No. It is not a school in the sense of the decree.

Q—You persist in your point of view which is directly opposed to the law?

A—As a Catholic priest when I teach religion to children, I am directly fulfilling my duty.

Q—And you declare that you will do it in the future?

A—Yes, I shall do so.

Father Federoff is still serving the term of Arctic exile he received for his priestly fidelity.

Orthodox Bishops in Solovki exile for like faithfulness to their calling lodged with the Soviet Government in 1926 a petition for the granting of spiritual freedom. For dignity, penetration, clarity, and courage in pointing out the parting of their ways from Communism, the appeal merits a place among the great documents of Church history. After recognizing the domain of the State in the political organization of authority, in the repartition of wealth, and in the nationalization of property, the authors located the discord in the irreconcilability of the teachings of the Church with the materialism and philosophy of the Communist Party, and of the Government directed by that Party in this language:

“The Church recognizes the existence of the spiritual principle; Communism denies it. The Church believes



in the living God, Creator of the world, Guider of its life and fate; Communism does not admit His existence; believes that the world was self-organized and that no reasonable principles or purposes govern its history. The Church believes in the steadfast principles of morality, justice, and law. Communism looks upon them as the conditional results of class-struggle, and values moral questions only from the standpoint of their usefulness. The Church instills the feeling of that humility which elevates man's soul; Communism abases man through his pride. . . .

"For the Church religion is not only the living force enabling man to attain his heavenly destiny, but also the source of all that is greatest in human relations—the foundation of earthly welfare, happiness, and the health of nations. For Communism religion is the opium that drugs the nations, that weakens their energy, that is the source of their poverty and misfortunes. The Church wants religion to flourish. Communism wants it to perish. With such deep difference in fundamental principles separating the Church and the State, it becomes impossible that an inner nearness or reconciliation could exist between them. There can be no reconciliation between assertion and negation, between yes and no. For the very soul of the Church, the circumstances of its existence, and the reason for its being is just that which is categorically denied by Communism."

The purpose in the minds of the leaders of Communism to extirpate religion in every form is indisputable. Their own testimony to this effect is monotonously uniform. There is no higher authority than Lenin. In November, 1925, *Izvestia* carried what

it called "these beautiful words" in a letter <sup>13</sup> from the Communist prophet to Gorky:

"In the freest countries where an appeal to democracy, to the population, to public opinion, and to science would be quite useless, in such countries (America, Switzerland, and the like) the people and the workers are stupefied with the idea of a pure, spiritual God-head, which had originally to be created. Just because every religious idea, every idea of any God, nay, all coquetting with such thoughts, is an unutterable baseness, it is gladly suffered, often welcomed even, by the democratic bourgeoisie, merely because it is the most dangerous baseness, the vilest infection."

Mme. Krupskaya, widow of Lenin, dissatisfied with the degree of thoroughness with which the children were being dispossessed of religious faith, insists: "The very roots of religion must be sought at much greater depth and completely extracted." <sup>14</sup>

The Commissar of Education thus enjoined the XIV All-Russian Congress of Soviets: "All our cultural institutions, from the school to the theater, from the Academy of Science to the village reading room must be considered by us . . . as means for curing the masses of this evil syphilitic disease (religion)." <sup>14</sup>

*The A B C of Communism* <sup>15</sup> elaborates thus the ground for this loathing hatred of religion: "Many weak-kneed Communists reason as follows: 'Religion does not prevent my being a Communist. I believe both in God and in Communism. My faith in God does not hinder me from fighting for the cause of the proletariat.' This train of thought is radically false.

<sup>13</sup> Translation in *Lenin and Gandhi*, by René Fülöp-Miller, p. 151.

<sup>14</sup> *The Way to the New School*, August 7, 1928.

<sup>14</sup> Lunacharsky, reported in *Izvestia*, May 17, 1929.

<sup>15</sup> Pages 256-257.

. . . The tactics of the Communist Party prescribes for the members definite lines of conduct. The moral



*Pravda.*

NESTLED BY CHRIST

code of every religion in like manner prescribes for the faithful some definite line of conduct. . . . In most cases there is an irreconcilable conflict between the

principles of Communist tactics and the commandments of religion."

By way of illustration the author quotes a New Testament text to uphold this major thesis that workers impregnated with such ideas as the Beatitudes can never be summoned successfully to make war on their neighbors and on the rest of contemporary society. Hence no class war, no proletarian dictatorship, no smashing of the representative state, capitalism, and the bourgeoisie, and therefore no communizing of the economic order and the rest of life. In short there can be no basis for composing a peace between Communism and Religion unless and until either the former abandons its class war technique on which sole reliance for success is placed, or Religion surrenders its purest ideals and ethic. In a situation where the Russian Communist censorship dealt with a Church publication friendly to the social and economic program of the régime, the only material deleted was that associating Christianity with a concern and program for the welfare of the masses.

Being realists Russian Communists increasingly mobilize all the forces of conquest at hand—the apparatus of the State as seen in the schools and Army; the Party, numbering nearly 2,000,000 members with monopoly of power in every organized unit of the new society, including the Trade and Professional Unions; 2,466,000 in the League of Communist Youth, dominant element in the whole range of youth life; and the Pioneers as numerous and, similarly, the Communist shock troops systematically and skillfully deployed to penetrate the masses of childhood. Educationally this entire well-integrated network of

organizations become vehicles of Communist ideology with its undiluted anti-religious constituent. Executively they are the instruments of the Communist will.

Created and constituted to make aggressive and effective this aggregate army of man, woman, and child power for the eradication of religion is the Society of the Militant Godless—the tireless, pitiless, presiding mind of the propaganda and the persecution. Its head is Yaroslavsky, Secretary of the Party Control Commission (the Inquisition of Communism), an instrument of power second only to the Political Bureau of the Party and the O. G. P. U. A few months after being brought into existence in 1925 the Society received the authority of the Party to give direction and method to all organizations having responsibilities in the anti-religious field.

Yaroslavsky reviewed some of the successes of his Society in June, 1930.<sup>16</sup> On January 1, 1926, the Union had 87,000 members. One year later 138,000. On February 1, 1929, the enlistment reached 465,000. By January, 1930, the figure rose to 2,000,000 and on March 1, 1930, the roster contained 3,000,000 members. At the time of reporting he gave the total as about 3,500,000.

Manifold activities concern this belligerent anti-religious organization of millions. It recruits and trains agents for missionary work in the provinces. The system of preparation includes seriously conducted anti-religious seminaries with hundreds of enrolled students. The *Teachers' Gazette*<sup>17</sup> announced thirty-five such institutions with 7,500 students and attend-

<sup>16</sup> *Pravda*, June 24, 1930.

<sup>17</sup> April 23, 1930.

ants January 21, 1930. One set up in the First University of Moscow History and Philosophy Faculty equips specialists in different lines of anti-religious activity. Leningrad writers organized such a training center for the advancement of their profession in the propaganda of godlessness. Shorter courses also are created and taught to volunteer workers in the Party, the Comsomols, the Pioneers, the Trade Unions, the Army and other clubs, the women's sections, the schools, and the chains of reading rooms reaching out to the villages.

Literature issues in floods widely adapted to workers, peasants, women, youth, children, Christians, Jews, Moslems, and the national minorities in their several languages. An "Anti-religious Literary and Artistic Library for Children" of nine volumes is a new production. In 1929 the pages printed totaled 34,000,000 to which 13,000,000 more were added the first three months of 1930.<sup>18</sup>

The festivals of all faiths are systematically campaigned against by counter-programs elaborated and promoted. The 1930 "Anti-Easter Collections" came out in three volumes—one each for the Cities, the Villages, and the Schools. Agitation for Red weddings, funerals, and christenings to replace the religious ceremonies is constant. New units of the Society are set up in the factories, clubs, home Coöperatives, and collective farms. Broadcasting carries short stories and current events interspersed with anti-religious songs and skits.

The papers and magazines of every description with enormous total circulation are bearers of this Society's

<sup>18</sup> *Pravda*, June 24, 1930.

message. The illustrated organ, *Bezboznik*, (*The Godless One*), a volcano of ridicule, blasphemy, and incitement to action was publishing 400,000 copies weekly in 1930. One of its early cartoons burlesquing the Lord's Supper indicates the depths of the travesties that it utters. Under the caption, "This Is My Body," the participants gnaw at different members. Two are engaged with entrails. Novelties among the Society's propaganda include the mobilization of artists, traveling cinema shows, and floating exhibits on the rivers.

Against the practice of religion, economic and social pressures not legally valid are inspired by the inflammatory charges and exhortations from platform and press, although Yaroslavsky warns against using administrative measures and denounces development of anti-religious agitation at a tempo not warranted by the actual situation. Nevertheless workmen active religiously find themselves jobless. Choir singers denied membership in the Musician's Union become unemployable. Teachers attending church or synagogues invite discharge. Children in religious families are the last to gain school privileges.

Isolated like social lepers, religious orders and officers irrespective of faith are relegated officially to the status of social dregs. Their "liquidation" is a studied program. Priests, rabbis, mullahs, church officials, nuns, and deaconesses receive no housing allotments or rationing cards. They may not join Coöperatives, thereby being forced in their bitter poverty to buy of private traders at multiple prices or starve. Many have succumbed, the others must fall before their time. Few would long survive but for the succor given them by the faithful out of their own slender livings.

Dispatches from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in

Moscow reported the cutting off of electricity from the religious institutions in Kiev and the refusal of the postal employees to deliver remittances and other mail and telegrams to religious communities, synagogues, churches, and members of the clergy.<sup>19</sup> The Presidium of the Tver City Soviet passed a resolution to discontinue the furnishing of electricity to churches and houses of prayer.<sup>20</sup> Appeal to the authorities brought only refusal to intervene. In the Ukraine under the slogan "convert them into tractors," praying shawls, phylacteries, and religious books have been seized and sold to benefit the industrialization fund. Brigades of Jewish children conducting house-to-house collections of these ritual objects even took away prayer-books from the synagogues.

The spiritual sufferings of old and young inflicted by the assaults on religion will never be revealed nor imagined. They bulk large in the total endured by the Russian soul in the agonies of Revolution. A letter from a woman doctor unconscious of her heroism portrays one drop in the ocean of tears:

"The life I led amidst the horrors of the civil war taught me to be a missionary. . . . I had to hide my little Gospel in order that they would not take it away from me, for it was a sign of a counter-revolutionary to have a Gospel in the Army. Not one Red soldier (of mine) died without confessing his sins, not to our priest but to me. Oh, you cannot imagine what I felt, when men, sometimes great sinners—murderers of women and men, even children sometimes—confessed it to me, asking me to read to them about the robber on the Cross and what God said to him. . . . When I

<sup>19</sup> *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, February 18, 1930.

<sup>20</sup> *Izvestia*, January 30, 1930.



could, especially during the nights when there were no attacks, I spoke to my wounded and sick of God, of their families, read them what I could of the Gospel, and when the day came and I had to go to my great medical work in the operation car, it was more light in my soul when I knew that something came out of my talking and reading during the night; and during the day, in free moments I thought of what I had to do in the night.

"I was exhausted at last and got typhus and then began my true career; while lying together with the soldiers and sisters who were ill also in the same barracks, on the floor, dressed, with no one to give me a drop of water to drink, while the fever burned our bodies and souls, then I had transcending experiences in the moments when I came back, that is, when I was conscious. I helped those who were lying near me. When God helped me through typhus and I was strong enough to move along the walls of the barracks, I was with all of them and we were 165 in the barracks on most friendly terms. We prayed together and we divided our food. There were many who died, only 37 of us survived, the typhus raged—it was the awful 1920. They all died Christians as well as I could do for them with God's help."<sup>21</sup>

The result thus far of all these powerful currents and cross currents in the life of the people is much confused. The weak in faith fall away. The strong increase in strength. The residue left to the Orthodox flock, and it is very large, is a purer and more purpose-

<sup>21</sup> *Ideals and Realities in Europe*, published by Association Press, 1925, pp. 127-129.

ful Christian body for the fires of refining passed through. Organizationally it is shaken at the center, indeed disorganized, though hardly demoralized. Repressions and scattering of the clergy have called forth increased lay responsibility and initiative. The estimate may be ventured that among adults the net intrinsic spiritual fund of the Church has not been impaired except as affected by deaths.

But the Communist grand strategy indulges religion for adults while rearing a generation of children knowing no God. The boast is made that religion will die with the older people. Beyond question among children and youth spiritual devastation is hard at work. It can hardly be otherwise than that millions of Russian children in whom hatred and contempt for religion and all it connotes are being implanted will go through life profoundly influenced and influencing others by these negatives?

*Pravda*, in an article published December 26, 1930, under the title "Religiousness and Anti-Religiousness of Moscow Workers," affords some very meaningful data on what is taking place. It reports a study undertaken in Moscow at the end of 1929 among 12,000 workers of the largest factories and mills in Moscow. The investigating committee received 3,000 replies to anonymous questionnaires which it sent out. The information these contained, in the opinion of the writer, is "typical for the Moscow proletariat."

Of the 3,000 Party and non-Party workers 88.8% declared themselves unbelievers and 11.2% admitted they believe in God. Non-Party workers alone gave 84.1% atheists, the Party contingent 98.9%. The percentage of believers among women rose to 27%; the

older ages yielded over 40%. No Comsomol member admitted being religious. The table below shows the higher rate of infection by atheism among the younger workers:

<i>Age</i>	<i>Percentage of Believers</i>
Up to 22 .....	2.7
From 22 to 29 .....	4.6
From 30 to 39 .....	10.1
From 40 to 49 .....	22.4
50 and over .....	35.1

The percentage of believers among the non-Party youth up to 22 years of age registered 4.8%. Men constituted 7.3% of believers (Communist and non-Party workers taken together); women 20.5%. The corresponding figures for non-Party workers alone are men, 10.6%; women 27.1%. The non-Party atheists stated that 38.9% of them became unbelievers before the Communist Revolution, and 61.1% after. More men (45.5%) discontinued believing in God before the Revolution than women (24.8%).

Since adherence to religion appeared to decrease as wages increased it was posited that "improvement of the material well-being of the working class and particularly the bettering of their condition by supplying them with food and the price necessities, which is now being undertaken under the direction of the Communist Party, is one of the most important anti-religious weapons." It was sought to establish the relation between education and religion. While the percentage of believers among workers without any education reaches 24.2, it falls to 9.0 for those with elementary education and to 2.9 for the High School product. The rate is highest among illiterates—30.8%. The workers who read the newspapers regularly returned 2.2% of

believers, those who read incidentally, 10.4%, and those not reading them at all, 33%.

That Communism wages war against every faith, alone refutes the charge that the sins and failures of the Russian Orthodox Church, however many and dark, engendered and explain the hostility to religion. The bearing of the Orthodox Church's past upon the present religious situation in Russia lies mainly in its numerous points of weakness to meet the attack. But regardless of strength or weakness, attack would have come, just as it is an accompaniment of the Communist movement in every land. Karl Marx, the doctrinal father of Communism and its anti-religious content, a German Jewish scholar, probably never saw a Russian church, service, priest, or communicant. His exile was spent principally in England and France. He coined the much quoted phrase "Religion the opiate of the people." When the French occupation of the Ruhr and resistance to it threw industrial Germany into distress and Communism came to power in almost wholly Lutheran Saxony, the Churches in the short period of that rule, so far as time admitted, met with treatment of the kind that other Confessions in Russia have suffered. In the Tartu cellar where leaders of the Estonian people were executed during a fleeting Communist régime, the bloodstains of slain Orthodox priests and Protestant pastors commingle. One searches unrewarded through the columns of *L'Humanité* for anything but enmity toward Roman Catholicism in France and French Protestantism. The London *Daily Worker* voices only hatred of the Anglican and Non-Conformist faiths and all their works in Britain. Its namesake in New York unremittingly pours defiance, scorn, and revilement on the almost innumerable de-

nominations of the United States, their ministry, and their messages—whether fundamentalist, modernist, or radical. In Norman Thomas, Christian Socialist outside any Church, this American organ sees “that sniveling preacher.” The Pope is headlined “Chief of the Big Opium Joint.”

CHAPTER VIII  
THE YOUTH PRODUCT

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*“ . . . There shall ultimately be educated a new generation capable of establishing Communism.”<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> *ABC of Communism*, p 398.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### THE YOUTH PRODUCT

THE permanent establishment of Communism depends upon the induction of the youthful generation into the steely determination against capitalism and the limitless hatred of the bourgeoisie, always upheld as prime qualifying qualities of real Communists.

The present adult population may be roughly classified by their attitudes toward the present régime into three groups: (1) the more or less active supporters—members of the Party, workers in general, and poor peasants; (2) the indifferent—the bulk of peasant population and some intellectuals whom the Party strives arduously to win to friendliness; (3) the inimical—independently well-to-do peasants, the residue of intellectuals, and remnants of the capitalistic classes. Annihilation of group three by varied means is well under way. "For the exploiters the only right that remains is the right of being judged." <sup>a</sup> The "old guard" Communists reconcile themselves to this situation for they can take a relatively clear course respecting it. They deal with people whose support or opposition is intelligent and deliberate, and during whose lifetime the seasoned Party group expect to retain the power in their own hands.

With respect to the youth they see the situation much more difficult and portentous. The new genera-

<sup>a</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229.



tion never endured the Czarist régime, never experienced its evils, and consider it more romantic than hateful. Having seen little of outside capitalists and bourgeoisie, they have no firsthand realistic ideas of the "crimes" for which those strangers are denounced. This limitation exists almost equally for the leaders and the led. Something of haste marks the older men in preparing their successors. They realize they are not immortal. Their comrades have been falling long before old age.

Present-day Russia accepts axiomatically that in the years ahead Communists will continue to be the rulers. The young go along unquestioningly with this current view. In the counter-revolutionary sense they constitute no threat to the existing power. The masses of young Russians between ten and twenty consider the régime normal, and any defects simply superficial shortcomings of a basically sound system. In contrast to the large numbers of determined adult enemies intelligent about what they are fighting for and against and who given opportunity would overthrow Soviet rule with alacrity, practically none such exist among the youth. Many of them express dissatisfaction with specific acts and features of the Government but not with the State itself. In this loyalty urban and village youth differ little. Twelve years have covered almost their entire self-conscious life, and no less than their contemporaries in other lands they give allegiance to the administrative, social, and economic system they know. In the event the present Government should be overturned the succeeding one could expect infinite trouble undertaking to reshape the social psychology of the generation trained under Communism, and in dealing otherwise with it.

The misgivings of the Communist Fathers, as they forecast committing their mission to the progeny of their system, arise from the measure of response made by the young to such basic ideological principles of Communism as the dedication of life to socialistic service, the duty and glory of labor, international solidarity with the proletarian youth of all countries, the equality of all workers regardless of nationality living within the borders of the Soviet Union and of the whole world.

Incessantly as these ideas have beaten upon the brain of all accessible Russian childhood and adolescence since 1917—in the kindergartens, schools, universities, camps, clubs, theaters, newspapers, books, and unnumbered meetings—the most authoritative official organ<sup>a</sup> on youth life after nearly twelve years confessed editorially: “Denials of the ‘kulak’ danger, the narrow ‘practicism,’ the advocacy of the class peace, the contempt for politics, chauvinism—all this is not our ideology. However we must admit that this ‘kulak’ and bourgeois tendency is popular in certain circles of the Comsomol.”

The lament correctly reflects how mass development of the communistic spirit among the young tarries. Respect for labor may be laid down as the most elementary attribute of Communist constructive psychology—the concept of labor not as a wearisome duty but a high privilege. The desire of every youth to become a worker and member of the proletarian family, hatred and contempt for bourgeois prosperity and individual achievements over against collective achievements are fundamental to Communist mentality—the *sine qua*

<sup>a</sup> *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, April 11, 1929.

*non.* The worker is glorified. Everything is proclaimed undertaken in his behalf. The more lowly, the more exalted and cherished is the object of solicitude. The whole world shall be remade to give all to the community of workers.

Yet striking contradictions to these ideas widely prevail. The lure of "bourgeois comfort" appears to become less and less resisted. Many Comsomol members employ their resources to get better clothes and by eating more expensively. Or they spend on women instead of loaning to the State or giving to their oppressed brethren abroad. "Wherefrom," indignantly asks their great daily paper, "come into the ranks of the Communist youth organization, the ideologists of the culture of private ownership, who in a bank book, in good clothes, and a gold watch have found the ideal of a Comsomol member and the final aim of the proletariat." Granting every member all these and more up to camera, sewing machine, and warm food the newspaper continues: "We will then have very clean, very well-fed, and very prosperous youngsters, but will they be fighters for the proletariat, for Socialism?"

Likewise bourgeois tendencies, against ruthless repression, make their way even among children, successfully resisting the cultural propaganda for "real workers in soul and in appearance." Severianova, influential woman comrade, reported to the 1929 All-Union Comsomol Congress from data collected in an investigation made among the Pioneers. They had been asked to tell who they would like to be in the future. She said, "We will see that we have not deeply enough dealt with the problem of educating the children. The majority who answered state that they do not want to be workers—they wish to be either artists,

writers, agricultural or other engineers." The Soviet engineer, hopeless tool in the hands of Soviet workers, the engineer receiving blows from above and from below, despised as an intellectual and as a remnant of the capitalist régime, his lot is still an aim of youth!

The first decade of tutelage manifestly has not created for its generation an aureole of glory around the dull existence of the worker. Though he is held before them as chief personage the young in large numbers look forward toward other vocations, better paid, and less grimy. Labor remains distasteful. The propagandist may repeat endlessly that it is a privilege yet oncoming youth tend to shun it. That the complaints are lodged against Comsomoltzy and Pioneers emphasizes their seriousness, for far less impact has been made on the youthful masses who belong to neither organization and constitute the vast majority.

The fact is the Communist Youth League as well as the Party consists of a thin line of leading reliables who sincerely believe the theory and practice of Communism and for it are willing to sacrifice their lives with enthusiasm. Most visitors to Russia necessarily limit their acquaintance to conditions in the larger cities. Having established contact with the elect convinced thoroughgoing Comsomoltzy, they receive and communicate the impression that young Communists on the whole are an enthusiastic body, free of the hesitations and doubts which torture the minds of the older generation, and that they blindly and uncompromisingly follow the path designated by the Communist leaders. But the average membership makes up the "social face" of the movement.

Any attempt approximately to estimate the proportion of "better" members might be wide of the mark.

One meets them both in larger centers and in the vil-  
lages. The leaders admit a gulf lies between the attain-  
ments of the far advanced and the immense majority.  
The most common explanation offered is that of social



*Comsomolskaia Pravda*

### THEY FEED ON CIRCULARS

The youth "find no interest" in the work of the Soviets Com-  
somol members of Soviets don't do a thing

origins. A resolution of the governing Party Central  
Committee March 24, 1929, confronted the Comsomol  
with "the most important problem—to strengthen and  
develop the enlistment of workers and poor peasant

youth, especially girls." Simultaneously the organization was flooded with applications for membership from the "class enemies"—children of intellectuals, traders, and kulaks. *Comsomolskaia Pravda* <sup>4</sup> voiced apprehension over the entire membership decreasing 32,697 the first half of 1929. A new press agitation for revision of the ranks by expelling all "extraneous elements" was begun late in 1929. The same powerful journal <sup>5</sup> directed attention to the aim of embracing in the Comsomol 100% of the proletarian youth, to the far distance from realizing it, to an actual slowing down in growth, and to a noticeable reduction of the worker element. While at large the proletarian strain declined only 1/5 of 1%, in some sections more serious falling rates were cited. In Dnepropetrovsk it fell from 62.8% to 53.6% in two and a half years; in the Shakhta northern Caucasus district from 52.9% to 48.5% in six months.

Theoretically no reasons stand out why young workers and the children of workers and of poor peasants should not enter the Comsomol and so formally establish their allegiance to the régime. They would thereby come to enjoy very considerable advantages in the way of gaining admission to high schools and universities, and to Trade Unions—thus greatly increasing working and related privileges. The tendency of the "hereditary proletarian" element in the Comsomol to remain static or to decrease may be attributed to the average young worker being either insufficiently reconciled to the Party practices or, in the language of the Party, "politically undeveloped." Yet more disquietingly to the leaders, the press continually observes

<sup>4</sup> February 13, 1930.

<sup>5</sup> December 31, 1929.

that the "extraneous dangerous influences" not only grow most rapidly in this very section of youth but that the "bourgeois influence" penetrates into the Comsol-mol from the strata of working youth.

The causes of these disappointments and fears lie deep in the soil from which human conduct springs. Clarifying representation of the outer world has yet to make an impress on Russian youth. Persistent caricaturing presents the "wicked foreign capitalist" either as a fierce, bloodthirsty oppressor and persecutor of the workers, limitless in atrocity and morbid ingenuity; or as one of a half-moribund class with feeble resistance to approaching death and annihilation at the hands of the "victorious proletariat." Latterly the foreign capitalist has been acquiring a third visage—that of a very clever technical organizer—out of the leaders' concession they could learn much from the "disintegrating capitalism."

Uncompromising hate toward a person or a class necessarily involves real knowledge and understanding of the hated. The Russian younger generation do not and cannot have a hatred of foreign "capitalists" realistic enough to motivate fighting their system to the death. The youth develop mentally under conditions of isolation. No foreign newspaper except the Communist papers, no foreign books, no foreign magazines reach them. Whatever can be learned of life beyond the frontiers comes through the distorting lens of the Communist censorship. This partly explains the almost zoölogical interest of the youth in any visitor whose dress identifies him as a foreigner. Strangers usually take this attitude for friendliness. Actually there is in it much acute curiosity. The young folks especially in the provincial towns look on foreigners about as

they would observe rare specimens of fauna from remote countries instead of enemies to be beaten down and despoiled.

Similarly disappointments have followed laborious effort to impart the active sense of international proletarian solidarity. Testings have found these youth on a wide scale cold toward the world-wide obligations of working-class unity. Newspaper editorials and official resolutions voice solidarity, while at heart and in practice young Russians think little of their fellow workers in other lands. They and not the youth alone look upon the foreign bourgeoisie with more respect, hope, and interest than upon the workers of foreign lands. This regard reflects in part the age-old Russian mass mentality of an oppressed and underprivileged people seeing in free and prosperous foreigners beings ranking above themselves, since neither the state of freedom nor of material well-being has appreciably changed for the better. The average young Russian, and in particular a Comsomol member, will comply with form in denouncing foreign bourgeoisie as enemies while inwardly he looks upon them admiringly as favored if not superior. In many cases the feeling cannot be concealed. Youth pays tribute to the strong.

Visiting workers from abroad excite a contrasting emotion in the same observers. They are regarded with sympathy and some condescension—"poor sufferers under the tyranny of capitalism." Responsibility for this mood rests somewhat on the Soviet leaders whose daily utterances patronize foreign workers, while the bourgeoisie on whom they spit in public remain their hope for credits, concessions, and techniques. The



newspapers editorially daily drench with hatred the "exploiting capitalists" but the news columns brim with commendation of the technical achievements of capitalistic industry. The young readers of this day upon day praise conclude "after all these imperialists are clever people."


The foreign proletarian brethren on the other hand have come to be thought about as objects for recurring relief, unsated beneficiaries from their slender and overburdened wages. As contributors they expect some achievements to correspond. Unfortunately for protégé prestige the Soviet leaders have been able to cite few successes of the foreign workers aided in their struggles. Rather the recent years registered one failure of Communist foreign aggression after another. Thwarted thus zeal flags and interest aroused in the "oppressed brethren" turns to depreciation. Many meetings of Comsomoltzy and other youth, convoked to promote fresh contributions in behalf of the "Chinese oppressed masses," British miners, "striking Americans," or "terrorized Roumanian brothers" display open dissatisfaction and impatience. Speakers declare they are tired of depriving themselves of daily necessities to invest their funds in the distant futures of world revolution. The leaders quickly suppress such outbursts but not with excessive conviction. By as much therefore as the world event tarries, and more giving rather than receiving of the promised blessings continues to be the Russian rôle, growth of international proletarian solidarity languishes among the youth though Party leaders deplore it and multiply resolutions.

However feebly awareness of proletarian solidarity

across boundaries registers with Soviet youth, another emotion increasingly possesses them. Although labeled the Socialist Fatherland Russia signifies to them their national Fatherland. At the time of the 1920 Russian-Polish War they flamed with nationalistic feeling. Their war cries rang out not against the imperialists but the Poles. The famous ultimatum of Lord Curzon, three years later, aroused their passion against Great Britain as the century-old enemy of Russia rather than as the foe of the workers' republic. Likewise the animus of their towering demonstrations for decisive action against the Chinese in 1929 was not revolutionary. China was not an imperialistic country, nor were the Chinese acting imperialistically. They were foreigners daring to interfere with Russian rights.

No nation is rearing the leading element in its young generation more chauvinistically, more bent to militarism and responsive to it. Fighting is the emotional breath of life to Communism in its early stages. Its everyday language is of battle. It envisions war within and without. No peace move abroad but receives the interpretation of another capitalistic ruse against the Soviet Union. Press and platform ever stress the unavoidability of war with foreign countries, Russia always the party to be attacked. The state of mind of a hunted beast is being created: the expectancy of attack at any moment. Experience teaches there is but a step from this position to that of offense as the best defensive measure.

Militaristic education widely envelops Soviet youth and they answer to its appeal. Pioneer camps, high schools, and universities make military training obligatory. Military discipline saturates much of the apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship throughout,



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influencing profoundly the mentality of youth, especially in the cities. The novel idea of a factory "adopting" a service unit has been extended to pledging enough young men to fill up that unit continuously. The League of Communist Youth "adopted" the entire Red Navy. Most of the bluejackets are Comsomoltzy and the organization engages to cover the complete conscription quota for the fleet and its auxiliaries. At each Comsomol Convention an elected delegation from the Navy makes a ceremonial report with solemnity similar to that given the Commander-in-Chief at the annual review.

Enforced military service considered a misfortune before the Revolution has been surrounded with conditions far better than in the Czarist Army, gaining a distinction that tinges with disappointment many who do not gain the privilege. If constantly preparing for war generates demand for war, then danger to the world's peace flourishes here. Soviet leaders consider the militaristic psychology highly useful. Whether they purpose to keep it within peaceful constructive limits will have later consideration. Whether they will be able to do so time must answer.

Communism seeks politically and culturally to break down racial antagonism. Young Russia has been reared under the State policy of proclaiming the equality of all nationalities inhabiting the vast territories of the former Empire on the principle that there is no such thing as a racial enemy but only a class enemy. Signs of diminishing racial and national prejudices have been more in evidence among the adult population than among the youth, accounted for in part probably by compulsory methods in this domain influencing the

conduct of adults through fear more than that of the young.

Certainly anti-Semitism raises its head among Communist youth more than among the adult Party members. Instances of its activity abound in the columns of the young people's press comprehending persecutions, killings, injuries to Jews in factories, State institutions, universities, schools, and elsewhere. The town of Pskov furnished one spectacular example, where Trofimov, Gentile Comsomol member, murdered Bolshemennikov, a Jewish fellow member, openly declaring on trial that he committed the crime from hatred of the Jews as usurpers of Russia and that he would not hesitate about a second murder of the same kind. If within these select ranks anti-Semitism survives where it is considered unforgivable sin, and persecutions of Jews often in violent forms take place in factories at the hands of proletarians, while Party and Comsomol members either actively assist or passively observe the perpetrators, its wide prevalence among the non-Party youth circles may be safely assumed. Similarly the assumption of Great Russian superiority over Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, and other non-Russian minorities has not abated appreciably, and youth carries highest the banner of racial pride and intolerance.

Russian youth's reaction to idealism by whatever name advanced illustrates a Communist lesson too well taught. Communism ultra-materialistic fights desperately against all tendencies of the opposing school of idealistic thought, scorns all idealistic principles, and caricatures as worse than fools the idealistically minded Russian intelligentsia of the end of the Nineteenth Century and the beginning of the Twentieth. Constantly

taught that economic forces underlying each event account for everything in life, the youth embrace the doctrine in the form of contempt for all idealism. The theory of historical materialism for all but the elect translates into utter utilitarianism and the uselessness of self-sacrifice. The many when appealed to for socialistic sacrifices answer: "We are materialists who have forsworn idealistic efforts."

The problems of thrift versus prodigality and the accumulation of personal wealth have been aggravated by this unspiritual fruit of materialism until to the leaders it looms as a potential danger. The adult population in general earns barely an existence minimum, but gainfully employed young people have margins. According to the labor legislation they receive their wages in person and under Soviet social conditions any parental attempt to impose conditions on the spending of this money arrives nowhere. With parents ruled out of court, some instructions on spending are naturally expected from the Party or the State. Consequently the youth papers wisely and frequently discuss the subject.

In the destructive period of the régime there was an easy solution. Did not the State provide for all necessities of every validated citizen, and on the principle of universal equality? Accordingly private accumulation, betraying petty bourgeois psychology tending to build up individual wealth as counterposed to the collective wealth of the State, was tantamount to counter-revolutionary crime. The situation changed with the advent of the constructive period. The Government launching internal loans and opening savings accounts made thrift by fiat an outstanding virtue in matters State and social. The press and official propagandists

changed front with remarkable dexterity and speed. Newspapers, which only a few months before had fulminated against the bourgeois vice, entered upon a country-wide campaign to encourage savings and accumulation with no less energy and insistence. Leading organs published the names of those first to buy bonds, lauding the example of proletarian consciousness. A network of savings departments in banks and postoffices soon covered the whole country. The vigor so usual in any Soviet campaign did not fail to bring early results, but among the youth these fell short of the objective. The younger generation passed by Government bond sales and savings accounts to buy better clothes, such inexpensive jewelry as Russia furnished, and theater, movie, and dance tickets. Sales of perfumes and cosmetics considerably increased.

The moralists and financiers of Communism both quickly took account of the new "danger." The natural allies of a government in the situation would have been parents irrespective of class allegiance who regarded with much displeasure the extravagant tendencies of the youth, but to resort to parents before they were communized would be against the sacred tenet and observance of the Party. Therefore the old fetish, collectivity, was put on display with renewed energy. It was fervently announced that saving and thrift habits in themselves are not counter-revolutionary in Communist society. The counter-revolutionary petty bourgeois element menaces at the moment when one resorts to spending money. Acquiring objects of luxury and outlays of money on dances, expensive clothes, and especially patent leather shoes were denounced as anti-proletarian, counter-revolutionary, and dangerous for the future of socialistic society. Money saved should be

lent to the State for use in further industrialization. This was the orthodox recipe for the younger generation. The Comsomol with great clamor expelled several members who expended "in a wrong way." Workers' clubs and similar institutions received instruc-



*Comsomolskaia Pravda.*

"Rudeness of speech and gluttony!  
When he laughs it sounds as a neigh.  
His stubbornness truly is that of a horse,  
In every inch of him a brute is manifest."  
—Heine.

tions to eliminate dances from evening performances and to substitute for them something more useful for the Socialist Fatherland. The victors in this fight still in full swing have yet to be decided, but Government and Party prompted by powerful financial and political



considerations will apply all the power of their combined machinery to combat the new "petty bourgeois peril."

Certain other intellectual and moral consequences flow from the "proletarian culture" of the young. The Comsomol breeds a new youth aristocracy with characteristic traits. Just as the children of the Czarist ruling caste knew they were to govern the vast country when the older generation passed on, so the chosen Comsomoltzy consider their future charted. The others will execute their commands. The usual results of such preëlection have appeared already. The members, enjoying special privileges in gaining the otherwise difficult admission to the universities, tend to show inferior academic progress. Odessa University published in May, 1929, a study showing the Comsomol and Party students academically behind the others. In its Chemical-Pharmaceutical Institute only 36% of the Comsomoltzy and 18% of the Communists passed the examinations.

The Comsomol member realizes he need not overburden himself with study. Since the technical work under him as director of some factory will be done by his non-Party assistants, a general idea of the industry or business suffices. In an earlier period functions required to be performed by students under Party and Comsomol discipline sharply interfered with academic progress. In recent years the studying Communist youth have been relieved of most such obligations and are without that alibi. Complete assurance that they will have people to do the hard work for them explains much of a continuing low scholastic ambition.

This Comsomol high caste tends to exercise its domi-

nance prematurely. The press contains many protests of older workers against the Comsomol members in the factories. They complain that the Communist youth engage actively in propaganda and social activities but shirk standing at the machine. They arrive first on any job of inspection or reorganization which involves the instruction of others. The organized "Light Cavalry" movement, recruited entirely from Comsomoltzy and aiming at a higher efficiency of labor in the factories and institutions, met strong resentment by the rank and file workers, including many adult Party members.

In a plant they have been able actually to interfere with the orders of the Chief Engineer if the latter be not a Party member, and very often the higher-up management of the Trusts will give more weight to their testimony than to that of an old non-Party engineer long responsible in the factory. They have admission to some Party meetings. With few possessed of sufficient self-restraint to keep within the appointed limits, the many not seldom acquit themselves in the eyes of mature Party members as nuisances.

These youth are scarcely to be blamed for their defects. Young and irresponsible boys and girls by force of circumstances have been placed where they enjoy powers and privileges beyond youthful dreams in other nations, especially in the small towns and villages where the Comsomol members are undisputed bosses of their mates who do not belong to the League. A Comsomol member reporting to the present system of Police Administration that a given boy companion has spoken irreverently of the Soviet régime, or otherwise displayed a counter-revolutionary state of mind, procures the victim's discharge from any position he may

have, usually without investigation, and sometimes subjects him to more severe penalties. The Comsomol local, meeting secretly and behind closed doors, practically decides the fate of other young people.

Self-consciousness mounting into arrogance, not only toward the non-Party inferiors but also toward senior Party members, grows inevitably out of the Communist educational strategy which sets the youth over against the older population, creates antagonism between children and parents, and persuades the young that their task is to remold the mind of the Russian people along with the economic and social system.

Petrovsky, President of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Associate President of the Soviet Union, and one of the most prominent Party leaders has resorted to public print on this turn of affairs. Recognizing that Karl Marx had said it was well sometimes for an elder to learn from the children, Petrovsky writes: "but this refers to an entirely different thing from such a pass that the members of the Comsomol shall assume the pose of educating the older generation. A certain balance needs to be kept. Children may talk frankly with their father and mother and with the older people but they cannot teach them because, if we should indulge them in such procedure, consider the uselessness of all the life and experiences of the old revolutionaries who must transmit their experience and knowledge to the younger generation. Simply imagine what our revolutionary Communist family will be like if children act in it the rôle of revolutionaries." The leading young Communist organ promptly declared him completely wrong and upheld the right of youth to teach the older generation and to point out their mistakes.

To present understandingly the Party moral standards for a model Comsomol member offers difficulties. The idea of drafting a code for governance of the private and social life of a young Communist has been advanced by Yaroslavsky, acknowledged authority on Communist ethics. Writing in *Comsomolskaia Pravda*,<sup>o</sup> he commends as worthy of the most serious attention a section on conduct in the constitution of an electrical factory commune. From this, he first quotes some provisions that demand of a Communist being the foremost promoter of production and the socialistic forms of labor organization; taking the most active part in social work; aiming to establish among the members of the commune comradely relations based upon understanding, respect, and confidence, mutual help in production, social work, and study; and engaging actively in propagandizing the substance and forms of the new life.

Following the social mandates in the code cited are three rules bearing on personal habits:

"The Commune forbids casual sexual relations between Communists as well as sexual laxity, and considers that the only possible solution of the sexual problem is a long term marriage for love based on the community of class interests.

"Within the Commune as well as outside of it, Communists do not drink any alcoholic beverages.

"Believing in healthy life Communists frown on smoking although they do not forbid it."

Having earlier pointed out that "with the class war in full swing . . . the so-called Communist-Comsol ethic cannot be expressed in definite statutes," Yaroslavsky reverts in the article to the thesis that

<sup>o</sup> March 23, 1930.

“ethical requirements cannot be separated from the requirements of class war” and “must be entirely subjected to the aims of the class war and Socialist construction.” He then gives his phrasing of what may be called the Communist Golden Rule which has back of it the authority of Lenin: “Anything which helps the victory of Communism and advances Socialist construction, anything which attracts to Communism masses of workers and toiling peasants is ethical.” The interests of Communism then form the final moral criterion of young Communist conduct. Personal friendship, honesty, loyalty do not merit mention. Yaroslavsky explicitly states that striving for self-betterment along lines of individual perfection cannot bring a solution of the ethical problem in the Communist régime. No act of violence more patently displays the reality of the Communist consciousness of being at war. The “ethics of Communism” are those of war as commonly understood and practiced.

In practice the new culture respecting relations between man and woman has worked revolutionary changes in the sex life of Russian youth. The prevailing attitude and tone in the Party and in the Communist Youth League, which regard lightly the family and family life, lend themselves to irregular sexual intercourse. Comsomol members generally treat “family happiness” with derision. Divorces often follow marriages between them immediately, if they care at all to register their union at the nearest magistracy. Denunciatory stories of some prominent Comsomol members betraying girls, many of whom are members also, occupy columns of the Soviet youth press. Among non-Party youth marriages have not decreased considerably, indicating that the “chains of mar-

riage" idea has not gained much ground in that territory.

The sex attitude of the girls varies. Some fear entering into marriage as their own Comsomol comrades then consider them less free and less useful for political work. Such intentionally dress shabbily, suppress in themselves the feminine traits, and try to appear sexless. This in turn repels the young men who reproach them with not being feminine and having no charm. "We should not mix social work with powder and lipstick," remonstrated a working girl at a factory meeting in Moscow, "but why then very often does the same guy who preaches this theory to us look with admiration at a well-dressed girl and, pointing to her, say to me 'here is the right girl, she is much better dressed than you.' Where is our young man friend and comrade?" Others go to the opposite extreme, ready to live with any man to show they are utterly indifferent to "bourgeois morality."

Several studies in the sex relations of students took place in the year 1927-1928, when within the Party alarm had been sounded over the results from the sexual anarchy that followed the proclamation of Communist principles in the quarters where they had acceptance. *Pravda*<sup>1</sup> reported a somewhat lengthy speech by Yaroslavsky, to the Central Executive Committee on "Party Etiquette" in 1924. He regarded sexual family relations as presenting some of the most difficult questions they had to face. He fled from "priestly morality" to physiological and Party valuations. He found the figures for abortions compared with the pre-revolutionary number "interesting" and "terrible." In 1900 these constituted 8% of the mater-

<sup>1</sup> October 9, 1924.

nity hospital cases, but had risen to 18.2% in 1919 (following wide legalization of the operation) and to 30% in 1922. He justified the wide practice for adults but continued "there are figures . . . which cannot be passed over in silence. They show that even young girls resort to abortion. . . . It would be hypocrisy for our Party to gloss over these facts . . . when we have the task of creating a healthy Communist generation."

The sex life statistics three to four years later were uniformly commented upon as showing a recession of the wave of promiscuity. In Odessa University 25.6% had sex experience before sixteen years of age.<sup>8</sup> *Izvestia*<sup>9</sup> quoted "some very carefully worked-out figures "that showed only 2% of the students committed to free love." The sexual life of 48% of the female students and 13% of the males questioned in that study began with a "constant comrade." One-half of the males had begun by the age of seventeen. The investigator in the Second State University of Moscow found "the sexual chaos which existed in our educational institutions at an end. . . . Only 20% stand for casual temporary connections." Thirty-four per cent were having no such relations.<sup>10</sup>

An investigation of drinking among the 2530 workmen in a Leningrad machine plant which may be assumed as typical, by reason of its selection, showed 10% total abstainers, 22% imbibing "only here and there," the rest moderate drinkers or "decided alcoholics." No difference between Party men and the others appeared. Among the young under twenty the abstainers were 28%, among the Comsomoltzy 22%.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Lass: *The Contemporary Students*, 1928.

<sup>9</sup> February 11, 1928.

<sup>10</sup> *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, February 11, 1928.

<sup>11</sup> *Red Gazette*, November 6, 1928.

A contributor to the Communist Youth League monthly<sup>12</sup> classifying criminals by social and age groups, commented on the crime increase, and attacked participation in it from Comsomol ranks. During 1927 criminals under 18 years of age numbered 27,108. There were 117,379 between 18 and 25. People under 25 years of age committed 144,487 crimes or 40.4%. Of 334 offenses against the Revolution, youth committed only 59; of the crimes against official or private employers, 3,381 out of 16,175 or 20.9%; against economic rights, 368 of 4,921; against the rights of ownership, 37,333 out of 74,319; administrative crimes, 76,297 out of 190,509. The largest pro rata of crimes by youth were in the forms of ruffian conduct denoted by "hooliganism" (59.6%) and against sex (71.8%). During the first half of 1927 there were 56,593 cases of "hooliganism." Of this number, 33,400 of the offenders were under 25. In 100 of the cases the investigator learned the most frequent chief cause to be the absence of any rational way of spending leisure time.

The writer exhorted: "We dare not remain indifferent to such figures—144,487 criminals during half a year, of which number 5,077 are Comsomoltzy. We must keep in mind also that crimes among the Comsomoltzy are increasing. . . . During the whole year 1926 the number was 6,364; and during the first half of 1927 it had reached 5,077. . . . We cannot pass over the fact that the percentage of criminal Comsomoltzy to the total number of criminals is greater than the percentage of the Comsomoltzy to the whole number of non-Party youth. Up to the present time the Comsomol has paid little attention to crime among its ranks. . . . The Comsomol is an army building up a

<sup>12</sup> *Young Communist*, June, 1928.



new life. We must hold this constantly in mind. All the traitors, all the slothful elements must be expelled, 5,000 criminals are 5,000 traitors!"

*Izvestia*<sup>18</sup> printed the findings of a serious study of older young people in general made from material collected during many years of observation by Zalkind as a clinical student, educator, and lecturer of high standing on social and biological themes. The cases would have had the impact of the Communist Revolution on them from pre-adolescence. They exhibit the confusing cross currents of life in Soviet Russia, the ultimate direction and sweep of which no man knows.

The young women produced on Zalkind the impression of the greater vigor. Appreciation of their new freedom differed among the various social groups of young women. Representatives of the intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie emphasized the personal element of freedom, more especially in the matter of sex. The working women spoke more of economic emancipation.

Together with social optimism were traces of depression. As one woman expressed it: "The Revolution has given such a tremendous impetus to brain work, it has stirred up so many new forces, but how and where shall we apply it all? The personnel is always being reduced; there is no work and of course we women are the first to be sent away. We are more cheerful than we really should be, undernourished as we are, but the question is how long will our strength last? After all the body is stronger than the soul."

The responses of the young men reflected conditions more varied, complicated, acute, and impassioned. One

<sup>18</sup> November 1, 1927.

outburst read: "If the Revolution has really given us a start we should fulfill it to the end. . . . Let all our generation perish, damn us, but the Revolution dare not go backwards. . . . I am for those who want to explode, to enforce, to shake up. Quicker, brighter, more daring. Otherwise what is the use of 'October?'"

The analysis revealed young workmen reacting painfully against the "social fat." As one put it, in the days when Nepmen more nearly flourished: "The crowd of the swells seems to grow pretty large. And our elders, do not they also catch the contagion of swell clothes and fine goods?" Another shared a jealous care for class ideals: "I do not mind that our leader has a good overcoat but I must feel sure that he is as courageous, as honest as ever."

This one senses a kindred weakness among youth: "Does not it seem to you that some of our young ones should be held somewhat in check? Do not they get a little too fine as far as clothes and women and professional ambitions are concerned? The older ones are safe, they have had their schooling, they are tested out but we, the young ones, without any past we'll just rot like nothing."

A student wrote to his professor: "The feeling of comradeship is much stronger and deeper than it used to be in your times. The fellowship is simpler, easier. . . . We are more openhearted. It is easier to accept help when we can give it ourselves." That's why we feel free with you, the professors, because we are a strong body, we are close to each other."

Economic complaints registered in great numbers. The letter last quoted continued: "Now if only we were not undernourished, if only we were not always physically weak and tired. What would we not have done in

our studies and social work? The trouble is we are cold and hungry."


Some of the students of the working and peasant class still had doubts as to their intellectual fitness for the tremendous scientific requirements of modern Soviet life—expressed only by a few.

Six witnessed to the acute "moral and ideological crisis" which the youth of the former intelligentsia experience, typified by this baring of the soul which Zalkind recognized expressed neither animosity nor desire of revenge but the sense of being lost, of terror, suffering, seeking help.

"It hurts to watch the lively jolly crowd of the Comsomol. They believe everything that happens here is their own, is real and I am a foreigner to them. And I am far from them, not only because they do not trust me but because I do not trust them. I do not believe in their cause and in general do not believe in anything. My mainspring is broken, that which gives a sense of life. At home among my own people I am also a foreigner. I am even farther from them than I am from the other young people. At home it is such a mean bluntness, such stinking rubbish—"God," "Czar," "Jew"—you hear nothing else. We must escape from it. But where to? Help us to understand—no, not to understand—to feel that which is the main thing. We are numerous you know, much more numerous than you think. I am only twenty years old. Is it really the end?"

The surveying expert thought another youth gave food for thought in this comparison of fathers and sons: "It is not the sons who are better than the fathers, who are more progressive. The parents are in advance, are better, loftier than the children. The

fathers are old revolutionaries, tried out by prisons, real fighters, creators of the Revolution, devoted to the



*Comsomolskaia Pravda.*

“WHITHER DOES THE UNKNOWN FORCE DRAG ME?”

The influence of the street, of the movies, and of an obnoxious book often erases all the education received in the school.

cause, ready for any sacrifice. We, the youngsters, have stepped into their shoes. We have found everything ready. We are spoiled. We find everything tame.

The parents were taken up with their work. They had no time for us, and so here we are without any ideals, without aspirations, without courage. At least some of us realize it, as I do. But the others?"

The investigator himself epitomized the situation as youth going through great mutations as opposing influences contended for supremacy over them. But he saw developing revolution gradually bringing out the new, the strong, the militant, the healthy element sweeping aside "the rotten remainders of yesterday." He exulted: "Long live Soviet youth!"

Some time, somewhere, and in some way earnest brains and willing hands must be prepared in large numbers for the real leadership of this great people. The best minds of the former days have been destroyed or isolated or grown passé, and all of them are on the way to extinction.

The first new relays of technicians on the whole have disappointed the master class at the point of an expected subserviency. Few of them are really trusted and already the decision has been reached in the Party to place reliance solely on recruits from communized proletarian ranks. Under this dispensation every engineer and technician must be a sympathizer. The newspaper *For Industrialization*<sup>14</sup> declared "the former 'non-Party' neutral attitude of technicians . . . impossible and unbearable." Seeming impasses surround the situation and the Communist cause in Russia may be lost in this territory.

This sifting process at the entrance of the higher educational institutions will tend to an almost 100% Communist enrollment. Future admission then will

<sup>14</sup> February 13, 1930.

become difficult even to non-Party workers. It may help the leaders to attract young workers into the Comsomol more than propaganda methods. Non-Party peasant youth will fare no better than non-Party workers in gaining admittance under stiffened regulations and probably will be more suspect. The admission privilege still granted to children of university professors and instructors will not change the general picture materially since they embrace but a very small portion of youth among the intelligentsia.

The sheer numbers involved would give the prudentially minded a commanding reason to deliberate, without any "social origin" or "loyalty" tests complicating matters on the personnel "front." On October 1, 1929,<sup>15</sup> the industries of the Soviet Union had 24,160 engineers—graduates of technical colleges—and 27,556 graduates of technical high schools styled technicians. In addition 48,575 "practical engineers and technicians" were available—without any college or high school education but appointed by the Government to fill in. Inclusive of the corresponding personnel in research institutions, building construction, forestry, and the agro-industrial group, the aggregate of specialists in the National Economy totaled 120,078 of whom 53,395 were of the "practical" category. The Five Year Plan demands for industry alone 176,278 more engineers and 258,916 technicians—approximately 440,000 youth to be prepared as experts within three and a half years. And agriculture looks for 79,000 additional graduate specialists and 367,000 technicians.

Party members constituted 16.8% of the engineers and technicians in 1929. Analyzed they made up only 5% of the graduate engineers, 13.7% from the techni-

<sup>15</sup> *Pravda*, May 11 and 13, 1930.

cal high schools, and 27.7% of the "practical engineers." The proletarian class furnished 7.1% of graduate engineers, 30.8% of the technicians, and 58% of the "practical" group.

After "cleanings" conducted over a period of years, more than half of the student body in the R. S. F. S. R. consisted of non-proletarians. The following table displays its social composition and Party affiliation in 1928-1929:

<i>Workers and their children</i>	<i>Peasants and their children</i>	<i>Employees and Unclassified</i>
40.9	16.9	42.2
<i>Members of Communist Party</i>	<i>Members of the Comsomol</i>	<i>Non-Party</i>
26.6	17.9	55.5

The prospect is further clouded by the low academic progress of the proletarian students. "The catastrophic percentage of students spending two years on the same term among the less prepared and less materially furnished proletarian group" attracted the attention of the newspaper *Economic Life*.<sup>16</sup> An article comments also on the percentage of students deserting the colleges, ranging from 5.5 to 17.6. It recognizes that desertions as a rule are from the proletarian group, illustrated by the proletarian group in the Moscow Institute of Engineers of Transportation in 1928-1929 which represented about 60% of the matriculants and furnished all the deserting students. The leaders expect to supplement the technical college output by out-of-school methods—education by radio and cinema, correspondence courses, and special school-factories where work will be combined with some theoretical education.

<sup>16</sup> January 5, 1930.

That these short-cut methods will yield many specialists of the requisite quality is not to be expected.

According to the preëminent authority in Soviet Russia on the organization of scientific forces, Lapirov-Skoblo,<sup>17</sup> outlook for leadership in that area gives no greater measure of promise than in the technical field, and, if the end of the day be considered, success or failure there is likely to be the more determining. This writer placed the total number of scientific experts in the Soviet Union on October 1, 1929, at 24,500. Of these 5500 worked in the exact sciences. Analyzing further, 1572 or 10.7% were doing research in the industrial and technical sciences, and 818 or 5.5% in agriculture. A fraction more than one-half of those in the R. S. F. S. R. up to 1928 began their scientific work before 1918. The small number of Communist scientific workers growing very slowly gave alarm. They constituted 7 to 8% of the total number and two-thirds of them were in the humanitarian sciences, 15% in the medical line, and about 9% and 8% in the exact and applied sciences, respectively.

Of 2368 young research workers in the R. S. F. S. R. May 1, 1929, only 143 were in the industrial and technical sciences and 336 in agriculture. October 10, 1929, was the last day for submitting applications for the posts of scientific assistants that academic year in the universities and scientific institutions of the R.S.F.S.R. The vacancies in the industrial and technical sciences numbered 150, the applications for the places 55. In the agricultural sciences there were 195 vacancies and 103 applicants. Whether or not these facts indicate the disposition of the young Communist generation not to avail themselves of the opportunities for research

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, November 21, 1929.



and other hard intellectual work essential in real leadership, the result must be a continuing dearth of scientists. Parallel with the shortage of Communist recruits, social origin bars out the large number who might qualify to use the opportunities, and be ambitious to do so.

The students who secure entrance and address themselves earnestly to a thorough scientific preparation for life service find themselves in heavily handicapped institutions. The twelve years of almost complete isolation from the outside world have resulted in Russian scientists and professionals becoming sadly in arrears on technical knowledge. For political reasons they severed associations with foreign scientists, did not attend international scientific conferences, and were deprived of foreign scientific literature. This state has been corrected only in small part. The supply of foreign scientific literature continues nearly negligible. Fifty-two research institutes of the Ukrainian Republic each received permission for the importation of scientific literature from abroad in the sum of ten rubles as late as 1929. "Actually it means," states a *Pravda*<sup>18</sup> article, "that scores of professors and their assistants will have for the whole year of research work one foreign scientific book. Evidently our research institutions cannot last long on such a 'scientific diet.'"

The human wastage from the policy of excluding millions of the nation's youth from the larger opportunities is at once beyond computation and irredeemable. Children of the intellectuals, private traders, and "liquidated" peasants see in their parents what they can expect from life. Bitterness and suspicion

<sup>18</sup> November 28, 1929.

toward the Party and the Comsomol youth result. Many and probably the less miserable ones philosophically accept the fact of being always second-class citizens. The more ambitious feel themselves imprisoned. This accounts for the numerous suicides among them and for numerous attempts to conceal their origin and join fraudulently the ranks of privilege to obtain a chance at life.

Numerically peasant youth form the largest group of the handicapped. Collectivization has made their condition much more acute. Theoretically "the Comsomol in the village embraces young hired laborers, poor peasants, and the better part of the middle peasants who are willing to join the collectives and work to strengthen them."<sup>19</sup> But the ardor of the collectivization fight left outside the pale almost all who did not extol the collectivization system and join it unhesitatingly. The local interpretation of kulak generally proves much more sweeping than the letter of the mandate from the center. This in practice multiplies the underprivileged. When struggle against the "right danger" is pronounced "the paramount task of the Party," not many Comsomol organizations will be found lenient and hospitable to the kulak children. One writer in the great daily youth organ has denounced as "right heresy" the theory of reëducating the young kulaks within the Comsomol. He disapproves of "unnecessary cruelty toward kulak children of pre-school and school age," but entrusts the Comsomol with furthering the process of disintegrating the kulak family and creating and deepening the enmity between the younger and older generations of recalcitrant peasants.

<sup>19</sup> *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, April 5, 1930.

Much alleviation in the social situation of the majority of peasant youth does not appear an early prospect. One sees the same vicious circle. That a child born of kulak family is bound to become an enemy of socialistic ideas is quite untenable, but that an isolated persecuted child will acquire this enmity very early is beyond question. The prescribed course therefore insures a new generation of enemies. If the older kulak generation should submit to the policy of its "extermination as a class," the younger people can be depended upon to show desperate resistance. The leaders admit that the young kulaks very often are the "most active enemies" and "counter-revolutionary agitators," but they reckon upon early success in the collectivization movement helping them to master the situation.

The youth product of Communism to date in Russia breaks into two camps. One, the huge non-Party mass, formless and leaderless, presents the semblance of a human herd, its individuals submissive or sullen, aimless or wistful. Outside the Party they have no future. Whether ineligibility or unwillingness keeps them out the predicament is the same. With few exceptions their chagrins and doubts go unresolved. In this plight millions of the world's most unfortunate youth spend their days that lengthen into years. They cannot leave Russia. They do not even know there may be another social system, which if instituted would be more friendly to their aspirations, and in larger opportunities yield them some measure of happiness.

On the other group, relatively small, hangs the fate of Russia and of other nations. They occupy much the anxious thoughts of the ruling Communists who have travailed to bring forth after their own kind. This young set will take over from the elders power and

responsibility with no hostility for the régime. Nurtured by it, they consider it normal and good as air, light, and trees. Yet in the eyes of the "old guard" they have fearsome limitations. Doctrinally they are less fortified than the present Party leaders. Life's hard



*Z. Posh/29.*  
Comsomolskaia Pravda.

### UNINVITED VISITORS

Active Comsol Member: "Drop in some other time, comrades (Marx and Engels). We are too busy now with practical work."

lessons are before them. Practical experience with the embittering Czarist régime has not forged their wills into Communist steel. They do not burn with the flaming hatred of the world outside that impelled and impels the Communist seniors to struggle. Kept in

isolation from the non-Soviet world, compromise with it may be easier. Staggering handicaps and gruelling difficulties will beset them as they do the present leaders. Concession except as temporary political expedient is sin against Marx and Engels. Judged by their present mood the younger ones as adults will care much less for Marx and Engels. To administer efficiently their inheritance may appear to them to demand deviation from orthodox Marxian ways. During the Party-wide fight against the "right danger" much attention was directed to what the Communist chiefs termed the abnormal growth of "practicism" in the attitude of the Comsomol members, many of whom went so far as to advocate sacrificing the theoretical future of the workers' movement to the actual practical requirements of the present day.

"Can successors so untried be entrusted with the future," the veterans ask dubiously. The absence of any alternative yields little peace or comfort. So fears afflict the "best minds" of Russian Communism. By the same tokens, those who see in Communist Russia the most portentous social experiment in history watch, as they that wait for the morning, the way this youthful body takes.

CHAPTER IX  
THE RED EMPIRE

*“The Communist Party recognizes that the nations have the right to self-determination even up to the point of secession; but it considers that the working majority of the nation and not the bourgeoisie (class) embodies the will of the nation. . . .*

*“ . . . What is to happen to nations which not only have no proletariat, but have not even a bourgeoisie, or if they have it, have it only in an immature form? Consider, for example, the Tunguses, the Kal-mucks, or the Buriats, who inhabit Russian territory. What is to be done if these nations demand complete separation from the great civilized nations? Still more, what is to be done if they wish to secede from nations which have realized Socialism? Surely to permit such secessions would be to strengthen barbarism at the expense of civilization?*

*“We are of opinion that when Socialism has been realized in the more advanced countries of the world, the backward and semi-savage peoples will be perfectly willing to join the general alliance of the peoples. . . .*

*“The Communist Party, therefore, wishing to put an end forever to all forms of national oppression and national inequality, voices the demand for the national right of self-determination.*

*“The proletariat of all lands will avail itself of this right, first of all in order to destroy nationalism, and secondly in order to form a voluntary federative league.*

*“When this federative league proves incompetent to establish a world-wide economic system, and when the great majority has been convinced of its inadequacy by actual experience, the time will have come for the creation of one world-wide Socialist republic.”<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> *The ABC of Communism*, pp. 206-207.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE RED EMPIRE

THE Communist doctrine of nationality and the bearings of it on international relations and policies, to the "alien minded," appear on first sight to lack that quality of singularly direct and open action which characterizes the program of Communism in general. A given line of procedure seems flatly to contradict or neutralize others. The same leadership denounces pacifism and all its works, that, in the Preparatory Conference on Disarmament of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1927, proposed universal and full disarmament. And the same exponents of peace at that price and by that road (the only road, they contend) simultaneously increase their own armed strength, and aggressively pursue a course of international conduct, the most provocative of ill feeling and reprisal in contemporary life. A central point of their foreign policy, for example, is the incitement of the workers in every non-Soviet country to organize, arm, and overthrow its existing government. The pledge of assistance is given by way of encouragement.

The Third International, on the tenth anniversary of the Russian Communist Revolution, in its draft<sup>2</sup> of the plan for celebrating and capitalizing the occasion, expounded an underlying philosophy which helps

<sup>2</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 7, No. 59, October 20, 1927.



to harmonize the surface contradictions. It branded as "nonsense" consideration of the "conflict of the Soviet Union with Great Britain" as a carry-over of the Czarist and British imperialistic conflicts. As "an instrument for the defense and the emancipation of the international proletariat," the Soviet Union, it is explained, has lost its national character and taken on an international character. The reasoning proceeds from this fact, or claim, to give the Soviet Union a status in another State different from any that a "capitalistic" State can maintain in the same State. Here is illustrated perfectly the curious Communist psychology which makes meat for one poison for another. Comparisons are termed "idiotic" which set over against one another the Red Terror and the White; the Red Army and the armies of Imperialism; the use of revolutionary force and that of reaction; bourgeois police and the O. G. P. U. "Class content" thus renders them good or evil, to determine which, the question must be put: "In whose favor and against whom function the police, the army, the terror, the dictatorship, the democracy?"

Whether these instruments are in the hands of the bourgeoisie, who employ them against the working class, or in the hands of the working class, which employs them against the international bourgeoisie, renders them vicious or beneficent. "The Red Army," it is maintained, "is the army of the international proletariat, the O. G. P. U. the police of the proletariat, etc. Nothing is Russian in the Soviet Union in the 'national' meaning of the word, everything is proletarian, that means international." Therefore, the argument leads to these conclusions:

"The Soviet Union is the bulwark, the greatest

achievement of the international proletariat in its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

"Relying on the Soviet Union the proletariat of each country can defend and extend its achievements even during the present reactionary period.

"The Soviet Union will support with all its forces the proletarians who attempt to seize power in their own country. The fate of every revolution is closely connected with the fate of the Soviet Union.

"The intervention of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, in case of a revolt of the workers and peasants of another country, cannot be regarded as a "foreign" intervention, but as the active solidarity of a proletarian State in the service of the world proletariat."

It will be observed that nowhere is war on behalf of the worker class renounced. On the contrary, the VI Comintern Congress (1928) laid stress on the need "for the proletariat to maintain and acquire the use of arms." Nor is the Soviet Government expected to keep aloof. And the men who speak through the Comintern direct that Government's every policy and move.

It turns out then that only nationalistic wars and those against Soviet States are sinful, the latter being particularly heinous. Furthermore, "anti-militarist agitations of a pacifist nature" are regarded as "extremely detrimental and can only assist the bourgeoisie in efforts to disarm the proletariat." Movements that tend to develop a pacific spirit among the masses are anathematized accordingly. The VI Comintern Congress<sup>a</sup> saw in pacifism "an important instrument in the hands of imperialists for their preparations for war and for concealing these preparations." It took

<sup>a</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, Vol 81, Nov. 21, 1928, p. 1548.

pains, in its report of the War Commission, in no way  
 "to be identified with the camp of the pacifists . . .

Рис. ДЕНИ.



Денни.

Pravda.

THE GENEVA NIPPLE

making quite clear," one passage read, "that our fight along these lines has nothing in common with the pacifists."

The odium of being the principal media for misguidance of the people was fastened upon the Social Democrats and the League of Nations, which the *Peasant Gazette* referred to on September 27, 1930, as "the renowned brothel of the international imperialists."

Bukharin, chairman of the Congress, declared the "ideological fraud" extraordinary in its dimensions, and went on to the use of stronger language and more specific charges: "Never before were there so many plans, official declarations, affirmations of 'peace,' 'peace projects.' Never before did the pacifist phrases pervade the cities and villages of the whole world as they do now. And never before has the thoroughly rotten, bigoted, hypocritical, lying, and false pacifist ideology been spread so energetically by the official heralds of imperialism as now, when imperialism is doing all it can in order to let loose the storm of a new imperialist war. And never before was this pacifist lie, which is being used as a screen for the imperialist war preparations, been covered up with so much insistence, energy, and even cynical frankness by the imperialist agency among the working class—the Social Democratic Parties."

The Communist authors of the complete disarmament proposal at Geneva will never be credited by the intelligent with believing the gesture had the slightest chance to receive even momentary consideration, but it attracted attention (almost childishly relished by them), added to their good name in the world at large, cost nothing, and if public opinion should catch it up and bring nearer the desideratum, they would be saved by so much the hard and dangerous work of disposing of a chief obstacle in their pathway—the protective

armed forces of the democratic States. Upon the removal of these the resources of the "revolutionary fatherland" could be mobilized against the "enemy classes" of this nation and that, until, one by one, or more rapidly, they would be brought into the system and under the rule of the Communist dictatorship.

Non-Soviet militarists, however, will find slippery ground for their cause and contentions in what might happen in the remote possibility of disarmament reaching a phase that these revolutionary tacticians would elect. The Communists are betting on a strategy far more likely to win. They see militarism keeping super-armament burdens on the people's backs to support competing imperialisms, great recurring wars bred by these systems, and Communism, as it did in Russia, establishing its rule over States exhausted in the struggles.

Meanwhile are projected in the U. S. S. R. a militaristic culture and organization of arresting intensity and proportions, defended by the "certainty and imminence of attack by the imperialistic powers."

On coming into power in Russia, the Communist statesmen had two military tasks to be executed simultaneously and with no delay—get the remnants of one army out of the way and create another. The few months duration of the Provisional Government in 1917 had witnessed the rapid disintegration of the old Russian military and naval forces. Desertions from the front lines of whole battalions, regiments, and almost armies became everyday occurrences. The Communists having insured the coöperation of several regiments in Petrograd, Moscow, and other large cities, reasoned soundly that the rest of the garrisons would

not care to fight hard for the government which they distrusted. But when the overthrow of the Kerensky Government was effected, the very serious need for an army of their own confronted them. This had to be a force that, up to the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, would make at least a show of holding the Eastern World War front, eliminate the vestiges of Provisional Government power in the provincial districts, and otherwise protect their new régime. White armies began to mass on more than one front and foreign interventions, first conceived as Allied moves against the still belligerent Central Powers, soon became anti-Soviet offensives.

The Red leaders acted with dispatch and vigor, internally by mobilizing groups of politically reliable armed units known as Red Guards. These consisted chiefly of revolutionary workers in the larger industrial centers. The hastily trained units were sent to the most crucial points to be the first line and sole defense of the Soviet power. Also they constituted a skeleton organization of the revolutionary armed forces in the making. Peace at any price was made with the Central Powers. A general order hastily completed the demobilization of the old army and navy remnants, before they could become a network of bandit units, or in their half-hungry state be recruited and reconditioned by the White enemies.

Meanwhile, the enemies did not waste time. With the active aid of foreign powers—troops, munitions, and money—they organized formidable attacks on several frontiers simultaneously. The improvised Red Guards proved entirely incapable of coping with the White armies led by well-trained officers and with complements of old soldiers. Conscription similar to the

Czarist system was instituted but with certain new guiding principles. The first decree stated explicitly that "former exploiting classes were excluded from the Workers' and Peasants' Army." The outcasts were formed into auxiliary units to do menial work in the barracks and camps. Members of such units could not be promoted to commanding positions, their families did not enjoy the privileges afforded to those of Red soldiers, and their pay and food ration were lower than for the armed ranks.

The pressing in of the numerous enemies dictated the bold venture of appropriating the services of old régime staff and field officers of experience. This idea of Trotsky, successfully executed, provided the new régime with former Imperial Russian officers to build and command its first armies, to win victory upon victory, and to triumph ultimately in a total situation that often appeared hopeless. At one stage, Lenin's suggestion that they all "be chased to the devil" drew the information that there were not less than 30,000 of them in use.<sup>4</sup>

In intrusting the Red Army commands to these Imperial officers, most of them avowed enemies, the Communists took intricate measures to minimize the dangers of treason. It was announced that their employment was a last resort and that every one of their movements and orders would be supervised, checked, and controlled. Each non-Party officer, and each Party military commander at the beginning had a special Communist commissar paralleling him. This commissar officially represented the Soviet Government with the commanding officer. Without his approval no order could be executed. Many of the commissars stayed

<sup>4</sup> Trotsky: *My Life*, p. 447.

in the Army, and after passing through military academies came to hold high positions.

In addition a web of secret police was interwoven with the Army directed by a "special department" of the "Cheka." Holding the families of officers as hostages reënforced the other precautions. Many high-minded commanders conceived themselves to be in the line of patriotic duty—opposing foreign interventions, some of which were believed to have designs on Russian territorial integrity. The number of anti-Soviet plots and acts of treachery in this officer contingent proved very small. Trotsky credited 100 dependable to every traitor and two or three killed for every deserter.<sup>5</sup> By the end of the civil war in 1920, the Red Army possessed a considerable number of newly made officers, former privates, and political commissars, most of them promoted for valor in battle.

The administrative organization of the Army reflected and continues to reflect the times and necessities of the civil war. The basic idea did away with individual command, explained then by a lack of confidence in the former Imperial officers. Company, battalion, regimental, and divisional units were kept. A collegium, called the Revolutionary Military Council of a given army, commanded it. The titular commander, being but one member of this Council, could issue important orders only with the Council's authorization. The political commissar of an army became ex-officio another member. The Government appointed still others from trusted military groups and frequently from civilian circles. These might be locals or personages sent from Moscow. The command of a front was organized on the same model; also that of the Navy.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.



At the top of both Army and Navy sat the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Government, whose president, ex-officio, was and is People's Commissar of the Army and Navy. Another member of this Council, ex-officio, was the vice-president of the secret police organization.

The Revolutionary Military Councils had responsibility for the military operations, maintenance, and political work of their respective units. Confronted with difficulties in the upkeep of its huge forces, the Government created an "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Red Army." The chairman of this commission became a member of the Central Revolutionary Military Council, and his representatives served on the subordinate Revolutionary Military Councils. A Council of Labor and Defense, set up in the early years to be the supreme authority in military and economic matters and to have legislative powers, still exists, though military concerns have ostensibly yielded to the economic. Yet in the event of war, a powerful coördinating and administrative organ is at hand to deal with the requirements of supply.

The adaptation of the Army to the peace time basis brought one major organizational change. It abolished the fronts; and armies, as military units, lost their importance. The whole Soviet Union has been divided into "military districts" (a feature of the Czarist Army) each subordinated to a district commander. The National Revolutionary Military Councils were left to the government of each member Republic, but kept subject to the Revolutionary Military Council of the U. S. S. R., the highest and undisputed authority on all military matters throughout the Union. The

Party "detachments of special designation" have been reduced to a paper status, but in a crisis they would probably be redrafted. These were trusted emergency units, service in which was compulsory for all Party members. In the civil war they were used mainly for maintenance of order, combating revolts, and meeting other dangers.

The O. G. P. U. forces in themselves constitute an auxiliary army on which the highest dependence is placed. Besides the regularly conscripted soldiery mobilized in the Army, every physically able male citizen undergoes compulsory military training in special summer camps. This system multiplies many times the number of trained men. The Communist Youth League has its own military training camps, its shooting tournaments, and sham battles. Each Soviet school from elementary to college grade makes military training obligatory. The League has been entrusted with keeping the military spirit high among youth, prepared to defend the "socialistic fatherland" and to help the revolutionary proletariat of other lands, if and when the latter will rise in revolt. Its press devotes a special section to the Army and Navy, and features "war correspondence" from the mimic "battlefields," praising and lionizing the victors.

Government military academies and schools, in part the former apparatus of the Imperial Army, otherwise new, graduate every year hundreds of staff officers and specialists qualified in the various branches of arms. Some of these have given a good account of themselves in Turkey, Persia, and China as military experts. Exceptional attention has been given to the organization of aviation and chemical defense. The "voluntary" civic organization known as the Society for the Promo-

tion of Aviation and Chemical Defense (Osoaviakhim) has several million members financially supporting and otherwise furthering development in these branches.



Vladimirsky in *Cosmopolitaia Pravda*.

(The framework letters are G. P. U.)

Arrangements made with German military officials for constructing several plants in Russia to manufacture explosives and materials for chemical warfare were persistently denied by Soviet officials but admitted in

a veiled form by the authorities of the other country. In its present form the Red Army presents a modern, well-organized, and technically equipped fighting force with maximum emphasis on the aërial and chemical departments. It may be safely presumed that the standard of keeping it stronger than the combined armies of any two of its bordering western neighbors has been attained and will not fall below that mark. The *Soviet Union Yearbook* of 1929 gives 562,000 men as the Army figure for 1928. The League of Nations tabulation<sup>o</sup> places the annual recruiting contingent at 1,200,000. It excludes 400,000 of these as unfit for military service. Of the 800,000 liable to service, the regular Army absorbs 260,000 who spend two years with the colors. The territorial formations take 200,000 and 340,000 are trained outside Army ranks.

The Red Army, after the manner of military systems that take themselves seriously, climaxes its activities with an intelligence service abroad. This one starts with the indubitable advantage of having ready contact with sizable Communist Parties in the other countries and in some with parliamentary members through whom to get confidential military information. Information thus obtained by Moscow should not be underestimated. The official service covers especially well the immediate western neighbors (Poland, the Baltic States, and Roumania), the other Balkan States, Turkey, Persia, India, and China. France receives a double measure of attention, conceived to be the master mind of anti-Soviet military designs. The Military Council and the O. G. P. U. jointly conduct these operations. Behind the accredited military attachés, the most important agents often are placed in inconspicuous posi-

<sup>o</sup> *Armaments Yearbook*, 1929-1930, p. 844.

tions about embassies and trade delegations. Other secret agents reach their fields and operate in the capacity of engineers, business men, and welfare workers, especially in countries which do not maintain Soviet diplomatic relations. The German and British experiences with Russian Trade Delegations afford the most widely known examples of the technique.

The Red Army discipline differs radically from the former Imperial system in substance and form, and adds to the Army's formidability. Most privates in the old forces never knew what they were fighting for. The well-known lack of mass patriotism, explained by the vastness of the country, the differences between nationalities composing the population, the harsh policy of the Government toward the minorities, the extremely low educational level of peasants and workers combined to make the former Russian armies, in the ranks, probably the least self-conscious in the world. The Czarist command considered the political education of soldiers useless if not dangerous. The Communists in contrast have undertaken to organize a class army calculated to be perfectly aware of the aims for which it is fighting, and representing an openly political entity. The methods of terror and spying applied to individual soldiers and officers early in the Soviet régime have been progressively relaxed. The changing social composition of the Army toward one of workers and poor peasants makes for "safety" in the forces, while political organization less offensive than espionage penetrates every unit and insures domination by the Party.

The previous Government lowered army allegiance by using it for punitive expeditions against revolting peasants, national minorities, striking workers, and for

other forms of policing. The present Government has studied to keep the Red Army as much as possible out of the internal struggles. The O. G. P. U. machine with a hand-picked army of its own serves to crush revolts, awe the peasants, and guard frontiers; and so reduces the dangerous possibility of the class Army realizing that it is being used against the people.

The old spiritless and embittering discipline has been further changed by establishing the equality of officers and privates when off duty. Moreover, the soldiers are taught that in all respects of personality they are the equal of their commanders when on duty. While orders have to be strictly obeyed, the general attitude taken enables the private to feel that his commanding officer is only a senior comrade and not a member of a higher caste. This Army knows no permanent ranks for commanding officers, no lieutenants, colonels, or generals, but only "commanders" of company, regiment, or larger unit. Upon leaving the Army, an officer loses his title incumbent on the post he held in active service. Often the transfer of a regimental commander to a unit of railroad troops lowers him two or three ranks whereas, in another army, such an officer would either keep his former rank or would have to be demoted to fit the place. Here the transfer amounts merely to a change of job.

The political education of Red soldiers and sailors, considered one of the prime tasks of the Government since its first days, has brought into action the propagandist educational institutions of the Party in surpassing fashion. The leaders maintain that the Army and Navy should be the most effective school of Communist doctrines, and remake into active supporters of the Communist régime the several hundred thou-

sands of young men who enter the forces each year.

The Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U. S. S. R. (designated P. U. R.) conducts the political education of the Red soldiers and sailors. It places propagandists in every unit, and directs and supervises their work. Practically the whole great array of this educational personnel consists of Communists. Elementary and political education, strictly Marxian, go together. Upon demobilization every ex-service man is supposed to be an apostle of the Soviet faith. As a means of increasing their usefulness and better commending them to their people, special courses in collective agriculture, fertilization, cattle breeding, and the like have been included in the curriculum. Standing regimental and company committees maintain contact with demobilized soldiers to stimulate and help them in their civilian propagandist commission. Usually the returning soldiers receive from their committees propaganda literature for use at home. Some play an important rôle as carriers of Soviet ideas to the remotest parts. From time to time officials complain of others that they are soon lost in the peasant mass, and do not retain interest in political matters. The Red Army and Navy on the whole have come to represent an ingeniously built organization, composed largely of workers and poor peasants. They receive an almost ignorant youngster, surround him with an atmosphere of comradeship, on the whole give him better clothing and food than he has known before, and return him to society with his mind more or less impregnated with Communism.

Concurrently, the leaders leave nothing undone to prevent the appropriation of the Army by a Bonaparte.

Thousands of trusted Communists, as in civil life, here man every key position. They receive orders not only from their immediate chiefs but also from the Party committees to which they belong. By this system the Central Committee of the Party exercises a dual control, first through the regular commanding channels and then through the Communist representatives at minor posts. Let it be supposed that the People's Commissariat for the Army and Navy and even the entire Revolutionary Military Council disobeyed the orders of the Party and decided to use force against it. Their countermanding orders to various units of the Army would have to be passed through the network of minor officers who would not execute them unless advised to do so by their Party committees. The system functioned at its best when Trotsky was broken by the Central Committee of the Party. He enjoyed a popularity in the Army equalled by none of his successors. Still, at a given signal, a legion of minor Communist officers started a campaign against him, and in a few months so discredited him that the majority of the Army could be counted on to refuse his leadership.

The social composition of the Red forces ties them ever more firmly to the Communist system. Data given to the XVI Party Congress by the War Commissar<sup>1</sup> showed the Army becoming one of workers, disproportionately urban instead of peasant as it had been during the first years of the régime.

The commander personnel figures gave a much higher percentage of workers and Party members than did the rank and file. Workers constituted 30% of Red officers. In the Army political staff the percentage of workers reached 46.7%. Communists furnished

<sup>1</sup> July 3, 1930.



51.1% of all the officers, not including the political agents. Almost every one of these is either a Party of Comsomol member. In the infantry 96.6% of the commanders of regiments and divisions participated in the civil war. In the cavalry the corresponding figure was 97.5%. Of company commanders 70% served in the armed civil conflicts. The ex-Imperials have been reduced to 10.6% of the officer force, the majority of whom the Commissar reported to be members of the Party. The military schools and academies are being energetically "proletarized." In 1928 industrial workers among new cadets accepted in military schools of all grades totaled 51.4%; in 1929 the percentage rose to 67.3.

The Red Army in 1930 had 129,000 Party soldiers and officers as against 87,000 in 1928. The Comsoltzy ranks furnished 150,000. Applause greeted this announcement to the Congress: "You have a homogeneous armed force of 280,000 men, ready to execute the will of our Party no matter what sacrifices this may require." The leadership ever labors to increase the proportion of workers among military Communists, believing in an extreme emergency, they will be the last-ditch element. Herein is displayed afresh the distrust which Communist leaders feel toward peasants and intellectuals even though members of the Party. The war chief rubbed in the fact and gained more cheers by pointing out that in two years workers in the Army's Party structure increased from 41% to 58.3%, while peasants declined from 32% to 29% and employees from 25% to 12%.

Along with its material and spiritual instruments of power, the Red Empire has a realistic goal of conquest

and a system of government designed for expanding borders. The revised Constitution of the Third International,<sup>9</sup> makes the task of that body "to struggle with all means, even with weapon in hands, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, and the creation of an International Soviet Republic. . . ."

One of the Third International's subordinate tools, the Red International of Labor Unions, declares, among its constitutional "Aims and Purposes," one "to organize the great laboring mass in the whole world for the overthrow of capitalism, the emancipation of the workers from oppression, and the establishment of the Socialist commonwealth. . . ." <sup>10</sup>

The fundamental law of the U. S. S. R. as amended and ratified in July, 1923, provides for admission "open to all Soviet Socialist Republics, such as are now existing and such as shall arise in the future." It represents itself to be "a decisive step toward the union of the toilers of all countries into one World Soviet Socialist Republic."

The first years of the Soviet Union have brought into its jurisdiction no territory or population not previously a part of Imperial Russia save Outer Mongolia. There has been opportunity however for the nature of the Union's approaches, controls, and administration to be self-revealed. Soviet leaders and most foreign observers consider the Communist régime to have obtained in this field of administering a variety of nationalities, one, if not the most brilliant, of its achievements. The Communists go farther and claim for their policy the one offering the only successful solution to the problems presented by several nationali-

<sup>9</sup> Adopted July, 1924.

<sup>10</sup> Adopted July, 1921.

ties existing within one State organism. True, the often cruel and generally stupid rule of minorities by the Czarist Government, opposed by all Russian liberals, afforded a background against which any change for the better would be spectacular, yet it is to the credit of the Soviet rulers that they did not choose the policy of minor ameliorations, but boldly undertook sweeping, revolutionary changes in government relations with the nationalities concerned.

One of the first acts was a "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" under the joint signatures of Lenin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and of Stalin, as People's Commissar for Nationalities. Published November 15, 1917, a few days after the seizure of power in Petrograd, this decree announced four basic principles of policy respecting nationalities. It recognized all peoples in Russia to be equal and sovereign; promised each the right of free self-determination, including even separation and the organization of an independent State; abolished all national and national-religious privileges and limitations; and conferred on all national minorities the right of free development.

The sheer political sagacity of Lenin and his associates in this pronouncement and its acceptability to the minorities may be calculated by the oppressions from which it promised release. For centuries the old Government's basic policy had been strict Russification of the subject nationalities, here and there lightened by a liberal Czar, but reënforced during the reigns of the last two Romanoffs, Alexander III and Nicholas II. They took away the last vestige of autonomy from Poland and tabooed its language. Bobrikov acquired his unenviable fame as the "strangler" of Finland. A

wave of Jewish pogroms swept the west and south of Russia. "National" elementary and higher schools, even if privately owned, were strictly prohibited. In the Ukraine with its 80% of Ukrainian population, no books or newspapers in that language were permitted to be published. Uniformly Great Russians<sup>11</sup> dominated all branches of civil service.

In 1930 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consisted of two Federations and five "independent" Republics. The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R. S. F. S. R.) includes the major part of European Russia and all of Siberia. It is by far the most powerful and influential member of the Union. The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic occupies the southern part of European Russia, not including Crimea (a member of the R. S. F. S. R.). The White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic abuts on Poland. The Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic embraces Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidjan. Three Central Asiatic Republics not in the Siberian sweep of the R. S. F. S. R. are: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. The last named received the status of membership in the Union as late as 1929 in a Soviet move calculated to win the sympathy and support of Tadjiks inhabiting the neighboring land of Afghanistan. Indeed, the creation of the border minorities into republics generally has had international considerations as a secondary if not the primary political motivation. There has been the desire to frustrate any attempts

<sup>11</sup> The term applied to the Slav stock which populated most of central and north European Russia, south of the White Sea and between the Western Dwina and middle Volga rivers. Under Imperial rule it was culturally and politically the dominantly ruling element and the most numerous.

of such local nationalities to seek separation or alliance with some other country for the better achievement of national aspirations. Also they might prove centers of attraction to draw the kindred races across the border to themselves and so into the Soviet Union.

Not only the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic but even such small units as Armenia and Georgia are composed of a number of lesser national Republics or territories, it being the declared aim to grant "independent" State existence to the minutest nations or tribes within the borders of the Union. The outwardly complicated character of this State structure may be seen from an analysis of the three ethnologic groups into which the minorities classify, each with its own several sub-divisions.<sup>12</sup>

The X All-Russian Soviet Congress in 1922 consolidated the then existing Russian, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian, and White Russian Republics into the Union. Previously they had been governed from

<sup>12</sup> The Finno-Ugric group embraces Karels, Komi, Votiaks, and Mordva, numbering altogether about three million people, the great majority peasants. The group comprises probably the most backward of the nationalities. Many have been without literary language or even alphabet.

The Turki group numbers from seventeen to twenty million inhabitants, distributed between the Volga Tatars, Chuvashes, North Caucasians, Nogaitzi, Bashkiri, 4,000,000 Kazaks (not to be confused with the Cossacks), and the 3,500,000 Kirghizes, Uzbeks, and Turkomans combined. The Turki are chiefly cattle-breeding and nomadic tribes but with an admixture of proletarians in the oil fields near the Aral and Caspian seas. Many other small Turki nations live in the mountains of Northern Caucasus and in Siberia.

Almost five million people belong in the third, or Caucasian group, subdividing into: Georgians of many strains, Armenians, Cherkess, Osetins, Ingushes, Chechnia, Avartzy, Dargintzi, Kurintzi, Laki, and other minor units.

To complete the spectrum, such Mongolian nations as the Kalmuks and Buriato-Mongols must be added, along with liberal sprinklings of Annamites, and the well-known larger minorities of Ukrainians, White Russians, Poles, and Jews.

Moscow with the recognition of a certain autonomy. The Constitution of the Union, finally accepted July 6, 1923, was framed to satisfy further the ambitions of the national Republics and at the same time to hold firmly in Moscow the reins of super-administration.

For centralization, the Soviet Union goes far beyond the British Empire or any other present State with heterogeneous population. In reality the old Imperial Russian State has been outdone. The decision of all matters pertaining to finance, foreign policy, war, labor, agriculture, industry, trade, transport, post and telegraph, and last but not least, the secret police, have been reserved to central institutions in Moscow, leaving but purely local affairs to the discretion of national administrations. And in them the centrally controlled Party is entrenched. That the right of separation proclaimed by Lenin in 1917 is only a phrase, is an open secret. Any attempt to effect a secession would be immediately and ruthlessly suppressed by the military power in the All-Union hands. The national governments function with strictly limited authority. Special emissaries of the Soviet Union on the ground, not occupying conspicuous positions, hold the situation well in hand and direct affairs behind the scenes.

The highest titular administrative organ of Soviet Russia—the All-Union Central Executive Committee—consists of two bodies, which formally possess equal rights as legislative chambers, the Soviet of Nationalities and the Union Soviet, but in practice business has come to be transacted in joint session. The first-named body contains five representatives from each of the national Republics and one from each of the autonomous territories. Constitutionally, it is set up to

consider and shape legislative measures in the domain of national policies, and to function somewhat as a clearing house for national controversies. Inasmuch however as appropriations of money, plans of industrial and agricultural development, and all other important measures are actually decided by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party and afterwards merely approved by the corresponding legislative bodies, these divisions have slightly more than theoretical significance. Their existence nevertheless is a propaganda asset heavily capitalized.

Each national Republic has its own miniature Central Executive Committee and its own Council of People's Commissars or Cabinet. Almost uniformly, nationals hold the chairmanships of all government bodies. Not less generally, deputies sent from Moscow fill the all-important posts of vice-chairmen to secure prompt and precise execution of the instructions of the Central Government, and actually to participate in the administration of the Republics. They smooth out controversies, insure efficiency in the government machinery, distribute and check the expenditure of funds, and at all times effect complete subordination of the national governments to the orders from Moscow.

In the national Republics, the official personnel still consists disproportionately of Great Russians. They outnumber nationals in the Party. And students of Communism, looking for the springs and apparatus of control, will always be rewarded by examining the Party. The Ukraine has an 80% Ukrainian population and an 11% Russian element, yet in this large division which hardly can be called a "national minority,"

Party complexion in 1923 was 52% Russian and 23% Ukrainian. "The majority of the Ukrainians were half Russified Ukrainians."<sup>13</sup> Seven years of exceptional efforts to attract Ukrainians into the Party brought the rate up to slightly over 40% in 1930. The Kazaks in their Republic constituted in 1924 about 50% of the population, while the republican organization of the Party had but 5% of Kazaks among its members. The condition does not please the Party leaders and it is underlaid by a basic problem. Not only did Russian Communists bring on the Bolshevist phase of the Revolution among these minorities, but they find an absence of proletarian material out of which to build a strong local Party. *Economic Life*<sup>14</sup> reported that nationals constituted but 27.5% of the workers in the Tatar Republic; in the Daghestan Republic in the Caucasus 50.5%.

Accordingly Russians at the outset largely conducted the administration of the Republics down to the lower strata. They still predominate in the higher official levels of all the minority governments except in Georgia and Armenia. The table below exhibits by percentages the nationals in the government institutions of minority Republics in 1930:

	Azerbaijan	Tatar Republic	Ukraine	White Russia	Georgia	Armenia
Central Institutions	36	34	36	49	74	94
Local Institutions	69	42	76	73	81	94

Resentment against Great Russian domination in all the national territories, fed by centuries of Imperial oppression, persists so formidably that the Party leaders realize they will never have a real stronghold in them unless and until they create real national

<sup>13</sup> Popov: *The National Policy of the Soviet Power*, 1930.

<sup>14</sup> July 6, 1930.



Communist Parties. These dominated from the center, will then make safe according to the nationals full representation in the national administrations.

Popov,<sup>15</sup> orthodox interpreter of the Soviet Gov-

In the office of the Oil Syndicate in the Tatar Republic there is only one Tatar employed and he holds the position of coachman.



*Pravda.*

"In our office all the employees, of course, are Russians, but the transportation is in the hands of a Tatar."

ernment's nationalities policy, has defined the fundamental problems the Party here faces:

"We must strive to create staunch, if small, Com-

<sup>15</sup> *The National Policy of the Soviet Power, 1930.*

munist groups on whom we can rely in all the Republics and territories inhabited by the backward uncultured peoples. . . . One of the basic problems of the Party is the creation and development of proletarian backbone in the young Communist organizations of the national Republics and territories, the rendering of a whole-hearted assistance to those organizations that should be given a real Communist upbringing, the consolidation of truly international Communist groups, even if their number be not large in the first years. The Soviet power will be strong in the national Republics and territories only when we shall have consolidated there really serious Communist organizations."

Since Communist doctrine prescribes the environment of a more or less strong and numerous proletariat to sustain a truly Communist organization, the Party addresses itself to hastily developing industry in the national Republics. Officially the policy of larger investments in industry and mining in them represents benefaction by the Communist régime, striving to lift the minorities to the Great Russian level, but desire to create proletarian and Communist groups articulating obediently with the all-powerful Party Political Bureau more deeply underlies the heavy outlays. While the basic funds of the State industry by the end of the Five Year Plan should increase by 289% throughout the whole U. S. S. R., the increase scheduled for several of the minority Republics exceeds that average materially. For example, the rate for the Ukraine is 308%, White Russia 442%, Central Asian Republics 444%, Kazakstan 549%, Buriato-Mongolia 966%, Daghestan 500%. The Five Year Plan proposes to lift the per capita gross production of industry in

the eight autonomous Republics of R. S. F. S. R., Central Asia, and Transcaucasia from 36 rubles to 105, and in the Great Russian districts of the R. S. F. S. R. from 89 rubles to 208. This course if pursued will yield large economic benefits to the minority peoples, along with Party political reënforcement.

Likewise because illiteracy does not further either the educational or political aims of the Soviet Government, it spends relatively much more for social and cultural purposes in national Republics than in Great Russia. The R. S. F. S. R. expenditures for these purposes amounted in a given year to 13.5% of the State budget. In the Turkmenistan Republic the corresponding appropriations reached 36%, and in the Uzbekistan Republic 48%.<sup>16</sup> The more backward peoples have far to travel along this road from the place they were left by their own and the Imperial rulers. In Uzbekistan 3.8% of the population were literate in 1926, in Turkmenistan 2.3%. The enrollment of children in the network of elementary schools in 1927-1928 reached 27.6% in Uzbekistan and 31.1% in Turkmenistan.

The figures with respect to children taught in their native language are much less satisfactory. In 1927-1928, of Russian children in the R. S. F. S. R. elementary schools, 99% were given Russian tuition. In the Votiak region only 2.7% of the native pupils were taught in their own language. Russian pupils in the same region secured Russian language tuition to the extent of 71.5%. In the Kalmuck region 99.8% of Russian pupils received instruction in their own language compared with 8.6% of the Kalmucks taught in their native tongue.<sup>17</sup> An alphabet using Latin

<sup>16</sup> *Economic Life*, July 6, 1930.

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, July 26, 1930.

letters instead of Arabic has been devised for several of the minorities having had none. Well indoctrinated newspapers, magazines, and books in their many languages have multiplied. National music, art, and literature receive encouragement. Theaters playing in the languages of these people are complete innovations.

The Communists have continually to labor at overcoming the handicap of the Party and the administrative strength being predominantly of Great Russian nationality—the same ruling extraction from which every minority expected to be relieved under the Soviet charter of liberties. The leaders try to parallel the training of nationals to fill in minor and eventually major government posts with choking down, among the personnel on whom they must still depend, expression of their old Great Russian chauvinism that outlives in them the régime and the policy that bred and nourished it. It survives not only among the remnants of the pre-revolutionary bureaucracy entrenched in Government institutions, but as well among members of the Party. Its manifestation is the source of constant anxiety.

In a *Pravda*<sup>18</sup> article entitled "National Problems in the XVI Party Congress," the author roughly handled offenders. Provoked by the proposal that the national Republics and territories be abolished and Russia emerge with a structure somewhat like the pre-revolutionary one he launched forth:

"This calumny against the national Republics is even more frankly stated by Communists, who deviate toward Great Russian chauvinism, when they say that the small and backward regions of the border territories

<sup>18</sup> July 26, 1930.

of the U. S. S. R. are great obstacles on the road of socialistic reconstruction. These regions, they charge to be the nests of reaction, the outposts of world capital in future imperialistic wars against the U. S. S. R. . . . Did not certain prominent Communists talk recently of liquidating various national Republics and territories? The Great Russian chauvinism remains the main danger facing the nationalities policy of the proletariat."

In proclaiming Great Russian chauvinism "the main danger" the Soviet leaders have an anxious eye upon the minority chauvinisms deeply rooted in the constituency of these Republics. If the Great Russian chauvinism can be extinguished, the ground will be cut from under the minority chauvinists for being what they are. They will be thwarted in the use of their present most effective propaganda technique—decrying the dangers of the "on-rushing Great Russian oppression."

This nationalism of the minorities (political backwardness to the master Communists) has far-reaching implications. It has been sufficiently rife among the Party members to win sufferance. Popov frankly confessed to its toleration in order "to keep within the Party minority people who would by no means be allowed to remain in the Great Russian section. . . ." It puts brakes on the progress of the Party program and forces communization into modified forms. While confiscating the Russian Church lands and nationalizing them, the Soviet Government in some districts of Central Asia legalized the management of Mohammedan properties by the priests for a long time. Similar leniency was shown to schools teaching the Mohammedan religion. A very notable concession preserved for a con-

siderable period in certain districts the status of the shariat courts <sup>19</sup> with shieks and mullahs presiding. The absence of a Party of nationals and of Communist nationals in the administration dictated such compromises—not regard for the people's religious and social traditions as such. All of them have since been violated that do not comport with Communism.

The U. S. S. R. Constitution leaves the gate ajar for all countries qualified to enter. It was meant for use ere this. The original hospitality has not cooled but the unexpected stability of the capitalistic world has deferred to the more remote future realization of the hopes that inspired that piece of legislation. Adventures savoring strongly of political imperialism have come to offer a greater attraction during the years of waiting for Western sovereign States to sovietize. In the fervid phrases of the Communist International: "It is wrong to limit at present our program to a bare acknowledgment or announcement of a rapprochement of the toiling masses of various nations. It is necessary to effect a policy of most close alliance of all national and colonial emancipatory movements with the Communist International and with Soviet Russia."

In pursuing a policy of duplicity in this direction, Russian Communists only follow the directing hand of Lenin. He validated the use of the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries as temporary tools, to be discarded as soon as the Communist movement in them should reach sufficient strength. A recent exponent of these tactics recognizes among "the most powerful weapons in the fight against capitalistic imperialism . . .

<sup>19</sup> Mohammedan in law, jurisdiction, and administration.

arousing the oppressed nations under its power to fight, the use of all national controversies that exist within the framework of capitalistic imperialism." He includes such issues "as divide the bourgeoisie of the dominating nations, not only from the toiling masses of the oppressed nations but from the bourgeois classes of these same oppressed nations."<sup>20</sup> If fashioned into plainer language and given the content left implicit by a typical admixture of unscrupulous politician and fanatic of the highest integrity, this orthodox Communist doctrine invites the nationalists of subject or exploited peoples to become sharers in movements for national liberation, which the Communists collaborators intend to develop into revolutionary phases that will betray and destroy their trusting allies. The Chinese Nationalists from experience can furnish doubters with particulars.

Labored invitations of this character are out to all nationalities that feel themselves oppressed and have the will to experiment further with Communist liberators. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party issued among other slogans for the eleventh Red Army Anniversary<sup>21</sup> these pointed ones: "The Red Army is an armed detachment of the world revolution." "Greetings to the oppressed nations of the Orient who are struggling against the imperialist yoke." "Proletarians, toilers, and oppressed of the whole world, prepare for a struggle with the imperialists." "Hail to the leader of the Red Army—the Communist Party."

The Army organ in an editorial article ten days later,<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Popov: *The National Policy of the Soviet Power*, 1930.

<sup>21</sup> *Izvestia*, February 21, 1929.

<sup>22</sup> *Krasnaia Zvezda*, March 3, 1929.

as if in response, spoke for that body: "The Red Army is the army of the proletarian world revolution, because in defending the Soviet Union it defends the nest of the world revolution, because the victory of the Red Army objectively brings emancipation to all the oppressed, while its defeat brings in its train an intensification of oppression for the workers and toilers of the whole world. . . . The strength of the Red Army lies in the fraternal support of the international proletariat, in the sympathies of the oppressed peoples. This is why an internationalist training of the soldiers of the Red Army is the way to strengthen the fighting power of the Red Army. This is why it is bound up by close inseparable ties with the Communist International, and through it with the working class and the oppressed throughout the world."

The *Military Messenger*, issued by the State Publishing House, Moscow,<sup>23</sup> carried a long argument by Petrov "Against Distortions in International Instruction" which took the form of exploding "the silly proposition that the Soviet power will never in any event permit a war . . . as if the U. S. S. R. were not the advanced forepost of the international revolution, and as if the international external policies of the U. S. S. R. were not a part of the strategy of the world revolution." The author finally took his stand "on the genuine Leninist comprehension of the defense of the U. S. S. R.," which he described as "not in the least localized within our present bounds." He continued: "It is an international matter, and its most important sectors in the course of the world revolution may be situated both within our bounds and upon the territories of fraternal Soviet republics. He made perfectly

<sup>23</sup> March 30, 1929.



clear that this might come about "pursuant to the necessity of the U. S. S. R. going to the support of the struggling proletariat of other countries."

Soviet intervention was seriously considered and openly discussed in 1923 when the German Communists made their second armed bid for power in the Reich.<sup>24</sup> Trotsky appears to take for granted it would have occurred had there been no Treaty of Riga and therefore no barrier states between the Russian and German frontiers. It is but a step from such reiterated pronouncements to interventions and annexations. Other opportunities have been seized. Georgia and then Turkestan thus "voluntarily" joined the Soviet Union. In Mongolia, officially not a part of the Union, the Russian Communist Party exerts full control with the Mongolian army subordinated to the Soviet military command. The sovietizing of Manchuria and other areas of China and their inclusion in the Soviet Union is axiomatic, the latter being given freedom and power to act. Such movements as succeed will be executed under the pretense of the "free desire" of the population, though as in Georgia and Turkestan the expression be attended by copious bloodshed. These are practical politicians not frightened by the sight of blood.

Assistance given by the Soviet Government to several other States, hitherto, in the forms of military supplies and experts, has yielded rather disappointing results to the Communists. Aid to "the national emancipation movement" was extended Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and China. In each instance, the other Government, its own purposes served, took

<sup>24</sup> *Lenin*, by Leon Trotsky, Minton, Balch & Co., New York City, p. 115.

initiative and dispensed with further help from the neighbor along with its propagandizers.

That other and more successful undertakings to make Soviet States and to add them to their Union will mark the course of the Red imperialists is predictable from the record of words and deeds. Although it is considered lack of wisdom and political good manners to speak of such things aloud in Moscow, their more immediate objectives are China, India, and the bordering Baltic Republics. As Red Army Commander, Trotsky was less discreet. Dedicating a plane to the Lettish Rifles, a unit of distinction in offense and defense during his first years as War Commissar, he prophesied: "The time is not distant when the Lettish red flyer will see the Red flag waving over the town (Riga, Latvia) which for diplomatic reasons I do not wish to mention." \*\* Estonia, another small neighbor, like Latvia, escaped Soviet rule by force alone, and experienced an abortive Communist "*putsch*" in 1924, inspired from across its eastern border. But for German military intervention in 1918, Finland would have been overborne by Russian Red forces reënforcing the Finnish Communists.

The habitual attitude, speech, and activities of the Soviet leaders toward other nations appear in the light of all history to invite and challenge attack. Under their Third International alias, in fifty-three nations to the limit of their ability they plot and propagate military sedition and the rising of the proletariat armed against all other States and the rest of society. They asseverate that war between Russia and the capitalist world is inevitable in the near future. Their course

\*\* Moscow *Kreewijas Zihna* (Lettish), No. 66, June 19, 1924.

cannot fail psychologically to bring nearer their consent and purpose to engage in war. Hurriedly they prepare for such an eventuality "while we yet have time," in the words addressed by the chairman of the War Commission to the 1928 Comintern Congress. The Five Year Plan has military as well as economic motivation, mingling fear and prudence. *Izvestia*<sup>26</sup> has registered faithfully the military mood of official Moscow:

"We fought off an Allied army of fourteen powers, 850,000 strong, when the Red Army was not only very young, but mostly disarmed. Now when we have industry almost double that of the pre-war period, the intervention of imperialists will meet with a still more shameful failure. We do not fear intervention; we do everything to halt it, but if we are invaded by imperialistic armies let the enemy not ask for mercy for we will not show it."

<sup>26</sup> November 15, 1930.

CHAPTER X  
WORLD REVOLUTION

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*“The Communist Revolution can be victorious only  
as a World Revolution.”*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ABC of Communism*, p. 141.

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## CHAPTER X

### WORLD REVOLUTION

ONE of the most disciplined far-flung painstaking and resolute of contemporary organizations labors tirelessly to bring the Communist order to world-wide realization through revolution. Human experience affords the parallel of few societies consecrated to a single idea with ramifications more wide and penetrative. The largest and best planned agencies for the propagation of Christianity approach it in elaboration but not in the combination of driving unity and intensity of zeal.

This child of Lenin's brain, known as the Third (or Communist) International, bears also the familiarly abbreviated name Comintern. When establishing it in March, 1919, the founder thus laid down its historical rôle as over against preceding international revolutionary parties:

"The First International (1864-1872) laid the foundation of the proletarian international struggle for Socialism. The Second International (1889- )<sup>2</sup> prepared the ground for a wide extension of the movement in a number of countries. The Third International succeeded to the fruits of the work of the Second International, threw overboard its opportunist, social-chauvinist, bourgeois, and petty bourgeois ballast and made a beginning with the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The Second International (Socialist) continues active

<sup>3</sup> Lenin: *The Place of the Third International in History*, April, 1919.

The manifesto of the first and organized Congress held in Petrograd in March, 1919, described the new organization as the International of "open mass action, . . . of revolutionary realizations, . . . of practical action." Representatives of eleven Communist Parties and other delegates from groups, nuclei, and embryo Parties constituted that creative body. In the VI Comintern Congress nine years later, fifty-nine Parties of as many countries participated. According to Komor, the majority of the Parties worked illegally and the rest were gradually being deprived of legal status and opportunity, proof to him that "the specter of Communism" had become a "real and a growing danger to the imperialist bourgeoisie." <sup>4</sup>

The nature and present objective of the Comintern are still frankly avowed. An official statement of both appears as paragraph one of its Constitution and Rules, appearing in the official press release following the VI Congress: <sup>5</sup>

"The Communist International—the International Workers' Association—is a Union of Communist Parties in various countries; it is a World Communist Party. As the leader and organizer of the world revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the bearer of the principles and aims of Communism, the Communist International strives to win over the majority of the working class and the broad strata of the propertyless peasantry, fights for the establishment of the world dictatorship of the proletariat, for the establishment of a World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, for the complete abolition of classes, and for the

<sup>4</sup> Komor: *Ten Years of the Communist International*, published by Modern Books, Ltd., London, 1929, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *International Press Correspondence* (English Edition), Vol. 8, No. 84 (Special Number), November 28, 1928, p. 1600.

achievement of Socialism—the first stage of Communist Society.”

The Russian All-Union Communist Party dominates—may almost be said to be—the Third International in the sense that the Comintern could barely survive without the powerful Russian unit. The headquarters are in Moscow. All of the Congresses have been held on Soviet territory, probably because no other government extends hospitality. Its Executive Committee (E. C. C. I.) sitting in Moscow functions between Congresses. The financial resources are chiefly Russian. It is the international apparatus of the Russian Party, as the Soviet Government is the domestic instrument.

The Russian Party does not hesitate to assume leadership and other responsibilities befitting primacy. The program of the International either originates with the Russian Party Central Committee or is approved by it on the way to attain validity and force.<sup>6</sup> Zinoviev's spectacular removal from his post in the Comintern in 1926, following action by the Russian Party controls, perfectly illustrated where initiative and power really reside. The organ of the French Party<sup>7</sup> extolling Stalin on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday described him, “the soul . . . of the world proletarian revolution” with “his pleiad of militants who collaborate with him in the Central Committee and in all the responsible posts of the Bolshevik Party (Russian) and of the Communist International.” Kuusinen, a member of the Presidium and of the Political Secretariat of the E. C. C. I., gave assurance in the *International Press Correspondence*<sup>8</sup> that “the

<sup>6</sup> *Pravda*, July 15, 1928, Report of Stalin to the Active Group of the Leningrad Party Organization.

<sup>7</sup> *L'Humanité*, Paris, December 29, 1929.

<sup>8</sup> German Edition, No. 119, December 31, 1929, p. 2795.



line of the Comintern in all leading questions has for many years been marked out according to the counsels of Comrade Stalin."

The Constitution and Rules<sup>o</sup> prescribe a most highly centralized rigid control and direction. One Communist Party only may affiliate as the Comintern's "Section" in a given country. Members in such a Party, and *ipso facto* in the International, accept the program and rules of both bodies, abide by all their decisions, join and actively work in one of the basic units of their Party, and regularly pay the Party dues. The basic unit of a recognized Party organization is the "nucleus" which unites all the Party members in the member's place of employment—factory, workshop, mine, office, store, or farm. A Party member travels from the country of his Section to another only by consent of the Central Committee; if he proceeds without consent the Section to which he goes is forbidden to grant him membership.

Member of the Party and Party organizations may discuss Party questions until the competent Party committees have taken a decision. Thereafter a decision must be unreservedly carried out though a part of the Party membership or of the local Party organizations disagree with it.

If there are two or more Party members in any non-Party mass organization or in its leading committees, such as Trade Unions, Coöperative Societies, sport clubs, ex-service men's organizations, municipal bodies, or parliament, they must form a Communist "fraction" subordinated to the competent Party organs for the

<sup>o</sup> *International Press Correspondence* (English Edition). Vol. 8, No. 84 (Special Number), pp. 1600-1601.

purpose of strengthening the Party's influence and for carrying out its policy in those organizations.

Communist fractions in international organizations like the Red International of Labor Unions, the International Class War Prisoner's Aid Society, and the International Workers Relief are responsible to the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Executive Committee of the Communist International and the Central Committees of its given Sections specifically determine the form of these Communist fractions and the manner in which their work is guided.

The World Congress of representatives of all Parties (Sections) and organizations affiliated to the Comintern constitutes its supreme body. The Congress considers and determines program, tactics, and organizational questions connected with the activities of the Comintern and the Sections. The World Congress only has power finally to modify program and rules. The membership of a given Party, the political importance of a given country, and action by the Congress itself establishes the voting power of each Section. Delegates may not come instructed.

The interim body of the Comintern between Congresses is the Executive Committee empowered to instruct all the Sections and to control their activity. Its decisions are obligatory on all the Sections. Pending an allowable appeal to the next World Congress, the E. C. C. I. decisions must be carried out. The Central Committee of a Section is responsible in turn to its Party Congress, but the E. C. C. I. has the right to annul or amend the decisions both of a Party Congress and of its Central Committee, and may initiate decisions obligatory on them.

Subject to appeal to the World Congress, but immediately effective, the E. C. C. I. may expel entire Sections, groups, or individual members who act in violation of the rules or program of the Comintern, of its own decisions, or those of the World Congress. The program of a Section must receive E. C. C. I. approval. Failing to secure approval a Section may appeal but not proceed. The mechanism employed to effect Party regularity in the various Sections is known as the International Control Commission, patterned after a corresponding instrument in the Russian Party and dominated by the same personalities.

Press organs of the respective Sections are required to publish all non-secret decisions and official documents of the E. C. C. I. The Committee sends its instructed representatives to the various Sections with the right to participate in meetings of both the central and local bodies, to speak in opposition to the Central Committee of the Section at its Congresses and Conferences if the line of the Central Committee diverges from their instructions, and to supervise the carrying out of World Congress and E. C. C. I. decisions. The Central Committees of Sections and of affiliated sympathizing organizations send Minutes of their meetings and reports to the Executive Committee for approval.

Elected members of the Central organ of a Section may not resign before the expiration of office without E. C. C. I. consent, on the theory that important posts in the Party do not belong to the incumbent but to the Communist International as a whole. Congresses of the various Sections await the authority of this Committee to convene. It determines and receives the affiliation dues paid by each Section.

"The E. C. C. I. elects a Presidium responsible to the E. C. C. I. which acts as the permanent body carrying out all the business of the E. C. C. I. in the interval between the meetings of the latter," according to Section III, Article 19 of the Constitution. The meetings of the E. C. C. I. may be six months apart. The power thus lodged with the small Presidium is enormous.

The 1928 Communist Calendar or Handbook sets forth the activities and methods of a member Party or Section in the form of twenty-one conditions<sup>10</sup> for entrance to the Comintern. They embody throughout discipline, militancy, and centralized authority.

Daily propaganda and agitation must correspond to the program and all resolutions of the Third International. Wherever entry can be gained to newspaper pages, popular meetings, Trade Unions, or Coöperatives, the instructions are to "stigmatize systematically and mercilessly not only the bourgeoisie but also their supporters, reformers of all shades." The execution of complete rupture with all "reformist" and "center" policies is submitted as an ultimatum. All such compromisers shall be removed from posts of any importance in the labor movement whether in Party organizations, newspaper offices, Trade and Professional Unions, parliamentary groups, Coöperatives, or municipal institutions; and be replaced by Communists. The name "Communist Party" is required—to signify "decisive war against the whole of the bourgeois world and against all yellow social-democratic parties . . . which have betrayed the banner of the working classes."

Illegal apparatus "capable of helping the Party to

<sup>10</sup> Adopted by the II Comintern Congress in 1920.

do its duty for the revolution" shall be created everywhere in the European and American countries, as bourgeois legality cannot be trusted when class war enters on the phase of civil war. The terms stipulate forceful systematic propaganda in the army. Refusal to conduct it "would be tantamount to a betrayal of revolutionary duty." Unqualified support of all Soviet States struggling against counter-revolutionary forces shall be forthcoming, to be given by inducing workmen to refuse transport of war materials destined to Soviet enemies and by disaffecting soldiers "sent to stifle proletarian republics." Since the working class is unable to assure victory without securing the enlistment of a part of the village wage-earners and poorer peasants and the neutrality of the rest of the village, "well planned, systematic sedition is essential in the villages."

The organization of Communist cells is enforced within Trade Unions, Workers' and Trade Councils, Coöperatives and other mass organizations, "which by dint of long and insistent labor must conquer them for the Communist cause."

Each member Party must reëxamine the personnel of its parliamentary group, eliminate untrustworthy elements, and enforce upon every Communist in a parliament subordination in deed to the Central Committee of the Party and to "really revolutionary propaganda and agitation." "Iron discipline bordering on military discipline," at the hands of an authoritative trusted Party center with wide powers enjoying the general confidence of Party members, summarizes another condition. This is styled the principle of "democratic centralization." A Party working legally must be committed also to systematic "cleanings" from

time to time to eliminate "petty-bourgeois elements which inevitably tack on to it."

The openly known activities of the Comintern fall under six Divisions—Organization, Agitation and Propaganda, Information, Women's, Coöperative, and Publication.

The official report made to the VI Congress for the period 1924 to 1928 presented the main organizational tasks to be construction of the Parties on the principle of factory groups; organization and guidance of the fractions in Trade Unions and other non-Party mass organizations; correct construction of the central apparatus and the local units of the Parties; instructing the Parties on anti-militarist and illegal activity; strengthening the Communist movement organizationally at the point of assistance to the Communist universities which enable Parties in capitalist countries to give their students international experience in organization; communication of the organizational experience of the Party in the Soviet Union to the Parties in capitalist countries.

The terms Agitation and Propaganda suggest the activities of that division through "agitprop" machinery set up in the various countries. Situations and events lending themselves to agitation are exploited scientifically, such as the Sacco-Vanzetti case, the Chinese Eastern Railway seizure by China, anniversaries of the October Revolution and of the Red Army, Trotsky's defection, unemployment, strikes, elections, and May Days. Historical and current material and manuals are prepared and sent out as press releases or pamphlets with illustrations and statistics. The larger legal Parties receive lantern slides and exhibits

displaying Soviet constructive achievements. Headquarters maintains a telegraph agency and a film service; edits and issues international periodicals; transmits information on the Soviet Union by bulletins in several languages; and promotes a network of "worker correspondents" and factory newspapers. Instructors are recruited, trained, and allocated.

Education in the distinctive Communism of Lenin constitutes another important function reaching out to leading cadres, secondary officials, and rank-and-file Party members. As one means to the end, training schools have been established and are being supported in various countries. Pressure is continuous upon all the Parties to spread Leninism beyond their own ranks to Trade Unions and other mass groups. The zealous refer often to this process as the Bolshevization of Communism, meant to produce a brand that meets super-tests for virility and action knowing no compromises.

The Information Division has a political assignment, comprehended best as the International's Intelligence Service. It supplies the Executive Committee and its organs up-to-date information about the life and activities of the member Parties, and keeps the Sections in turn informed of the Center's activities. It brings to the organs of the Comintern and Executive Committee the new political and other problems. "Collaborators" are established in the principal countries of Europe, North America, the Near East, Far East, South Africa, India, Indonesia, and Australia. Information Departments within the larger Parties further elaborate the international apparatus. Conferences, correspondence, private missions and counselings, bulletin, and formal documents afford the

main lines of communication. A library on vital current political problems keeps abreast of developments.

The Women's Department proceeds by having work among its constituency incorporated in the general Party program with organizational apparatus to correspond, including women promoters for intensive penetration into factories and Trade Unions. It directs its effort toward strengthening the women's papers published by several Parties and making the general Party press and factory papers more useful in advancing Communism among women workers. It features international campaigns and congresses to augment the participation and ingathering of women. An annual Women's Day, Youth's Day, and Children's Week with the same objectives are organized. Prepared articles, reports, pictures, papers, pamphlets, and charts dealing with women workers and peasant women afford the Sections effective publicity materials on the status of women in the Soviet Union. A bulletin of information appears in four languages. In the year beginning March, 1927, the department supplied its correspondents with 175 articles.

The Coöperative Division enters aggressively into "the struggle for the proletarian class character of the workers' coöperatives and their inclusion in the general proletarian class front." It plants Communist fractions in the local and national Coöperatives to agitate, educate, and organize them for revolution. An annual International Coöperative Day has been instituted as an occasion for large scale propaganda. In connection with the Tenth Anniversary of the Soviet Union nine countries responded with attending delegations on the invitation of the Moscow Coöperative Society. The reports they published were regarded by



the promoters useful in commending Communism to the masses. The same anniversary was turned to account in staging a campaign of international proportions among Coöperatives featuring mass meetings, stereopticon lectures, cinema shows, exhibits, and literature. Each Party received detailed instructions and the needful material for conducting the drive. The Center circulates monthly or oftener an international bulletin to reach Coöperatives.

Serious strain developed in the International Coöperative Alliance, after the Soviet Coöperatives gained admittance, between the latter and the non-Communist majority. The Comintern Report 1924-1928<sup>11</sup> commented on the situation: "British representatives attacked the Soviet Coöperatives at the Brussels Conference of the Central Committee of the Alliance in April, 1927, for assisting the relief action on behalf of the British miners, which they interpreted as unauthorized interference in the internal affairs of another country."

Violent discussion in the Stockholm Congress of the International Coöperative Alliance later widened the breach. It grew out of the Soviet representatives objecting to collaboration with economic organs of the League of Nations and to the foreign policies of other governments. Also, they made demands "for the creation of a program of work in the interests of the proletariat" involving coöperation with the Red International of Labor Unions. The British and German majorities, the Communists complained, "sanctioned the already existing class collaboration with the bourgeoisie," refused "action in the interest of the

<sup>11</sup> *The Communist International Between the V and VI Congresses*, published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, p. 68.

proletarian membership," and offered no "tangible opposition to the war policy of the Imperialist governments." The Congress on the other hand ratified the official report of the Central Committee which condemned the Soviet Coöperative representatives for their disloyal attack upon the Alliance and their disruptive work within organizations in other countries. The Comintern report concludes: "The question of a split in the Alliance has now entered upon an acute stage." The entire proceeding perfectly illustrates in cameo the Communist "boring-in" process.

The Publication Department dates from 1925 created then to centralize the publishing activities of the Parties, to plan production, to help secure authors, and in other ways to assist Party, Left Marxist, and sympathizing publishers in their work. A supply of serious, theoretical, and propaganda literature, impracticable for any single Party house to cover, thus materializes for all Parties. The program includes a thirty-volume edition of Lenin's Works. Several volumes of this library have appeared in languages of the principal countries. The plan calls for completion of the series at the rate of four or five volumes annually. Contact with nearly all the Party publishing houses extends the central "editorial" sphere. An exhaustive catalogue of projected Marxist-Leninist literature will afford a survey of the revolutionary literature market in all countries, and lend itself to future intelligent planning. A widely disseminated release, known as the *International Press Correspondence* (Inprecor), conveys to the Communist organs and other subscribers the resolutions and other communications from the Comintern, its auxiliaries, and Sections, also authoritative articles by Communist officials, specialists, and other leaders.

It issues in the English, French, and German languages. Its seat has lately been transferred from Vienna to Berlin. A report<sup>12</sup> of the E. C. C. I. describes it as "the best organ of information for the Communist movement." It was commended to its legal Parties and those having no daily organ. The German edition appears tri-weekly, the French and English twice a week.

Fieldwise, the Comintern Sections in 1928 embraced all twenty-five European countries, ten on the Western Hemisphere, five in the Near East, three Far Eastern lands, India, Indonesia, Australia, and South Africa.<sup>13</sup>

Preparations for revolution by the working class and the dictatorship to follow bulk large in the program and technique of the Third International. The III Comintern Congress in 1921, accepting the fact that readiness of the masses to fall in line for world revolution as an aftermath of the war had failed to materialize, addressed itself to ways and means of making them ready. The thrust of the German Party to seize power in March of that year had proved abortive. Lenin, the realist, told the Congress "that having organized ourselves in a Party we must learn to prepare revolution." He declared the "sympathy of the masses," not an absolute majority, a requisite to victory. For the retention of power however "one must have on one's side not only the majority of the working class, but also the majority of the exploited toiling rural population." The slogan of the Congress became "To the masses!"<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congresses.*

<sup>13</sup> *The Communist International Between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses.*

<sup>14</sup> Komor: *Ten Years of the Communist International*, pp. 24-25.

The tactics vary with situations but not the objectives. These are first, to forge from among the workers in a given country a Communist convinced and disciplined fighting and organizing unit to act when the "historic moment" arrives; second, to win a mass following to support whatever steps the Party takes, even the most revolutionary. In industrial countries the existing Trade Unions become the first line of attack for control. If they successfully resist control, they are to be disrupted and submissive ones formed. The ubiquitous elementary Communist nucleus, or cell, takes form in Union, club, and factory, knit into the Party system and subject to it from the Moscow International headquarters down the line to the local body. The instructions of the Organization Department of the Comintern to a Party are clear: <sup>18</sup>

For Party reasons Communists in all Trade Unions and other non-Party organizations must be organized into fractions. In their organizations they carry out the decisions of the Party and are responsible to the latter for this. Communist comrades with a seat in the Executive of a non-Party organization are at the same time members of their fraction. They are responsible for their work solely to the Party.

One widely practiced method, calculated to discredit the responsible Union leaders and to have the Communists recognized by the workers as their champions, is to engender industrial discontent to striking fever, then espouse the cause regardless of its merits or hope of success, and oppose any settlement short of the most extreme demand of the strikers.

The report, *The Communist International Between*

<sup>18</sup> *Communist Papers*, published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1926, pp. 18-19.

*the V and VI Congresses*<sup>16</sup> recites numerous instances of interference dictated by this strategy in the chief industrial conflicts during the 1924-1928 period:

The Party (British) was particularly active in the General Strike and in the Miners' Strike, and the influence it exercised upon the masses in these struggles proved its fitness to act as the leader of the working class.

\* \* \* \* \*

With the collapse of the General Strike . . . the Party members were active on local committees and among the masses of the miners rallying them to resist the attempt of the Trade Union bureaucracy to compromise on wages and hours. . . .

\* \* \* \* \*

The Party is also conducting a wide campaign throughout the Labor movement against the General Council's (of Trade Unions) policy of industrial peace.<sup>17</sup>

In the Warsaw metal workers' strike in 1925 "the Communists played a most active and decisive rôle. The strike was disrupted by the members of the Polish Socialist Party, who were soon followed by the National and Christian Unions; and the workers had the opportunity to see once again that the Communists alone are fighting in defense of their interests."<sup>18</sup>

In the United States "The anthracite coal strike was confined to the hard coal regions of the State of Pennsylvania and involved 150,000 workers. The Party entered the struggle and worked out a program of Left wing demands."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Page 102.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 341.

Citations in similar vein run along several pages, sketching the strikes of Passaic Textile Workers, Furriers, Cloakmakers, Bituminous Miners, Colorado Miners, and Haverhill Shoe Workers—all featuring Communist zeal and successes over against the “betrayals” and “failures” of the American Federation of Labor and other “Right Wing” labor bodies.<sup>20</sup>

Communist activity in the Southern Textile field has displayed the orthodox tactics. The acts of certain of the employers, authorities, and citizens admirably served the Communists by giving them priceless material for propaganda at this stage of their program. Violences done them have added new martyrs to their list—gifts worth more than winning any strike or capturing a great labor position. They have already capitalized these new assets around the world.

Germany and Czechoslovakia, next to the U. S. S. R., have the largest and politically strongest Communist Sections. The German Party in 1927 enrolled 124,729 members<sup>21</sup> in good standing. In the 1930 parliamentary elections it polled in excess of 4,500,000 votes or more than 1,000,000 above any previous vote for Communist candidates. It is evidence of the increasing economic and political tension in that country. The Czechoslovak Party membership registered 138,000 in 1927. The polling strength that year reached almost 1,000,000 making it the second largest party in the country.<sup>22</sup> In the two largest Anglo-Saxon nations, the Party enrolls only a few thousand members in

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 341-344.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 128-129.

each. The decline in Britain followed the failure of the Party program during the General Strike. American Communists have indulged in numerous splits in the interest of "purification." Before the divisions, and at the peak in 1920, following their break from the Socialist Party during the war, the Communists claimed a membership of 50,000. The successive expulsions and secessions reduced to 7,377 in 1929 the element (The Communist Party of the U. S. A.) elect enough to be recognized by the Comintern. Further expulsions in the summer of that year halved the last figure. Vigorous recruiting in the 1930 unemployment situation has built the figure up a few thousands. *Pravda*\*\* announced a gain of 5,400 up to February 22, of whom 900 were Negro workmen. The same newspaper on October 25, 1930, gave the Party in the United States 8,385 members. The presidential ticket polled 48,228 votes in 1928, of which New York State furnished about 23%.

The ultimate organizational destination the Comintern has for Trade Unions is affiliation with the Red International of Labor Unions (R. I. L. U.) known as Profintern. With its base in Moscow it opposes fiercely the International Federation of Trade Unions (I. F. T. U.) with its seat in Amsterdam; also the American Federation of Labor. The new body created in 1920 proposed to act with the Third International to oppose all reformists and conciliatory policies. The International Labor Bureau was denounced in terms of "war to the knife," and Amsterdam declared to be "on the other side of the barricades." To a friendly gesture of the Secretary of the I. F. T. U., the belligerent Red

\*\* March 10, 1930.

chief, Losovsky, replied in the November, 1920, *Communist International*: "There can be no compromise, no agreement, with those who seek a solution of the social question in a friendly understanding with





the middle classes. Every true revolutionary, every true Communist must strive without repose to influence the masses, get possession of the Trade Unions, and transform them into organs of the social revolution. . . . That is why we have set up a hostile organization." <sup>24</sup>

The Constitution <sup>25</sup> provides the following conditions for an organization to become a member:

(1) The recognition of the principle of revolutionary class warfare.

(2) The application of this principle in the daily struggle against capital and the bourgeois State.

(3) The necessity to overthrow capitalism by social revolution and to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat in the intervening period.

(4) The necessity to observe international proletarian discipline.

(5) The recognition and application of the decisions taken by the Constituent Assembly of the Red Trade Union International.

(6) The necessity to break with the I. F. T. U.

(7) The necessity for complete agreement between the revolutionary organizations and the Communist Party in each country in all offensive and defensive action against the middle classes.

The Red Trade Union's monthly organ, March, 1928, gave figures in three categories, which are impressive even if taken with some reserve. The organizations directly affiliated in fifteen countries where the Trade Union Movement adhered wholly or in part to the Profintern enrolled 13,341,700 members, of whom 10,248,000 were in the U. S. S. R. and 2,280,000 in China

<sup>24</sup> *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, published in the United Kingdom for the International Labor Office by P. S. King & Son, Ltd., p. 219.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

(in 1927).<sup>26</sup> Thirty other territories reported 2,874,600 "Revolutionary Minorities," 1,100,000 of them German, 800,000 British, and 265,000 American. A third section of 368,230 in eighteen countries was claimed and described as "taking position from the point of view of the revolutionary class war but not adhering because of White Terror and police repression."

Lenin assiduously upheld the principle that agreement between the proletariat and the majority of the peasant population was an essential to successful organization for social revolution in most countries. In the interest of recruiting for such alliances the Peasant International (Krestintern) functions, like the R. I. L. U., auxiliary to the Comintern with Moscow headquarters. It aims "to organize the liaison between the economic, political, and coöperative groups of peasants throughout the world and between agricultural workers and the working classes with a view to a common fight against the owners and capitalism." Being "spokesman for the world's peasantry" is one of the organizational assumptions. The distance covered in China in arousing mass armed action by bands of landless farmers indicates possibilities under given incitements. To deal with what the leaders consider the particularly susceptible India situation, a special section of the Krestintern has been created by the Presidium which gave as the first commission to two British Communists (one an Indian M.P.) "to get into touch with all the existing peasant organizations of India, even if the latter, by their programs, be at variance with our view as to the general aims and

<sup>26</sup> *The Press Reports of I.F.T.U.*, No. 20, May 28, 1930, reduce the R. I. L. U. figures for Asia from 2,805,000 in 1927 to 74,452 in 1928, ascribing the decline to "the collapse of the Communist Trade Unions in China."

methods of our work among the peasants.” In the same communication Moscow expressed the desire “to establish individual contact with leading men in the agrarian movement of the Hindu people. . . .”

The Comintern leaders in 1928 considered their rural achievements slight, and the VI Congress that year gave vigorous instructions to intensify work among the agricultural laborers and small peasants, specifying besides France and Germany such agrarian countries as Roumania, the other Balkans, and Poland. The Congress also directed the E. C. C. I. to take urgent measures to stimulate the work of the Krestintern and called upon every Section to support it.

Another auxiliary arm of the Comintern is a body called the International Seamen’s Clubs, a revolutionary instrument, the importance of which, whether for propaganda or direct action, Oulanovsky expounds in the *Red International Labor Union Review* of March, 1928. Clubs maintained at the world’s chief ports—London, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Marseilles, Copenhagen, Bordeaux, Leningrad, Odessa, Vladivostock—give radiation to the activities. The Marine Workers’ Industrial Union is the American affiliated body with headquarters in New York and other leading Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific ports.

Russian ships train “politically conscious seamen” to be sent to other ships. Candidates are carefully chosen, “preference being given to negroes, Hindus, and other oppressed nationalities.” The instructors are “such seamen as cannot obtain employment because of their Communist agitation.” A director of this process testifies that “preliminary results were apparent during the seamen’s (British) strike when those who had

<sup>27</sup> *Communist Papers*, pp. 104-105.

passed through our school occupied the prominent positions.”\*\*

The International Society for Aid to Revolutionary Fighters is a creation ostensibly to relieve M. O. P. R. revolutionaries and their families who suffer for their activities in prison or from other disabilities, but serving definite political objectives as well. The American Section is known as the International Labor Defense. The Fourth Comintern Congress enjoined upon the Parties of all countries “to organize material and moral support for political prisoners in bourgeois jails.” The Soviet Government grants it limited free domestic postal facilities. When the British comrades showed reluctance to proceed formally an earnest letter\*\* received from the Secretary of M. O. P. R. in Moscow held organization to be “of extremely great importance to the Party in the event of the Party becoming illegal.” In that case, if correctly directed and a non-Party character maintained, the writer explains “it is likely to remain legal.”

The letter to the Central Committee of the British Communist Party enlarged upon the nature and possibilities of this auxiliary unit. It would function as a wide non-Party organization to internationalize the masses and increase their class consciousness by drawing into its ranks large numbers of men and women workers united to defeat the White Terror. The Red Aid propaganda would definitely prepare them for Party propaganda. Such an individual membership section is further urged for its “definite concrete organizational value for the Party’s penetration into the factories,” and as “a strong weapon in the hands of

\*\* *Communist Papers*, p. 107.

\*\* *Ibid.*, p. 108.

the Party for the breaking down of the political passivity and insularity of the British working-class movement."

An Educational Workers' International and a League against Colonial Oppression add two to the family of that fertile parent of revolutionary movements, the Comintern. The second named specializes on mandated and subject peoples. Another creation, the International Workers' Relief, brought into existence in the period of raising funds for Russian famine relief, has become a permanent agency for receiving and disbursing the means of financial assistance to striking workers wherever revolutionary returns may be expected. Other organizational names and bodies are often employed to fit particular national situations. Among those of sufficient importance to receive mention are the Trade Union Unity League <sup>30</sup> (United States), the National Minority Movement (Great Britain), and the Red Front Fighters' League (Germany), the last a veritable army until forced by the Reich to demobilize. The two first named are sections of the R. I. L. U.

A not too successful adventure has been made in the area of international games. Meets of a Sportintern <sup>31</sup> are arranged chiefly between Communist organizations as a counterbalance to the service of the Second International in this field. According to Semashko, Soviet Commissar of Health, contests between Soviet citizens and foreigners are admissible only "where they correspond to the interests of the revolutionary movement in the country in question."

The Communist Youth paper of Great Britain <sup>32</sup> in

<sup>30</sup> Prior to 1929 called the Trade Union Educational League.

<sup>31</sup> International of the Red Sport Organizations.

<sup>32</sup> *The Young Worker*, June 15, 1929.

its column, "Workers' Sport in Other Lands," reported that determined efforts were being made "to develop the workers' sports movement into a mass organization and winning the 4,000,000 young workers at present organized in the big bourgeois sport leagues."

Both the League of Communist Youth and the Pioneers have been reproduced across the world. *Izvestia*,<sup>33</sup> reporting an International Children's Conference in Moscow, referred to the youngsters as "the grandchildren of the Comintern." The Communist International of Youth enjoys full membership in the Comintern, to whose Executive Committee it is subordinate. Its visible success has not been marked. The membership outside of Soviet Russia numbers about 125,000 in sections distributed throughout Europe and as widely as Australia, South Africa, Persia, Morocco, the United States, Central America, Argentine, Indonesia, and the Far East. Its influence goes far beyond its numerical ranks. A German pastor observes "a great number of youth not yet ready to go the full distance with political Communism are adopting the social practices with respect to morality, family, home, and religion."

A 1927 Comintern press release<sup>34</sup> makes large claims of progress for it in the Orient, all dating from 1919-1920, the more notable, the writer contends, because made despite "the weakness of the workers' movement, the want of revolutionary tradition, and the repression of native and imperialist governments." According to this authority the organization then numbered in its oriental sections more than 60,000 members, with influence extending over "hundreds of thousands of

<sup>33</sup> September 25, 1925.

<sup>34</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, August 21, 1927.

young workers, peasants, and students." Movements like the Boy Scouts and the Young Men's Christian Associations are everywhere opposed by the Communist Youth societies and by the presiding senior Parties, which brand the others as fascist, bourgeois, capitalistic, and militaristic.

The 1928 Comintern Congress<sup>15</sup> instructed the Communist International of Youth to reëxamine the tactics and the methods of its work with a view to including larger sections of working youth, to employing more versatility in recruiting, and to securing a more lively and active response to their economic, educational, and theoretical requirements, "without impairing the militant political features." The Congress demanded intensification of work in the Trade Union youth sections in consideration of the growing place of youth in industry. Where young workers were not eligible for Trade Union membership, youth societies under the leadership of their International were prescribed with the object of "fighting for the economic needs of the proletarian youth."

The tasks committed to the Youth organization in its field included the conduct of industrial struggle; participation in strike leadership and in special cases, independent conduct of strikes; activity in the Trade Unions and fighting for the right of young workers to membership in them; development of the anti-militarist program; penetration into Trade Unions, sport clubs, and "every organization to which young workers belong"; and finally giving "a sharp turn to methods and tactics in the direction of mass work."

The Congress, turning to the Sections of the Comintern and its Executive Committee, summoned them to

<sup>15</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, No. 83, p. 1574.

give more systematic aid to the Communist youth bodies and to exercise more guidance over them. Both the Party and youth organizations were directed to devote greater attention to reaching workers' children through Communist Children's Leagues. Seventy-seven papers and magazines for youth and children serve as Communist organs in thirty-five countries outside of Russia.

Beyond its own articulated agencies for penetration of the masses and certain special areas of society, the Comintern uses the constituted bodies of other organizations to influence opinion. The chief motive of these strategists for their participation in existing parliaments and in such international conferences as those at Genoa, The Hague, and Geneva springs from the wide ready-made sounding boards thus afforded. The II Comintern Congress (1920) directed "revolutionary utilization" of the forms of bourgeois democracy for the purpose of strengthening Communist influence among the masses.

The Communist youth practice the same art. The official paper \*\* of the Russian Comsomol carried a report prepared for the Executive Committee of the Youth International regarding patronage of the Pacifist Youth Congress that was held in August of 1928 in Holland. It stated: "Both the Communist International of Youth and the All-Russian Leninist Comsomol will consent to take part. A number of other organizations have been invited to participate—Catholic, Pacifist, Social Democratic, and Communist. Our organizations will take part in this Congress to make use of it as a platform from which they will be able

\*\* *Comsomolskaia Pravda*, May 13, 1928.



to speak to those strata of the working youth who will listen to the voice of the Congress. Here they will be able to expound their revolutionary point of view on all questions of war and peace. In the midst of the pacifists themselves, they will again declare the most merciless war on all kinds of pacifism in all its numerous forms."

When gratuitous platforms are not available as needed, some are erected under names and auspices not always self-revealing. One of these was conceived by Clara Zetkin to take the form of an international gathering of women to discuss current questions. In giving the project his approval, Lenin's analysis and assessment of the situation to be created ranks high as a revelation of tactics and sardonic humor:<sup>37</sup>

Just imagine those who will meet together with the "hyenas of the revolution" and, if all goes well, under their leadership—honest, tame Social Democratic women from the camp of Scheidemann, Dittmann, and Legien; pious Christians, blessed by the Pope, or swearing by Luther; daughters of privy councillors and freshly baked government councillors; lady-like English pacifists and passionate French feminists. What a picture of the chaos and decay of the bourgeoisie such a Congress would give. What a reflection of its futility and hopelessness. Such a Congress would accentuate the disintegration and so weaken the forces of the counter-revolution. Every weakening of the forces of the enemy is simultaneously a strengthening of our power. . . .

The number and weight of non-Communist elements will be met by us Communists with the scientific superior strength of historical materialism in the understanding and elucidation of social problems, with the coherence of our demands and suggestions, and last, but not least, with the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia and its pioneer work in the liberation of women. Weaknesses and

<sup>37</sup> Zetkin: *Reminiscences of Lenin*, pp. 76-77.

deficiencies in the training and understanding of individual comrades can be made up for by systematic cooperation and preparation. I expect the best from our Russian comrades in this matter.

They will be the iron centre of our phalanx. With them I would confidently dare more than congress battles. Besides, even if we are out-voted, the very fact of our struggle will push Communism into the foreground and will be of extremely good propaganda value in creating contacts for work later on.

The direct control which the Comintern exercises over Party affairs in the respective Sections measures up fully to the unabridged powers granted by the Constitution. The March, 1929, election for general secretary of the Party in the United States resulted in 106 votes for Lovestone, the successful candidate, against one for his opponent, who was backed by the Comintern. Following the result a Comintern cable directed the majority to be made the minority. On demurring, the popular candidate was summoned to Moscow for judgment and expelled for disobedience.

The Comintern leaders boast of this power. One of the official organs, the *Communist International*, published on March 30, 1930, a 7,500 word exposition of the revolutionary and Party situation in the United States by Mingulin. Recounting Lovestone's miscalculations leading to his downfall, Mingulin says of him and another recalcitrant: "They had failed to notice that the Communist International is a Leninist International and those that manage it are Leninist managers." Stalin is quoted as having told Lovestone at the hearing in Moscow when he was disciplined and expelled: "For the time being you are formally still in

the majority, but to-morrow there will be no majority at all, and you will be completely isolated if you try to struggle against the decisions of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International."

"The Communist Party of Great Britain is a Section of the Communist International and is bound by its decisions," so reads the opening declarations of the Statutes and Rules of the British Party as do those of all the Sections. The British Government's seizure of Party leaders and papers in London in October, 1925, secured documents establishing the receipt and use in Britain of money from the Comintern and the Red International of Labor Unions, applicable to organization work among the miners, to the Party newspaper organ, and to other activities. A school for Party workers to be conducted in Moscow with free scholarships allocated to various countries tendered five of them to England, Wales, and Scotland. The funds provided maintenance of a matriculant during the period of study. If there were dependents, one such would be maintained. Examination tests would select from the forty comrades applying the five to receive appointment. The correspondence showed the Executives of the Comintern issuing mandatory instructions to the British Party officials and as freely passing criticisms upon their policies and methods and demanding the correction of them.

Complaints, protests, and proven charges against the Comintern and its organs for persistent interference in their political and other affairs crowd the archives of governments, labor movements, and other organiza-

tions around the world. Many of the indictments find verification in the published documents of the Communists.

When the Turks took expulsive measures to break up the Communist influences and organizations in their country that had synchronized with the Russian aid extended the Turkish Nationalist Movement, the Comintern, in a characteristic proclamation "To the Revolutionary Proletarians and Peasants of the World," February 14, 1923, admonished the Angora Government: "Don't follow up the paths of Poincaré and Mussolini." The pronouncement went on to enjoin the proletarians of all countries, "and first of all those of England, France, Russia, and Switzerland, to warn the representatives of the Angora Government in those countries." On anything that jeopardized the victory of the Turkish laborers and peasants, "merciless and implacable war" would be declared by the international proletariat. Similar broadcasts were made that year to bring international proletarian action to bear on Bulgarian political affairs, and upon serious industrial disorders in Poland that offered some revolutionary possibilities.

The Soviet Trade Unions made public the transfer of several millions of rubles to Great Britain in a single strike situation. Apropos of the 1925 elections, the E. C. C. I. sent specific instructions to the British Party covering over thirty details and concluded: "Further instructions follow. Representatives of the German, French, and Chinese workers will take part in the election campaign. Invitations have been sent from here (Moscow). The Georgia (Caucasus) Trade Unions will send an appeal to the British Trade Unions,

A manifesto from the German, French, and British Parties to the British proletariat follows by the next post." \*\*

The Comintern program for organized May Day demonstrations in 1929 brought serious collisions with the police in Berlin and many casualties, not a few fatal. The Central Committee of the Metal Workers Union of the U. S. S. R. wired over the Soviet telegraph system, which is government-owned, operated, and censored: "Barricades and blood of Berlin laborers will become immortalized in the history of revolution as a demonstration of revolutionary pace-making by the German working class, and of a disgusting act of treason by the trebly-cursed Social Democracy. Flaming salutes to the heroic combatants for Socialism! Cheers for the proletarian world revolution! Cheers for an unmitigated fight for life and death against the bourgeoisie and their watchdogs, the Social Democrats!" The message received a reading and protest in the Executive Committee of the German Reichstag by the Minister of Interior.

Venizelos, asking the Greek Parliament for the 1929 laws suppressing Communist propaganda, gave among his reasons for the request: "The Communist Party which follows the Third International is acting against the State." Henderson, British Foreign Minister, while resisting the Opposition's demand to again break off Soviet Government relations on account of the ceaseless propaganda from Russian sources, recognized "much to be dissatisfied with."

The auxiliaries of the Comintern and of the Russian Party publish treasury receipts and disbursements of large sums. Dogadov, as General Secretary, reported

\*\* *Communist Papers*, pp. 49-50.

to the VIII Congress of Trade Unions that the International Fund of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions amounted to 5,835,000 rubles April 1, 1928,<sup>39</sup> and that 1,296,531 rubles were disbursed from January, 1927, to October 1, 1928. He commented: "We have rendered the most diverse assistance to the workers of various countries during lockouts and strikes."

The Comintern's own annual balance sheet, as officially reported by the E. C. C. I., occasions surprise by its modest proportions considering the extent of the known operations. Only 1,374,994.60 rubles appear on either side for the year 1927.<sup>40</sup> Of the receipts, 1,029,367 rubles came from forty-four of its Sections and 690,206 rubles were appropriated to seventeen Sections as "subsidies for Party press, publishing houses, cultural work—schools, circles, clubs, etc. The statement manifestly does not account for secret funds concerning which evidence abounds that these are of proportions corresponding more nearly to the scope and variety of the admitted activities."<sup>41</sup>

What the world revolutionary field marshals term "the partial stabilization of capitalism" after the war shifted emphasis sharply from Europe to Asia and to colonial possessions for quicker results as related in the preceding chapter. Zinoviev considered "the Eastern

<sup>39</sup> *Trud*, Moscow, December 13, 1928.

<sup>40</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, No. 17, March 15, 1928, p. 340.

<sup>41</sup> The *International Anti-Bolshevik Review*, published by the Entente against the Third International, Corraterie 13, Geneva, Switzerland, in its May, 1926, issue, gave with some particularity "the budget of credits of the Executive (Committee) of the Comintern for the year 1926-1927." The total amount was placed at 7,934,632 rubles. The figures are undocumented, being reported by the Entente as received through a confidential source.

front to be decisive in the long run." Large outlays on agitators, organizers, and subsidies for China followed. Gandhi received overtures of aid which he declined because of his dissent from the violent and anti-religious content of Communism.

The VI Congress (1928) devoted much attention to colonial situations and policies. The section of its findings and program entitled "The Immediate Tasks of the Communists"<sup>42</sup> mapped out procedure among colonials, minorities, and nations with impaired sovereignty that lacks nothing in comprehensiveness. It treats on the problems of Party building where no Marxist element exists, and where the readiest recruits are from the petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and students with their "moods, waverings, and half-hearted ideology." The tasks include recruiting the necessary proletarian core to a real Party; bringing into existence revolutionary Trade Unions; penetrating, winning, and organizing the peasantry; arousing and recruiting the proletarian youth in the colonies "exposed to especially grievous suffering"; and enlisting the women "whose exploitation in the colonial countries takes on especially wide dimensions and barbarous forms."

The plans single out certain countries for particularized treatment—China, India, Korea, North Africa, and lands with the large Negro populations. Among the latter listed are the Central African colonies, the Union of South Africa, the United States, those Latin-American republics with black minorities, and the Negro States of Liberia, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. The program for Latin America as a whole received elaboration, also for Indonesia. The document registers

<sup>42</sup> *International Press Correspondence* (English Edition), Vol. 8, No. 81, November 21, 1928, p. 1660.

the claim that the November, 1926, rebellion in Java "to a considerable degree was carried out under the leadership of the Communists." <sup>43</sup>

Very extensive bureaus of research and publications have been set up to equip the colonial and oriental drive scientifically. A Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat of the R. I. L. U. unifies the attack upon the problems of that most populous littoral, one with economic conditions on a wide scale tending to furnish revolutionary human raw material plentifully. The University of the Toilers of the East, and the University of the Toilers of the West in Moscow regularly receive and train several hundred international students to become revolutionary workers.

While official spokesmen of the present Soviet Government generally disclaim responsibility for the manifestoes and acts of these revolutionary organizations which it domiciles, proof of repeated collaboration is not lacking. Technicalities aside, the acts of the Soviet Government and of the Third International are practically indistinguishable. Morally they are inseparable. The same few men in the Political Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party direct both, and all of the auxiliaries of the Comintern as well. Snowden, Britain's Labor Chancellor of the Exchequer, has described the Government, the Comintern, and the R. I. L. U. as "a trinity—three in one and one in three." The French Government declined to differentiate between Rakovsky, Soviet Ambassador to France, and Comrade Rakovsky of his Party's Central Executive Committee when he signed a declaration of faith to establish his

<sup>43</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, No. 88 (English Edition), December 12, 1928, pp. 1670-1676.



Party fealty. In this he subscribed to slogans that, in the event of war with the Soviet Union, called upon "every honest proletarian to work for the defeat of his capitalistic government"; and upon all foreign soldiers to join the Red Army "who do not want to help the slave owners of their country." "His recall was requested and secured. Several such recalls of Soviet officials have been demanded and acceded to on the ground of their proven activity as agents of the Comintern.

In January, 1930, following the deportation of Russian Communist agitators as "pernicious foreigners" and consequent Communist demonstrations against its Embassies in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Washington, Mexico broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads in part: "The Mexican Government knows perfectly well that this propaganda against our institutions and our national revolution has been prepared in and directed from Russia." "5

Cumulative evidence from many quarters compromises the Soviet Government directly in the Chinese revolutionary movement. Speaking in the Chinese Commission of the Enlarged E. C. C. I. November 30, 1926, Stalin set forth three important factors existing in the Chinese situation, one being "that the Soviet Union exists and is developing, the revolutionary experience and help of which cannot but facilitate the fight of the Chinese proletariat against Imperialism and against the feudal-medieval remains in China." "6

Two weeks earlier the Commissar of Foreign Affairs at Moscow had sent the Soviet representative at

"4 *Pravda*, August 10, 1927.

"5 *The New York Times*, January 23, 1930.

"6 *International Press Correspondence*, December 23, 1926, Vol. 6, No. 90 (English Edition), p. 1581.

Peking this message concerning the chief and very able Russian agent in China:<sup>47</sup> "I herewith communicate department's decision for your execution:

(1) Until a Soviet representative is appointed to Peking, Comrade Borodin<sup>48</sup> is to take his orders direct from Moscow.

(2) The Far Eastern Bureau (of the Comintern) to be informed that all its decisions and measures regarding questions of the general policy of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) in China and of military political work must be agreed on with comrade Borodin. In the event of difference of opinion arising on these questions they must be referred to Moscow for investigation. Borodin and the Far Eastern Bureau must keep Moscow's representatives in Peking informed of all their decisions and moves with regard to these questions.

(3) Comrade Borodin's appointment as official Soviet representative in Canton is considered inadvisable. Borodin is to remain (? in charge)<sup>49</sup> of the work in the provinces under Canton rule and an official representative to the Canton Government is to be appointed.

Bessedovsky, former Charge d'Affaires and First Counsellor to the Soviet Embassy in France, who fled from that post and renounced his Soviet allegiance, has published several revelations of his government's foreign interventions that came under his observation while in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, one being to the effect that all Soviet diplomats in China except the Ambassador were placed under the authority of Borodin, agent of the Comintern. He states also that the Political Bureau of the Party in July, 1926, directed the Commissar of Finance to deliver \$25,000,000 to the

<sup>47</sup> *Russia No. 2*, presented to Parliament and published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1927.

<sup>48</sup> Chief Russian agitator and revolutionary organizer.

<sup>49</sup> An omission or confusion in the text as received.

on the necessity of a workers-peasants alliance to achieve the goal. Extensive contacts with factories, Trade Unions, the Soviet apparatus, and the Party supplemented a curriculum. Copious translations of Communist literature into Chinese paralleled the teaching and coaching process. Until the Government of China imposed restrictions on the movement of Communists across the Russian frontier, the delivery to Chinese society of graduated revolutionaries reached an annual rate of 300.

During the first years of its existence the Soviet Government undertook no concealment of a world revolutionary mission and program. It avowed both. In 1917 the Council of People's Commissars voted "the assigning of two million rubles for the needs of the revolutionary internationalist movement, at the disposition of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs."<sup>52</sup> *The Proceedings of the II Congress of the Comintern* (1920) report Radek as saying: "The Soviet Government is fulfilling its duty as a detachment of the International." In an official report to his Executive Committee Zinoviev, President of the Comintern, wrote of its relations with the Government: "From our communistic standpoint it is clear that the Communist International is very important for Soviet Russia and vice versa. It would be laughable to question . . . who is subject and who is object. It is the foundation and roof of one building. One belongs to the other."<sup>53</sup> Stalin in April, 1923, speaking on "The Tendencies of Revolutionary Policy of the Moscow Government," called the Soviet Union "a detachment

<sup>52</sup> *Gazette of the Temporary Workers' and Peasants' Government*, No. 31, December 13, 1917.

<sup>53</sup> November 11, 1922.

of the vanguard of the world revolution." When Trotsky, a leading member of the Government, was writing authoritatively he maintained "that the Soviet power considers diplomatic relations necessary not only with governments, but also with revolutionary Socialist Parties, seeking the overthrow of existing governments."<sup>54</sup> After the break that cost him exile he accused Stalin of dominating the Parties in the U. S. S. R., Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the United States by arbitrary methods that included use of "the apparatus" and "the financial resources of the State."<sup>55</sup> In 1927 Bukharin referred to the Soviet Union as "the organizing center of the international revolution" and "playing the part of the chief founder."<sup>56</sup>

Any vapid theory that world revolution has been abandoned fails to account for certain later reticences of speech. On gala occasions the truth finds utterance. Language used in 1929 offers difficulties of interpretation from the premise that international revolutionary purpose has been surrendered by Stalin and the other great ones in the Soviet State. The English Edition of the *International Press Correspondence*, March 1, 1929, furnished an article by Yablonsky entitled "The Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of the Comintern." It contains such affirmations as this, a dictum of Lenin, the starting point for all good Communist dialecticians:

"The International Federation of the Parties, which commands the most revolutionary movement in the

<sup>54</sup> *Works of L. Trotsky*, Vol. III, Part 2, State Publishing Office, Moscow, 1925.

<sup>55</sup> *The Nation*, New York, May 29, 1929.

<sup>56</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, February 17, 1927, Vol. 7, No. 14 (English Edition), pp. 281 and 283.



## GLOSSARY



## GLOSSARY

*Bolshevik Party*—See Communist Party.

*Bolshevik Revolution*—See Communist Revolution.

*Bourgeoisie*—Technically the dominant element engaged in capitalistic production and distribution. As used by Communists, it embraces all the groups of the capitalistic order which oppose them and against whom their major class attack is directed.

*Central Committee*—Theoretically the highest executive body of the All-Union Communist Party, although directed in reality by the Political Bureau. Each Communist Party of a national Republic has its own Central Committee subordinated to this Central Committee of the All-Union Party.

*Central Control Commission*—A body elected by the Congress of the All-Union Communist Party entrusted with maintaining Party regularity. It is practically merged with the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection which has the corresponding task with respect to the working of the Government institutions.

*Central Executive Committee*—The highest legislative and executive organ of the Government of the Soviet Union and as such commonly designated within the Union as ZIK S.S.S.R. Each member Republic has its own Central Executive Committee. That of the R.S.F.S.R. is known as VZIK.

*"Cheka"*—Abbreviation of Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation—the Soviet secret police and terrorist organ set up after the assassination of Uritzsky and the attempt against the life of Lenin in the autumn of 1918.

*Comintern*—Abbreviation of Communist International.

*Communist International*—The international revolutionary party created by Lenin in 1917, known also as the Third International in contradistinction to the Second International (Socialist).



- "Communist International"*—A periodical publication of the Communist International, official in character.
- Communist Party*—When no geographically descriptive title is employed, the term signifies here that body of organized Communists known until 1918 as the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (of Bolsheviks). In March of that year the VII Party Congress changed its name to Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). The XIV Party Congress in 1925 changed the form to the present All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).
- Communist Revolution*—The movement which culminated November 7, 1917 (October 25, Old Calendar) in the overthrow of the Provisional Government and Kerensky Cabinet, and the institution of the Soviet Government directed by the Bolshevik (Communist) Party.
- Comsomol*—Abbreviation of All-Union Leninist League of Communist Youth.
- Comsomoltzy*—Members of the League of Communist Youth.
- Dessiatine*—A Russian unit of land measure equal to 2.7 acres.
- E.C.C.I.*—Executive Committee of the Communist International.
- Employee*—Used in the Communist sense, it signifies a person doing clerical or other office work as distinguished from labor employed manually in industry or agriculture.
- Five Year Plan*—The comprehensive unified scheme of the entire National Economy framed and adopted for the years 1928-1933 with fixed goals greatly in advance of the preceding period.
- Hectare*—A metric unit of surface measure equal to 2.471 acres.
- Inprecor*—Abbreviation of International Press Correspondence.
- Intelligentsia*—The social classification formerly applied in Russia to the professional groups, scientists, writers, artists, and other intellectuals.
- International Press Correspondence*—The organ of press releases for the Third International and the Communist

- world, published in English, French and German, located in Berlin.
- Institution*—Used in the Communist sense, it signifies the administrative organization and its personnel (employees) in an industrial, governmental, educational, or other unit as contrasted with a factory organization and its personnel (workers).
- Kilogram*—A metric unit of weight equal to 2.2046 pounds avoirdupois.
- Kilometer*—A metric unit of linear measure equal to 3280.8 feet—nearly  $\frac{5}{8}$  of a mile.
- Kulak*—A member of the class of “wealthy” peasants as compared with the “poor” and “middle” peasants.
- League of Communist Youth*—The name used alternately with its abbreviation—Comsomol—for the All-Union Leninist League of Communist Youth.
- March Revolution*—The movement in the Russian Revolution signalized by the revolt of the Petrograd garrison on March 1, 1917 (February 16, Old Calendar), the abdication of Nicholas II a few days later, and the setting up of the Provisional Government which was overthrown by the Bolsheviks about seven months later.
- Metric Ton*—A unit of weight equal to 2204.6 pounds avoirdupois.
- M.O.P.R.*—The International Society for Aid to Revolutionary Fighters, an auxiliary organization of the Third International.
- NEP*—Abbreviation of New Economic Policy.
- Nepman*—A private trader so named in the period of the New Economic Policy or NEP who took advantage of the wider scope for individuals to engage in trade and commerce.
- New Economic Policy*—The economic system introduced in 1921 which marked the temporary recession of militant Communism in favor of limited private trade and industry, and economic freedom for the peasants.
- October Revolution*—See Communist Revolution.
- O.G.P.U.*—Initials of the Unified State Political Administration, the organization which succeeded to the work of the Cheka.
- Party*—See Communist Party.

*Pioneers*—The Communist controlled children's organization in the Soviet Union.

*Political Bureau* (sometimes abbreviated to "politbureau")—The highest executive organ of the Party.

*Pood*—A Russian unit of weight equal to 36.113 pounds avoirdupois.

*Presidium*—The usual name for a continually functioning small administrative group in certain Party and Government organizations corresponding to a Cabinet, consisting usually of the dominating executive and other personalities. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union enjoys legislative powers in interims between sessions of the Committee. Such action, while immediately effective, to continue so, requires ratification by the next meeting of the plenary Committee.

*Profintern*—See Red International of Labor Unions.

*Proletariat*—The industrial and agricultural wage-earning class.

*Provisional Government*—The first revolutionary Government established under the authority of the Duma. It held power from the March, 1917, Revolution until overthrown by the Bolshevik or Communist Revolution November 7, 1917 (October 25, Old Calendar).

*Red International of Labor Unions*—The international body of Communist and other revolutionary Trade Unions, an auxiliary of the Third International.

*R. I. L. U.*—Red International of Labor Unions.

*R. S. F. S. R.*—Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

*Ruble*—Soviet monetary unit at par equal to \$0.5145.

*Russian Revolution*—The general term to connote the revolutionary movement which was directed against the Autocracy through a long period and accomplished the overthrow and abdication in 1917. It had an abortive phase in 1905, and passed into the present Communist or Soviet phase after the brief rule of the democratic and Socialist parties from March to October, 1917.

*Sectarians*—Christians in Russia related to bodies of believers that have dissociated themselves from the Russian Orthodox Church. In this volume the term refers to the active evangelical groups.

- Soviet*—A Russian word meaning "council." When used in this volume it connotes an organ of government unless otherwise specified.
- Soviet Government*—The Government set up by the Bolshevik (Communist) Party following the overthrow of the Provisional Government November 7, 1917 (October 25, Old Calendar), and which continues in power until the present time.
- Soviet Union*—See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- Third International*—See Communist International.
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*—The Federation of numerous states, provinces, and peoples of the former Russian Empire that having come under the control of Communist Soviets are governed under that name by the All-Union Communist Party. The territories included are named in the chapter, The Red Empire.
- U. S. S. R.*—See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- Whites*—The term contraposed to Reds and, by the Communists, applied to counter-revolutionaries in Russia and in other countries.
- Worker*—Used in the Communist sense, it signifies a wage earner manually engaged in industry or agriculture in contrast to an office employee or "brain" worker.
- Zemstvos*—The name given to the local units of administration existing before the Communist Revolution that exercised a measure of self-rule in health, educational, and certain other affairs.



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